Militancy drew national attention to Kashmir twice in 2025 – first in April, when militants killed 22 tourists in Pahalgam, and again in November, when an attack near the Red Fort, which killed 13 people including the attacker, was linked to Kashmiri doctors. While both incidents attracted considerable attention, it was the second militant attack that became the centre of a wider national debate on the Kashmiri response to militancy.Discussions focused on what was seen as a qualitative shift in the nature of militancy in Kashmir. Militancy, or rather ‘white-collar militancy’, as it came to be termed due to the involvement of doctors, appeared to have penetrated deeper into society, drawing in new sections, particularly the educated, professionally qualified and economically better-off sections of society.This development, quite disturbing, raised serious issues about the nature of radicalisation of Kashmiris and their response towards militancy. How deep did this radicalisation go? Even though there were no clear answers, the issue generated considerable discussion at the national level. In sharp contrast, the unprecedented response of Kashmiris to the gruesome militant attack in Pahalgam just a few months earlier received little national engagement. That moment – when Kashmiris spoke their mind clearly and, to a large extent, in one voice – did not evoke the kind of attention it warranted. As the situation unfolded after the attack and the nation moved into a military confrontation with Pakistan, this significant development within Kashmir was further overshadowed.Yet, what stood out unmistakably at that moment, was a clear and collective condemnation and rejection of militancy by Kashmiris. It was an unprecedented moment of collective moral articulation in Kashmir. This was not merely passive distancing; it was an active, public and ethical denunciation of militancy itself. The response represented a decisive shift from quiet disassociation to an explicit condemnation of violence as socially illegitimate and politically destructive.The Kashmiri responseThe Pahalgam attack was one of the most repugnant acts of terror, where 26 men, mostly tourists, were singled out and killed in front of women and children after their religion was ascertained. While there was outrage in the rest of India, the reaction within Kashmir was strong, clear and unequivocal. Kashmiris expressed their anger and resentment in unambiguous terms. A day after the attack, a total shutdown was observed across the Valley, reflecting a collective response of students, traders, political parties and civil society. The Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly also later unanimously condemned the attack, terming it heinous, barbaric and inhuman.This response was unprecedented in its spread and intensity. It is not that Kashmiris had never reacted against militancy earlier, but such responses were usually localised or limited to particular sections shaped by specific political contexts. This time, however, the response was neither confined nor fragmented; it extended across the Valley, cutting across political and ideological divides. Condemnation came from all sections of society – leaders across the political spectrum, social activists, business groups, youth and students.What made this moment particularly significant was that Kashmiris did not merely distance themselves from the attack, but disowned it altogether. The message was clear – not in the name of Kashmiris. At the same time, they asserted that this was not just an attack on tourists, but on Kashmiris themselves. This understanding was rooted in the long-standing, though unstated, norm that tourists would not be targeted, given the deep link between tourism and the local economy. The attack was therefore seen as directed at Kashmir, its economy and its people.While the economic implications were certainly present, the response went beyond immediate material concerns. What was being opposed was not only the impact on livelihoods, but also the brutality of the act and the communal logic underlying it. For many, it was experienced as an assault on Kashmiri identity, a sentiment captured in the collective assertion: ‘Not in our name’. More importantly, this was not merely a political reaction; it was a spontaneous societal expression reflecting the core of Kashmiri society.A brief history of Kashmiri response towards militancyTo grasp the significance of this moment, it is essential to trace the evolving nature of Kashmiri responses to militancy since its emergence in the late 1980s. While there has been a considerable shift over time, certain pivotal junctures stand out as defining moments of change.Initially, when militancy erupted in the late 1980s, it was closely linked with separatism. With an overwhelming sway of separatist sentiment, militancy enjoyed societal legitimacy. Due to their local roots, the first generation of militants were quite integrated with the society and received moral and emotional support from Kashmiris. Militancy, on the whole, was celebrated and romanticised and militants were treated as heroes. However, the societal response started changing with change in the nature of militancy. By early 1990s, as the local context of militancy had given way to control by Pakistan, and with the proliferation of militant groups with many having foreign linkages, militancy began to lose its sheen among the local population. By the mid-1990s, Kashmiri society itself was bearing the brunt of militancy, not only in terms of lives lost, but also in terms of cultural intrusion. Militant organisations enforced various codes relating to dress, education and social behaviour through coercion, leading to a gradual erosion of their earlier appeal. Alongside the loss of lives was also the silencing of Kashmiri voices, as space for dissent shrank considerably. So, while separatism continued to shape political responses, militancy was no longer celebrated, giving way over time to fatigue and disillusionment.Much before its global delegitimisation, after the September 11 attacks in the United States, militancy had already begun to lose legitimacy in Kashmir. Voices against it emerged even within separatist politics. Abdul Gani Lone, for instance, was to lose his life mainly for asserting the declining relevance of militancy in Kashmir and questioning the role of foreign Jehadi elements. Following the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, he had argued that the phase of armed militancy was over and called for a shift towards peaceful methods. Though he was assassinated, his position prompted wider reflection on the direction of Kashmir’s politics and contributed to a shift in the post-2000 period. It was the result of this shift that while the militancy declined, political space gradually reopened and democratic politics began to take root in Kashmir, particularly after the 2002 elections. This phase was marked by increasing electoral participation, competitiveness and credibility of democratic politics, even as it operated in the shadow of separatism. Electoral politics, which had lost legitimacy after the 1987 Assembly elections, regained relevance, as reflected in sustained public participation despite periodic separatist upsurges in 2008, 2010 and 2016.Militancy during this period witnessed a steady decline, with local recruitment becoming increasingly limited after 2006. With democratic processes gaining ground, there was little local support or identification with militants. An exception was the brief phase between 2014 and 2016, when Burhan Wani, a local militant started using social media to mobilise youth, particularly from relatively better-off backgrounds. This phase, however, remained geographically limited and was closely tied to political disillusionment of local Kashmiris, specifically in few districts of South Kashmir. Following the killing of Burhan Wani, this kind of militancy was also phased out. As the official data clearly shows, since 2018, there has been a constantly declining number of local militants. As per a newspaper report, as against 160 local militants in 2020, there number was reduced to 125 in 2021, 130 in 2022, 23 in 2023 and 20 in 2024.In conclusionKashmiri responses to militancy have undergone a significant transformation over time – from a phase of identification in the early 1990s, towards clear disillusionment and disassociation. Even though local recruitment continued intermittently, the widespread public approval of the early 1990s has long faded.The response to last year’s Pahalgam attack, though consistent with this longer trajectory, was nevertheless unprecedented in its articulation. Never before had Kashmiris expressed their disapproval so openly, collectively and with such moral clarity. This moment marked not just a distancing, but a decisive and comprehensive rejection of militancy.The response of April 2025 is another critical phase in Kashmir’s political trajectory. By disowning acts of terror carried out in their name, Kashmiris not only rejected violence as a means of political expression, but also challenged the very rationale that sustains militancy. In doing so, they rendered militancy devoid of both political legitimacy and moral grounding.Rekha Chowdhary was formerly a professor of Political Science at the University of Jammu.