More than six years after the government appointed General Bipin Rawat as India’s first chief of defence staff (CDS) and secretary of the newly created Department of Military Affairs (DMA) in late 2019, the country’s long-awaited military reforms remain very much a work in progress.Foremost among these unfinished tasks is the restructuring of the armed forces’ 17 single-service commands and two tri-service commands into three, or possibly four, integrated theatre commands or ITCs for optimal utilisation of resources.In an erudite article titled ‘Military reforms are not a one-man act’, published in Hindustan Times on June 23, 2026, retired Lieutenant General Deependra Singh Hooda attributed the slow pace of these reforms, including ITCs, to three structural shortcomings: the absence of sustained political ownership, inadequate financial commitment and the near absence of institutionalised military advice to the government.General Hooda’s diagnosis is indisputable, but the remedies he proposes to overcome these obstacles merit closer examination and debate.There can be little disagreement that political ownership is a sine qua non for military reform. General Hooda is correct in arguing that the three services will naturally hold differing professional views on theatre commands and that, while the CDS can place various options before the government, the ultimate decision rests with the political leadership. He is equally right in observing that no CDS, however determined, can simultaneously be both the architect of reform and the authority empowered to approve it.Outgoing Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan takes the salute during the Guard of Honour, at South Block Lawn, in New Delhi, Saturday, May 30, 2026. Photo: PTI.But no one expects the CDS to sanction theatre commands. Media reports indicate that the outgoing CDS, General Anil Chauhan, submitted three proposals on ITCs to the defence ministry shortly before demitting office, for eventual consideration by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), which alone can grant the necessary political approval.Also read: Why India Keeps Returning to Weapons It Spent Years RejectingThis distinction is important because the CDS was never intended to be the final authority on such reforms. His role was to conceptualise, coordinate and drive theatreisation, but the decision to implement so fundamental a restructuring of the armed forces has always rested with the political leadership.The government had already signalled its political intent when it acted on a recommendation that had languished for almost two decades by creating the post of CDS and assigning it, among its principal responsibilities, the task of driving military theatre integration. Having steadfastly backed this reform this far, the Bharatiya Janata Party-led (BJP-led) government can scarcely be accused of lacking the political will to pursue what is arguably the most consequential reorganisation of India’s higher defence structure since Independence.Yet, political resolve alone could not overcome the deep differences within the armed forces over the shape and functioning of the proposed ITCs and could not simply be brushed aside by government fiat. Speaking at the Kalam & Kavach 3.0 defence dialogue in New Delhi on May 14, 2026, General Chauhan revealed that he had personally delivered nearly 90 to 100 lectures at military institutions to build support among mid-level officers for the concept of joint war fighting. He acknowledged that the greatest obstacle to theatreisation was not political hesitation but changing deeply entrenched service mindsets – a task, he implied, that no political leadership could accomplish on its own without the military’s active co-operation.In arguing that defence transformation in mature democracies has rarely been achieved through inter-service negotiations alone, General Hooda cites the example of the United States, where the landmark 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act fundamentally reorganised the US military by strengthening the authority of the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, clarifying the operational chain of command and compelling the services to function jointly. The reforms were driven through Congress by determined political leadership despite considerable institutional resistance.This comparison is instructive but needs qualifying.Although there are similarities between the circumstances preceding the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and those prevailing in India today – whose ongoing ‘jointness’ reforms have drawn, at least in part, upon the American model of military integration – the US legislation did not emerge in isolation. It was preceded by years of rigorous study, public debate and a succession of influential reports, most notably ‘Towards a More Effective Defense: The Final Report of the CSIS Defense Organisation Project’ submitted by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 1985.This analysis was backed by several influential US soldiers, including General Andrew Goodpaster (former Supreme Allied Commander Europe), Melvin Laird (former Secretary of Defense), General David Jones (former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), General Edward Meyer (former Army Chief of Staff), and key senate and Congress members.Unsurprisingly, this legislation did not have an easy passage. Numerous proposals were debated and separate Bills were introduced in both houses of the US Congress. Eventually, the Senate passed the Goldwater Department of Defense Reorganisation Act in May 1986, while the House approved the Nichols Bill three months later, in August. The differences were subsequently reconciled by the Congressional Conference Committee, which produced a compromise-and comprehensive – measure renamed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganisation Act of 1986, which President Ronald Reagan signed into law in October of that year.General Hooda is right in arguing that defence reforms are not a one-man endeavour, but neither are they driven by political ownership or stewardship alone, even allowing for the differences between the Indian and American constitutional systems. As the US experience demonstrates, the initial intellectual impetus for such reforms must emerge from a broad coalition of institutions, military professionals, civilian experts and policymakers. In the US, this intellectual heavy lifting was shared among think tanks, senior military officers, civilian defence specialists and, ultimately, the political leadership but India’s experience over the past six years in this regard, has been markedly different.For nearly two decades, assorted, state-sponsored or supported think tanks and the wider strategic community in India lamented the absence of a CDS and the lack of service jointness, but produced little, or nothing, by way of a detailed blueprint for ITCs or a comprehensive framework for achieving greater integration among the armed forces.It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the eventual responsibility for developing workable alternatives ultimately fell solely upon the CDS and the individual services themselves.Moreover, unlike the US, India also has relatively few politicians and civilian specialists with a sufficiently deep understanding of the armed forces’ organisational structures, the conduct of joint military operations, emerging technologies likely to shape future warfare and the