Media reports the army has recently demolished two houses purportedly belonging to alleged perpetrators of the terror attack resulting in the death of a policeman on Amarnath yatra-securing duty in Kashmir. This is not the first time the army has deployed its resources to such effect in aid to civil authorities.The last time was in the wake of the dastardly terror attack at the Baisaran meadow, when ten Kashmiri houses allegedly linked with terrorists were demolished. Three months later it turned out that the three Pakistani terrorists killed in Operation Mahadev were the perpetrators of that terror attack.At the operational level, if the intent is retributive, clearly, the demolitions in wake of Baisaran were patently excessive, if not wholly arbitrary. Given that demolitions continue, the deterrent effect appears to be somewhat meager. At best useful for venting, such actions appear to have a political rationale.Answering terror attacks with demolitions threatens to acquire policy imprimatur. Such insertion into the Indian counter insurgency play-book needs to be examined and, if called for, shot down timely.Doing so is important, since there is now a negative two-way street between Kashmir and rest of India. Not only is there Kashmirisation of India, such as the recent letting-off of a pellet gun and a Kalashnikov on street protestors, but practices in the mainland – as demolitions – have been imported into Kashmir.Controlled explosionsAt the tactical level, the army is perhaps lending its combat engineer assets in an area – demolitions – where policing expertise is noticeably deficient. The amateur manner the confiscated explosive material in the Delhi blast case was handled after it was shifted to Kashmir shows the police requires a helping hand with explosives. However, the police’s expertise on demolishing without use of explosives is considerable. The use of explosives appears to be an egregious turn to the knife.At the operational level, the army may believe that such collaboration shows cooperation between security forces. The underside of blind collaboration is that potentially all get tarred with the same brush. An uncalled-for bonhomie also leads up to mutual back-scratching, a force degrader.At the strategic level, if the army is itself persuaded on the desirability of the tactic – that controlled explosions demolishing civilian property deters – then it needs to be disabused speedily. The demolition of houses is most closely and long associated with the Israelis. Having truck with Israelis can only be at the cost of strategic autonomy and avoidable mimesis.From the genocide in Gaza and the ongoing ethnic cleansing in West Bank, it is clear Zionists do not see Palestinians as fellow humans. Further, Israel is an occupying power in Occupied Palestinian Territory with its obligations in international law disregarded with impunity. Taking Israel as model for anything by a democratic polity as India is fraught.Consequently, the incidence of an Israeli tactic – demolitions – in India must raise eyebrows, if not hackles. Given that counter insurgency in India is instead incident on Indian territory inhabited by Indian communities, an uncritical borrowing of military practices must remain unthinkable.To the extent demolitions have an Indian inspiration – taking cue for the bulldozer action in the Indian hinterland in right-wing governed provinces – the army must surely know that the Supreme Court has ruled against such arbitrary ‘justice.’ If and since bull-dozers have come to signify a political position, the army cannot lend its sappers in Kashmir for tasks plausibly linked to a political plank.The legal case againstConsequently, it must put the calls made on it for such support through a legal grinder. A re-reading of the relevant paragraph of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) is in order:(b) if he (an army officer) is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, destroy any arms dump, prepared or fortified position or shelter from which armed attacks are made or are likely to be made or are attempted to be made, or any structure used as a training camp for armed volunteers or utilised as a hide-out by armed gangs or absconders wanted for any offence; …(d) enter and search, without warrant, any premises to make any such arrest as aforesaid or to recover any person believed to be wrongfully restrained or confined or any property reasonably suspected to be stolen property or any arms, ammunition or explosive substances believed to be unlawfully kept in such premises, and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary, and seize any such property, arms, ammunition or explosive substances…Thus far it was not uncommon for encounter sites in disturbed areas to be reduced to rubble. If houses cave-in or burn down during firefights, such as by the employment of rocket launchers, it is understandable. Preserving human life supersedes considerations