The Wire’s analyses showed that a new Election Commission (EC) directive in Bihar threatens to disenfranchise an estimated 4.74 crore citizens. By demanding documents like matriculation certificates to revise voter lists, the directive places the burden of proof on the state’s most vulnerable – the poor, the landless, and those from the Dalit, extremely backward class (EBC) and Muslim communities. It should come as no surprise that these are the very groups which have long been cut off from the administrative and educational systems that issue such papers.This analysis moves from the vulnerable individual to the vulnerable political seat. By comparing the at-risk population with the razor-thin results of the 2020 Bihar assembly election, we can measure the potential political fallout.The question is not just who might be excluded, but what their exclusion could mean for the state’s political balance. Could this administrative “purification” of voter rolls systematically alter election outcomes?Geography of vulnerabilityTo understand the political stakes, we created the Bihar Vulnerability Index to capture multi-layered disadvantage in a single figure. The index is built on five key indicators of vulnerability: MPI Headcount Ratio: The percentage of the population living in multidimensional poverty.Educational Deprivation: The percentage of households where no adult has completed six years of schooling.Muslim Population PercentageScheduled Caste (SC) Population PercentageScheduled Tribe (ST) Population PercentageFor each of these five factors, we ranked all 38 districts of Bihar from 1 (most vulnerable) to 38 (least vulnerable). A district with the highest poverty rate, for example, receives a ‘Poverty Rank’ of 1. The final Composite Score for each district is the sum of these five individual ranks. A lower composite score therefore signifies a higher overall vulnerability, identifying districts that consistently rank among the worst-off across multiple, intersecting axes of deprivation.Table 1: The results reveal a clear “vulnerable belt” across north and northeast Bihar.The 14 most vulnerable districts are: Araria, Purnia, Katihar, Kishanganj, West Champaran, Madhepura, Supaul, Sitamarhi, East Champaran, Sheohar, Saharsa, Darbhanga, Jamui and Banka.Three key findings emerge from the index:A concentrated belt: This belt covers the political subregions of Seemanchal, Kosi and parts of Mithilanchal and Champaran. These are interconnected regions that share a common socio-economic reality.Seemanchal’s multiplier effect: Araria, Purnia, Katihar and Kishanganj hold the top four spots. Here, a multiplier effect combines some of the state’s highest rates of poverty and educational deprivation with its largest Muslim populations, making their citizens uniquely susceptible to the EC’s directive.Demographic drivers: West Champaran ranks fifth because it has the state’s largest ST population. Jamui (13th) and Banka (14th) are on the list due to their large SC and ST populations. Sheohar, though small, ranks tenth because it is first in educational deprivation; in 82.9% of its households, no member has six years of schooling.In contrast, the most resilient districts – Patna, Rohtas, Munger and Bhojpur – are in the state’s more prosperous central and southern areas.The index provides a data-driven map of risk, showing exactly where the political impact of the voter roll revision will be felt most.Political landscape of the vulnerable beltThe 14-district vulnerable belt is a critical political battleground containing 86 assembly constituencies (ACs). The 2020 election results here were fiercely contested:National Democratic Alliance (NDA): 45 seatsMahagathbandhan (MGB): 36 seatsOthers (All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen or AIMIM): 5 seatsThough the NDA had a slight edge, the MGB and its allies won a formidable 41 seats. The belt is a contested territory where the MGB has a massive political stake. Any action that disproportionately harms its voter base could cripple its competitiveness in the entire region. This is the fault line where tremors from the voter revision would be most severe.High-risk constituenciesThe political volatility sharpens at the constituency level. Of the 86 seats in the vulnerable belt, 28 were won by a razor-thin margin of less than 5% in 2020. In these contests, where a few hundred or thousand votes decided the outcome, removing even a small fraction of voters could easily flip the result.Table 2 Table 3: