“Today is supposed to be the last day of your custody, and there is absolutely nothing I want more right now than to see you both walk out free. Nothing else matters to me at this moment. I just want my brothers back,” Abhijit Dipke wrote in an open letter on Monday, October 19, 2026.Today, October 21, marks a week since the Cockroach Janta Party’s (CJP) Ashutosh Ranka and Saurav Das were sent to Tihar Jail, for allegedly breaching the conditions of their bonds by trespassing into Jantar Mantar in New Delhi on October 13, 2026. A day before that, Jantar Mantar had been de-notified as a protest site. Das and Ranka were remanded to 5 days of judicial custody on October 14, extended by two days on October 19. The incident has raised questions of both procedure and principle.The procedural question is whether preventive arrest and custody in our laws can survive without a known design to commit a cognisable offence, an inquiry or a reasoned rejection of sureties. But the question of principle is whether statutory provisions to prevent apprehended violence can be stretched to detain people for protests, and whether this has effectively equated the right to protest with a “breach of peace”.In this article, we first examine what a peace bond means in law and the legal consequences of breaching its conditions. We chronologically trace the events of the present case, contrasting what has happened with what ought to have happened in law. What Happened? A TimelineOn October 10, 2026, Das, Ranka and Dipke were detained, from within their Air India flight, upon landing at the Indira Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi, ahead of a planned protest in the capital demanding the resignation of Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar. The Delhi Police stated that they had come for a protest without permission at Jantar Mantar.On October 11, preventive proceedings began under Sections 126 and 170 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS). The trio executed bonds of Rs 50,000 each, with sureties, to keep the peace for a year. While he was in detention, Dipke’s grandmother passed away, and upon release, he returned to Maharashtra to be with his family.On October 12, the Delhi Police officially de-notified Jantar Mantar, formerly a designated protest site. On October 13, Das and Ranka were arrested at Jantar Mantar, after allegedly climbing a locked gate, waving the national flag and shouting slogans against the CEC. The Delhi Police cited “inputs” that CJP workers “might cause a disturbance” and two FIRs.On October 14, Special Executive Magistrate (SEM) Mahesh Kumar Meena issued notice under Section 130 BNSS, finding breach of the bonds (dated 11.10.26) “evident” from their conduct, social media posts and the complainant’s statement, and remanded Das and Ranka to judicial custody in Tihar Jail for five days “to maintain public peace and order,” with no “sound surety,” being produced.Also read: Why We Must Intervene to Take Back Our DemocracyOn October 18, the SEM Meena mentioned that he received threats and was facing mental harassment. So, the hearing was delayed to Monday and held by another SEM, Ritu Raj. On October 19, at the end of the initial remand, fresh sureties were tendered and rejected, and SEM Raj extended custody by an additional two days, to October 21. On October 20, Das and Ranka moved the Delhi high court against the extension to their custody under Article 21 for noncompliance with Sections 135(3) and 140 BNSS.On October 21, they withdrew the plea after the high court’s suggestion to wait till after a hearing before the SEM court.What is the law on ‘breach of peace’?Neither the Criminal Procedure Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) nor the new Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, (BNSS) defines a breach of the peace. The courts have described it “a violation of that quiet, peace, and security which is guaranteed by the law,” as the Bombay high court did in V K Rao v Chandappa Appa Devadiga, and have accepted that it can occur even in private, as the Allahabad high court held of an assault in Naziruddin v Emperor. It is a narrower concept than public order. In Ram Manohar Lohia v State of Bihar Justice M Hidayatullah described law and order, public order and the security of the state as three concentric circles and observed that “every breach of peace does not lead to public disorder.” The phrase matters because the preventive powers in the BNSS are intrinsically connected to it. Preventive powers are powers that the state has and does enforce in order to prevent a crime (à la Tom Cruise’s Minority Report).Chapter IX of the BNSS, which replaces Chapter VIII of the CrPC, allows the state to act against offences against public tranquillity, but in return, lays down a fixed procedure. The Supreme Court upheld the old chapter in Madhu Limaye v Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr on exactly that basis, and in Rajender Singh Pathania v State (NCT of Delhi) it repeated that these powers serve preventive justice and are not of a punitive nature.Preventive powers