The ‘free hand’ given to the military has been much acclaimed as a major reason for the operational results of Operation Sindoor. It will likely figure as a replicable lesson in the promised future iterations of Operation Sindoor. However, not only must this lesson be reviewed in light of the constraints of the nuclear age, but Operation Sindoor could do with a reexamination, warts and all.Attempting one here leads to an opposite conclusion: that the free hand given in Operation Sindoor amounted to political abdication. Consequently, the lesson to the contrary is that more intimate political oversight of the operational aspects in the military sphere befits appropriate civil-military relations in the nuclear age.Some military theoryThe popularly imagined ideal type has political and military circles adjacent to each other but with an overlap in-between. In the space jointly shared, the political supersedes military considerations. Outside the overlap is the essentially military space, on which matters are adjudicated with a professional lens. Yet, for military accountability to political masters the entire military circle is subject to political oversight.Ideally, the political level sets the agenda and gives the military the necessary autonomy to execute it, with the degree of ‘freedom of action’ depending on the confidence the political leadership has in its chosen military leaders and the political delicacy of the operation. Even so, this is seldom an uncomplicated relationship; an example being the friction between Count Bismarck and General von Moltke.Today, distinguishing ‘essentially military matters’ – from which the political class must maintain a respectful distance by leaving these to professional minds – is rendered more difficult by the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons. Indeed, a principal impact of the nuclear age on military matters has been to restrict the scope of military; lest, in pursuit of autonomy, the military overstep the constraints placed on the use of armed force by the nuclear imperative.An early nuclear theorist, Bernard Brodie, had it that the military’s role in the nuclear age is but to deter war and not to wage one. From recent revelations on Operation Sindoor, it appears that this insight on the nuclear dimension is being given a dangerously short shrift.A nuclear context to the free handIn his telling of Operation Snow Leopard in his unpublished book, the then army chief recounts that knowing that an affray involving tanks could start a shooting war, he looked back over his shoulders to his political masters for instructions. Told, ‘jo uchit samjho, voh karo (do whatever you think is right),’ he decided to wait-out the Chinese. This revelation was met with the criticism that the delegation of authority on as grave a matter as war with a nuclear-armed neighbour amounted to abdication of political responsibility.The matter rested in the overlap between the two imaginary circles – political and military – that required the political level to take a considered view with military input. No meaningful discussion followed the criticism, resulting in the ‘free hand’ recurring a few years on as the right and obvious manner of civil-military relations in a military conflict with another nuclear-armed neighbour.Also read: India–Pakistan: In a Nuclear Dyad, The War That Cannot Achieve AnythingA recent documentary on Operation Sindoor informs that the national security adviser (NSA) briefed the prime minister that an attack on terrorist targets within Punjab (“soch se bahar” in the former Chief of Defence Staff General Chauhan’s words) could trigger a nuclear response from the Pakistan army. Yet, the political master signed off on the military operation, evidently sanguine in his hands-off supervision of the military through a trusted hand in the national security establishment, Ajit Doval, and with confidence in his deep-selected military leadership.In the documentary, military leaders in all three colours of uniform confirm each service was prepared for escalation into a war, which could well spell a nuclear war. That Indian strike forces elsewhere were by then in assembly areas is already well known. The then naval chief once said that the navy was but five minutes from gate-crashing the landward military conflict.Readiness for escalation helps deter it. Indian preparedness for Operation Sindoor turning into a conventional war was to keep Pakistan from upping the ante up the ladder to a war. Pakistan throwing in the towel after a brief recourse to its Operation Bunyan al Marsoos shows Indian escalation dominance on the last night.Of consequence for the future, however, is the revelation that the military continued going after Pakistani targets, for over three hours after receiving their call for calling off the exchanges. Whether this had political imprimatur is not known. In either case, this was an egregious extension to Operation Sindoor, befitting closer scrutiny on its necessity and escalatory potential.The free hand vindicated?A retired air marshal reveals that he told a white lie (“I lied”) to his air chief. He says he pretended that a strike was already underway when asked after their status by his chief, in order not to disappoint the crews long in the cockpit, ready and waiting, to preempt the possibility of the strike being called off. Later, when he in an informal setting he admitted this to the air chief in front of the defence minister present, it was glossed over.An air marshal, who went on to head a temple trust, says he had no knowledge of the explosion at Kairana, though the hills fell within his operational responsibility. The now-retired chief of defence staff (CDS) making light of the matter said it was an ordnance-laden drone expending itself. That it did so with a visible bang near where Pakistani nuclear stockpiles are allegedly hidden shows it was not thought through in its entirety prior to launch.Also read: Army Sappers Are Not for a Bulldozer Raj in KashmirIn the documentary, the then director general military operations, Lt Gen Rajiv Ghai, informs that at the time when Pakistani call came in asking for a ceasefire, the response was not made then, attributing the delay – hold your breath – to a glitch in the hotline. This is the first and only mention of the supposed glitch.In the interim of three hours, concerned Indian diplomats in the external affairs ministry keeping American crisis manager Marco Rubio on hold inquired after the hold up. Evidently, India utilised the time gained to have a last crack at Pakistan, the go-ahead for which was given by the CDS directly to the air chief, without any thought by either of the two to his lack of jurisdiction.During Operation Sindoor, it must be recorded that a lackadaisical attitude to the rule of law and procedural integrity attended military actions in internal security. The army supported the demolishing of family houses of alleged local militants in Kashmir by using controlled explosions, even though NSA Doval in the documentary confirms that it was known early enough that the perpetrators of the Pahalgam atrocity were Pakistani. The military participated in deporting alleged Rohingyas from Delhi by air lifting them to Nicobar and then deboarding them from a naval ship into the sea off the Myanmar coast. Clearly, a free hand has a drastic underside.The opposite conclusionIn such a reading of Operation Sindoor, the political level opens itself to credible criticism of abdication. It turned a blind eye to the military disregarding ceasefire overtures; going ahead on their own accord (absent evidence of political approval) with strikes that were no longer a military necessity; allowing a ‘glitch’ in the hotline and to hold matters up without considering work arounds (if the glitch story is taken as true); and, allowing for expansive targeting (that may have included the ‘kill’ at the longest range ever) that that could trigger uncertain consequences.Blinded and with their conventional counter strike capability dwindling, the Pakistanis could have brought into play their cruise and more capable ballistic missiles. That they didn’t do this owes not to their being over-awed, but American crisis-mitigating activity – which India is in denial over. That the next round will now begin at this higher level is almost certain. Therefore, the consequences required taking a grand-strategic call, which there is no hint of.As for the military, it must introspect on the political call on it to expand the space for conventional punishment of Pakistan. Its over-enthusiastic execution was at such nuclear risk that it has squandered the trust a ‘free hand’ implies. They must know that the free hand given could well have proven an alibi for their political master, if things went south. They surely are aware that the political firmament does not produce the likes of Nehru anymore.The ideal type of adjacent political and military circles with an overlap no longer holds in a nuclear age. The military circle must hereon be seen as an embedded within the political, for accountability and holistic appreciation of military pathways. There are no essentially-military matters qua operations any more. Persisting with a free hand can only imply political abdication or military usurpation of a political call.Ali Ahmed is a strategic analyst. This article first appeared on his Substack, ‘ali’s version’.