geopolitical environment, to contribute meaningfully to the debate on theatre commands. To some extent, this limited engagement also reflects the armed forces’ longstanding reluctance to welcome civilian participation in military affairs, at times bordering on disdain.Two MiG-29, two Rafale, two Sukhoi Su-30MKI and one Jaguar aircraft of the Indian Air Force perform a flypast in ‘Operation Sindoor’ formation. Photo: PTI.Furthermore, there is another difficulty with the political ownership argument domestically. While bipartisan consensus on major national security issues is not uncommon in Washington, any indication in India that the government’s decision on theatre commands lacks the support of all three service chiefs could carry significant political costs. Unfortunate though this may be, it makes it difficult to replicate the Goldwater-Nichols approach in the Indian context.Turning to force capability development – another core responsibility assigned to the CDS – General Hooda points out that although the ten-year Integrated Capability Development Plan is approved by the Defence Acquisition Council, it carries no assured financial commitment from the Ministry of Finance (MoF). Instead, procurement priorities remain subject to the fiscal constraints of each annual budget, rather than to the armed forces’ long-term capability requirements.He argues that while the CDS can establish priorities, he cannot compensate for the absence of sustained government funding. Nor, he contends, will industry invest in manufacturing capacity or advanced technologies if procurement programmes remain hostage to annual budgetary uncertainties. Without a long-term financial commitment from the government, a ten-year capability plan risks remaining more aspirational than strategic.It’s true that defence plans are not backed by guaranteed financial commitments from the MoF. However, whenever the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has sought guidance in the past, MoF generally indicated the likely annual increase, or overall level of funding, that could be assumed while preparing five-year defence plans. For instance, this was certainly done for the 11th Five-Year defence Plan (2007-12), but the plan could not be finalised as the proposed outlay exceeded the amount MoF was prepared to consider.The central problem, therefore, is not so much the absence of assured financial backing as the broader financial unviability of defence planning itself. Besides, existing plans cover only the armed forces and exclude other MoD-administered organisations like the Indian Coast Guard and the Border Roads Organisation. The problem is further compounded by the absence of a permanent, dedicated defence planning organisation to formulate integrated plans, oversee their implementation, carry out mid-course corrections and assess outcomes.And, while the government established a high-level Defence Planning Committee under the chairmanship of the National Security Advisor in 2018, it was no substitute for the institutional planning structure that the MoD requires. Little, however, is publicly known about this committee’s achievements or activities over the past eight years.Passing Out Parade of the 158th Regular Course and the 141st Technical Graduate Course at the Indian Military Academy (IMA), in Dehradun, Uttarakhand. Photo: Rashtrapati Bhavan via PTI.The third issue raised by General Hooda concerns the institutionalisation of military advice.He argues that though the CDS and the three service chiefs do advise the government, such counsel is generally sought during crises. To address this shortcoming, the former three-star officer advocates institutionalising military advice at the highest level so that integrated professional assessments shape peacetime planning as much as crisis response.That, however, was precisely the purpose behind creating the DMA and appointing the CDS – to institutionalise integrated, ‘single-point’ military advice to the government. Arguably, the CDS’s mandate was never confined merely to periods of crisis, and there is nothing in the rules to prevent him from taking the initiative to offer professional military advice in peacetime whenever circumstances so warrant.That said, if the CDS is indeed unable to provide integrated military advice in peacetime because of structural limitations in the DMA’s mandate or the existing higher defence management framework, then there should be a candid discussion on what further institutional mechanisms are required to vindicate this aspect. One possibility could be the establishment of a Defence Minister’s Advisory Council to formally bring together the civilian and military leadership to discuss security and military matters.Such a measure would not be without precedent. A Defence Minister’s Committee (DMC) was established in 1947 as part of India’s original three-tier higher defence management structure to oversee day-to-day administration and inter-services coordination of the armed forces. A similar body could be revived with a broader membership and a more clearly defined mandate suited to contemporary requirements.Meanwhile, General Hooda’s article does not cover two of the most contentious questions surrounding the ITCs: who will ultimately exercise operational command over them, and what role the three incumbent service chiefs will then perform. Both issues have remained unresolved despite years of debate, with the country’s two previous CDS struggling to forge a consensus, but seemingly futilely.The first difficulty arises because, despite being India’s senior-most military officer, the CDS was deliberately created as the government’s principal military adviser rather than as an operational commander. The second concerns the future relevance of the Army, Navy and Air Force chiefs. Once operational control of combat forces passes to theatre commanders, their responsibilities could be reduced largely to raising, recruiting, training, equipping and sustaining their respective services, leaving them with little direct role in the conduct of military operations.To avoid unsettling existing command structures, theatre commanders are presently expected to remain three-star officers, thereby preserving a clear hierarchy beneath the four-star service chiefs. This is widely viewed as a pragmatic interim compromise that allows theatreisation to proceed without immediately provoking fresh inter-service disputes over rank and authority.Few, however, expect this arrangement to endure. As theatre commands gradually assume responsibility for joint warfighting, pressure is likely to grow for elevating their commanders to four-star rank, placing them on par with the service chiefs. That, in turn, would inevitably reopen the unresolved question of the CDS’s own position in the military hierarchy and strengthen the case for elevating the office beyond its present “first among equals” status to a clearly superior five-star appointment capable of exercising authority over an integrated theatre command structure.To conclude, General Hooda’s central argument – that military reform requires sustained political ownership, assured financial backing and institutionalised military advice – is unexceptionable, but the larger challenge remains to ensure that all these aspects are pragmatically supported by the intellectual groundwork and institutional capacity needed to translate intent into an enduring military reform. Amit Cowshish is a former financial advisor (acquisitions), Ministry of Defence.