under the BNSSWith this context set, it is useful to look at the architecture that the BNSS lays down for the state’s preventive powers. Given the procedural labyrinth, going step by step will ensure coherence. The steps that follow will try to mirror the actual incident as much as possible through provisions in the statute. The first step here is Section 126, Section 107 of the erstwhile CrPC. It essentially requires that an Executive Magistrate (usually a police officer of the rank of an ACP), receiving information that a person is likely to commit a breach of the peace, form his own opinion that there is sufficient ground to proceed. He may require that person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond to keep the peace for up to one year. Section 126 is only a power to call for an explanation. It does not authorise arrest. Then we come to the second step. Now the Executive Magistrate will give a written order under Section 130. This must set out the substance of the information received, amount of the bond, its term and the number of sureties. The Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye called this order “the foundation of the jurisdiction,” because without it the person does not know what case they have to meet. The order is read over to the person if he is present, or served with a summons under Section 132 if he is not. Also read: Can the Police Judge Its Own Case? Why Saurav Das and Ashutosh Ranka’s Imprisonment Defies Basic Legal PrincipleThe third step is an inquiry under Section 135 into whether the information is true, conducted as nearly as practicable as the trial of a summons case. At the end, the Magistrate either orders the person to execute a bond under Section 136, which he may do only if the inquiry has proved that the bond is necessary, or discharges him under Section 137. The inquiry must ordinarily finish within six months.Given that Das and Ranka are in judicial custody, it must be highlighted when custody may be permitted during this process. In the structure of BNSS, Chapter IX & XII, custody is exceptional, and is permitted only in four situations: First, the police may arrest a person under Section 170, but only if they know of his design to commit a cognisable offence that cannot otherwise be prevented, and such custody cannot exceed 24 hours unless some other provision authorises more. Second, the Magistrate may issue an arrest warrant under the proviso to Section 132 if he records that a breach of the peace cannot be prevented except by immediate arrest. Third, once the inquiry has begun, he may, under Section 135(3), for reasons recorded in writing, direct an interim bond and detain the person only until that bond is executed. Fourth, Section 141 allows imprisonment where a person fails to give security orders under Section 136, or breaks a bond executed under such an order. It is quite clear that apart from these four situations, there is no power in Chapter IX to keep anyone in custody, and certainly no general power to remand. While this is the broad statutory architecture, the question that also needs to be addressed is what are the consequences when a bond condition has been breached.Right to protest = breach of peace? The a priori question stands: does protesting constitute a breach of peace? Peaceable demonstration and dissent is protected under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b), as the Supreme Court recognised in Kameshwar Prasad v State of Bihar, and Shreya Singhal v Union of India distinguished discussion and advocacy, however unpopular or unwelcome, from incitement to violence. The state may regulate where protests take place, and Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v Union of India, which concerned Jantar Mantar itself, held that no one may insist on protesting at a place of their choice while also holding that regulation cannot amount to the total extinction of protest. A protest, on its own, however, does not amount to a breach of peace. That leads to another question, as while protesting at a de-notified Jantar Mantar may involve actions and directions from the police, does it show an intention to commit a cognisable offence under Section 170 BNSS? If yes, then what is the cognisable offence? It may be argued that because Section 163 BNSS was in force, i.e. an order prohibiting the assembly of more than five people; its violation automatically amounts to disobedience of an order duly promulgated by a public servant, constituting a cognisable and bailable offence under Section 223 BNSS. However, Madhu Limaye says that mere disobedience of the order is not enough to constitute an offence. There must be an obstruction, annoyance, or danger to human life, health or safety or a riot or an affray before the offence under Section 223 BNS is constituted. The catch-22 is that Section 223 being bailable itself but the apprehended offence can authorise 24 hours of custody. This leads to quite an absurd situation. Even under Section 170, for custody beyond 24 hours, it is unclear what other provisions would authorise an extension, because it does not