of material damage, but with the principles of humanitarian law – proportionality and discrimination – kept in mind.Whereas the AFSPA provides a permissive cover for post-operations action – destroying a ‘shelter’ or ‘hide-out’ – the army must recall that the AFSPA was conjured up in the face of the troubles in Nagaland’s jungles. Even that deployment set-off with the army chief’s Special Order calling for respect for human rights. It has since been transplanted almost verbatim to Kashmir (and elsewhere momentarily to Punjab). By no means can the interpretation of what is permissible make post-facto destruction of housing – even if encounter sites – legal or reasonable. With the termination of an encounter, encounter sites cease to be military objectives, lapsing the rationale of military necessity.Premeditated destruction unrelated to military necessity amounts to war crimes (para 8b): civilians and civilian objects enjoy protections unless found to be in direct participation in conflict. Belligerent reprisals are prohibited.Nevertheless, customary international law on collective punishments and human rights laws (right to due process) apply. To be sure, India is not a signatory to the additional protocol on internal armed conflict and no internal security situation in India has thus far been recognised as crossing the threshold into conflict. Even so, the domestic law corpus is enough to put the demolitions policy through the legal grinder.The argument behind demolitions is that the property targeted are ‘proceeds of crimes’ or built without authorisation. In Kashmir, it a means to address the political economy of terror, divesting vested interests and over ground workers of resources and habitat to fund terror. Clearly, the AFSPA does not empower the army to demolish any property with such a consideration. Supporting the civil administration acting through the police can of course be done but without a blank cheque.Recall the Supreme Court directions were six months prior to the Pahalgam incident. The alacrity with which both instances of demolitions mentioned have occurred – within five days of the Pahalgam terror attack and within a day of the recent terror incident in Anantnag – shows up the state as a flailing actor. Alongside, the last time 2,500 were detained while this time’s figure is close. The demolitions are increasingly a pavlovian response, intended as signal to a partisan constituency on the muscularity of the state.Wary of this, the army’s operational leadership that is beholden to its members must ensure no illegal orders are handed down. It would be too much to expect sappers in an operational environment receiving orders in good faith to push-back. However, both sets of demolitions resulted in neighbouring property sustaining damage. They require to advise on collateral damage to preserve against reputational risk.The leadership must step upWhen demolitions with equal rigour can otherwise be done by Kashmir police, the need for explosives is only for their loud bang. The blast is the intended message as much for terrorists, but also for supporters. At the operational level in Kashmir, an unintended consequence – instilling fear in people – must inform decisions. The conclusion can only be that demolitions as a practice have no place in the sub-conventional operations regimen of a constitutional democracy.Human rights must be the lynchpin of a counter insurgency doctrine, not only for idealism sake, but equally so from a ends-ways-means perspective. Such yardstick entails stacking the middle-term deterrent effect against the long-term alienation that sustains insurgency. Anything that detracts from conflict resolution, even if useful for conflict management, must be avoided.At the strategic level, at which India’s Kashmir policy gets framed, the military’s input is indispensable. Any policy direction, peg or pigeonhole that defers the end-game in Kashmir must be discouraged. Patently political decisions, such as the one on evacuation of Article 370 of all meaning, obviously require the military to fall in line. At best it could advise on the desirability of statehood for conflict resolution. The matter of demolitions, not being one at that higher level, allows the military a greater say in light of its joint doctrine on sub-conventional operations (speaking of which, the link is unresponsive).Default demolition of civilian property is getting to be a policy plank and must receive the army’s considered professional input. The policy has suppression writ large as part of low-brow politics, and is therefore political. The army must convey to the powers-that-be that it cannot be associated with such a tactic of questionable provenance. Its advisory role must be exercised forthrightly and where necessary forcefully. Rolling back demolitions as a tactic may require the latter.Ali Ahmed is a strategic analyst. This article first appeared on his Substack, ‘ali’s version’.