Note: While the margins in most AIMIM-won seats exceed 5%, they are included as they fall within the 14 vulnerable districts and represent an extreme consolidation of the at-risk minority electorate, making them a critical part of this analysis.A disturbing pattern emerges when these 28 seats are cross-referenced with demographic data.The Seemanchal factorIn Kishanganj, the Congress (MGB) candidate won by just 1,381 votes (a 0.77% margin). The district is 68% Muslim, and Lokniti-Centre for the Study of Developing Societies post-poll data shows that 76% of Bihar’s Muslims voted for the MGB. The Congress victory was delivered by Muslim voters – the very community who are among the most likely to lack the required documents due to poverty and educational gaps.In Jokihat in Araria district, the logic is the same. The seat was won on a consolidated anti-NDA vote in Bihar’s number one most vulnerable district. Removing these voters could re-engineer the result, likely benefiting the NDA.The SC equationThe vulnerability extends to reserved seats. In Dhoraiya (SC, Banka), the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) (MGB) won by 2,687 votes (1.49%). Banka is the 14th most vulnerable district, with high poverty and a large SC population. The 2022 caste survey confirms that SCs are among the state’s poorest groups. The RJD’s victory depended on securing a decisive slice of this vote.These are precisely the voters least likely to have matriculation certificates. Removing them could flip the seat to the NDA.In Raniganj (SC, Araria), the Janata Dal (United) (NDA) won by just 2,304 votes (1.24%), showing that any shift in the electorate puts such narrow victories at risk.The EBC swingEBCs are Bihar’s largest (36%) and one of its poorest social blocs. While they leaned toward the NDA in 2020, the MGB won a vital share.In Bahadurpur (Darbhanga), the RJD (MGB) won by just 2,629 votes (1.48%). To win this general seat, the RJD needed a decisive chunk of the EBC vote beyond its core base.Disenfranchising poorer EBC voters, who often lack formal documents, would chip away at this support, making such a narrow victory nearly impossible.The political knife’s edgeThis detailed breakdown paints a stark picture of political volatility. The fortunes of both major alliances (but one of them more than the other, as we will see) rest on a knife’s edge.The Mahagathbandhan’s seats are particularly precarious. Victories in constituencies like Kishanganj (0.77%), Darbhanga Rural (1.36%) and the SC-reserved seat of Dhoraiya (1.49%) were clearly dependent on mobilising their core supporters among Muslims, Dalits and poor EBCs – the exact demographics most likely to be affected by the EC’s documentation requirements.At the same time, the NDA’s hold is also fragile. In places like Parihar (0.91% margin) and Raniganj (SC) (1.24%), their victory was achieved by narrowly overcoming strong opposition. Any administrative process that affects a large number of voters introduces volatility that could just as easily threaten their slim leads.The five seats won by AIMIM highlight the Seemanchal dynamic. These victories were achieved through an unprecedented consolidation of the highly vulnerable Muslim vote. Any process that disenfranchises this specific community would not just threaten the MGB’s chances but could wipe out the AIMIM’s presence in the assembly, with the NDA as the most likely beneficiary.The risk, therefore, is not symmetrical. For the MGB, it is a targeted erosion of its core voter base, while for the NDA it is the collateral damage of general volatility.Intent and consequenceThe data tells a clear story. The EC’s directive threatens communities defined by poverty, educational need and minority or Dalit status. These same communities form the political bedrock of the opposition MGB in a highly contested “vulnerable belt”.Within this belt, at least 28 seats were decided on a knife’s edge. In many seats won by the MGB, the margin of victory came from the very voters now most at risk of being struck from the rolls.Regardless of the EC’s stated intent to “purify” the lists, the data reveals a predictable consequence – a systematic erosion of the opposition’s vote base where it is most vulnerable. The result could be a redrawing of Bihar’s political map, not by the will of the people, but by an administrative pen.This raises a fundamental question. How can a process be fair if its foreseeable result is to disenfranchise the most vulnerable and rewire political power?