seem conclusively that the peace, the quiet and tranquility that the law guarantees was breached by unarmed protestors that were grossly outnumbered by the police. Now, let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the bond was broken. The BNSS gives two consequences for breaking a bond.First, forfeiture under Section 491. For this, the breach must be proven (was it proven here?) to the court that took the bond, or to which the case has been transferred, or to the Magistrate of the first class i.e. a judicial court (was it before a judicial court?). That court must record the grounds of proof and may then call on the person to pay the penalty or show cause why he should not. This penalty seems to be monetary. It seems then that Section 491 was not applied here, so the relevant section must be the second consequence under Section 141(1)(b). This provides for detention until a maximum of the remainder of the bond’s term i.e. a year. But it applies only where the bond was executed under a final order under Section 136, and only where the breach is proved to “such Magistrate or his successor-in-office,” meaning the Magistrate who made the order. So even this does not support the present procedure. A final legal clarification is essential. The BNSS makes a distinction between a bond to keep the peace and a bond for good behaviour. Some of the confusion that seems evident in reporting and the courtroom process perhaps can be avoided by distinguishing the two. The primary distinction is that a bond to keep the peace binds the person not to commit a breach of the peace. But a bond for good behaviour is wider, as under Section 139 it is broken by the commission or attempt of any offence punishable with imprisonment. The other difference is that Section 126 proceedings can only lead to a bond to keep the peace, and proviso (a) to Section 135(3) states expressly that no person against whom proceedings are not being taken under Sections 127, 128 or 129 may be directed to execute a bond for good behaviour. To simplify, good-behaviour bonds can only be demanded in the more serious proceedings under Sections 127 to 129, which deal with seditious matters, suspected persons and habitual offenders. Specifying the condition to be good behaviour makes the question of whether protests are equivalent to breach of peace moot. Equally moot is whether violating Section 163 BNSS is enough to qualify as breaching this bond. It raises other even more damning questions such as whether there were any proceedings under Sections 127-129 against Das and Ranka. And the issue of procedure under 141(1)(b) remains unanswered still. With this understanding of the law and procedure here, let’s try to see what has actually unfolded in the past 10 days. The case of Das and RankaWhen Das and Ranka were arrested at Jantar Mantar on October 13, there was no identified cognisable offence. The stated grounds were “inputs” that workers “might” disturb order, which is exactly the possibility Shahaji Lokhande v M P Mirgali held insufficient. Entering a de-notified site is, at best, a regulatory contravention. As held by the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye, a mere disobedience of the order is insufficient to constitute an offence, as it must be accompanied by “obstruction. annoyance, or danger to human life, health or safety or a riot or an affray,” to warrant arrest [27]. The reports mention no served Section 163 order, and cognisance requires a written complaint from the public servant under Section 215 BNSS.Second, the pretext that the offence “cannot [could not] otherwise be prevented” but for the arrest is untenable. The Delhi Police had two FIRs, the ordinary arrest procedure, and the plain option of escorting two unarmed individuals off the site at their disposal. Both were already under a one-year bond. The police allege only that the pair were brought under control “with difficulty,” but have cited no weapons, no violence, and no damage.Third, Section 170(2) forbids detention beyond 24 hours unless another provision authorises it. That provision was Chapter XI, where the custody fails.The October 14 order does not obviously satisfy the standard of Chapter XI. Its reported basis is social media posts, a complainant’s statement and a pen-drive of videos allegedly showing the two as “adamant and hostile.” Nothing reported shows the substance of the information being served in time to answer, or the videos being tested. The alleged breach was of a bond executed before a different Special Executive Magistrate (South-West). Whether a bond is broken is governed by its own procedure, and the reports show none. The order simply declared the breach as fact.On October 18, a news report highlighted a wait of five hours for a very short hearing lasting about 10 minutes. SEM Meena mentioned that he received threats and was facing mental harassment. It is baffling on how a proceeding can be delayed for this reason. There does not seem to be any basis to delay a hearing for these reasons. While the grievance raised by SEM may be legitimate and should definitely be looked into in other proceedings, it really cannot come at the cost of the accused’s liberty. The extension of custody on October 19 is untenable. The Delhi high court petition’s central point is that detention under Section 135(3) is to secure a bond, and once sureties were tendered on October 19, the stated basis had elapsed. Rejecting them under Section 140 requires a sworn inquiry, notice to the surety, and the person offering him, and a written order with reasons, which the petition states has not been done. The reasons given for rejection were that one surety’s photograph did not match his Aadhaar card, and another could not give Das’s parentage. These require simple clerical checks. The order also remarked that neither surety could “control” the respondents. A surety guarantees attendance; a test of whether he can “control” a political actor makes him a guarantor of silence. Earlier offers were also refused because the sureties had been detained before, or lived outside Delhi.The Delhi high court, before which the petition has come, has already spoken. In Aldanish Rein v State NCT of Delhi, on analogous proceedings before a SEM, the Court directed release on personal bond while sureties continue to be verified, and no single period of judicial custody beyond 7 days, with weekly review. The Court declared the arrest and remand illegal and awarded ₹25,000. While five plus two days, as in Das and Ranka’s case, stays inside this 7-day ceiling, the ceiling is not a licence, and had Aldanish Rein been followed, Das and Ranka would have been released on 19 October, pending verification of their sureties. The 11 October bond was to “keep the peace.” Protest-related conduct followed on 13 October. This conduct is a breach of the bond and therefore of the peace. Effectively, the bond has been read as a bond not to protest.Also read: Explainer: Jantar Mantar and the Right to Protest at a Place Where the State Can’t Easily Look AwayThe authorities on “breach of peace,” as cited above, share a core – force, hurt, or a credible threat. None stretches to a gathering that raises slogans, which would turn the peace power into a general power to restrain any conduct that a Magistrate finds disagreeable. Anita Thakur v Government of Jammu & Kashmir and Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v Union of India treat peaceful demonstration as a fundamental right under Articles 19(1)(a) and (b). Ramlila Maidan requires preventive steps to be “founded on actual and prominent threat,” while Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India (2020) holds that the power “cannot be used to suppress legitimate expression of opinion or grievance,” absent “sufficient material to show that there is likely to be an incitement to violence,” and requires proportionality and the least intrusive measure to restrict the same.Himat Lal K Shah v Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad allows a permission requirement, since the right is not one to meet at any place and time. Amit Sahni v Commissioner of Police upholds designated sites of protest, and MKSS accepted limits at Jantar Mantar. So, an unpermitted gathering at a de-notified site may be regulated, and prosecuted if the statutory elements are made out. But Amit Sahni concerned the indefinite occupation of a public road, and none of these judgements equates a gathering in the wrong place with a threat to the peace. That is a regulatory problem with regulatory remedies.The order extending Das and Ranka’s custody falters considerably on addressing these issues.SEM Raj opines that Das and Ranka have “no respect for law.” This seems to be an assessment of character, not a finding of danger or criminality. Custody under Chapter XI cannot amount to censure.Das and Ranka’s “habitualness,” was also cited, but on the police’s own chronology, the bond was executed on October 11 and the alleged breach came on October 13. No call was made after October 10. “Habitual” is a technical term in this chapter, confined to listed offenders such as thieves and robbers.The order cites Das and Ranka’s continuous “calls to protest,” condemning posts, press conferences and videos urging people to gather. But that is the right to speech and assembly protected by Articles 19(1)(a) and (b). No call to violence has been cited, so there is no Bhasin “material,” of incitement.Stating that Das and Ranka “immediately committed a breach of the peace,” upon their initial release conflates a right to protest and a regulatory contravention with breach of peace. A breach of peace requires disorder and violence, and the order acknowledges none. A pending petition before the Supreme Court, Apoorvanand Jha v Union of India, raises precisely this question, one we must all ask ourselves – if the right to protest amounts to a breach of peace, then how can it ever be exercised? “Our people have not been provoked and are still following the ideals of Mahatma Gandhi,” Dipke said on Twitter on Tuesday, October 20. “They will also come out of jail with a smile.”Ramsha Farhan and Rohan Mehta are both students at National Law School of India University.