The recent political developments related to Ladakh mark the culmination of nearly seven years of sustained political mobilisation around questions of representation, autonomy, constitutional safeguards and regional empowerment. Although the demand for full-fledged statehood remains unresolved, most of the major demands articulated by Ladakhi political organisations have now received acceptance in principle. The latest negotiations between representatives of the Leh Apex Body and the Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA) and a subcommittee of the High Power Committee, constituted by the Union Government, reportedly resulted in broad agreement regarding restoration of democratic institutions and constitutional protections for Ladakh. According to statements issued by representatives of these organisations, the discussions led to an “In principle” understanding on restoring democracy in Ladakh and providing constitutional safeguards on the lines of Article 371A, 371F and 371G (as applied to Nagaland, Sikkim and Mizoram). Most significantly, there appears to be agreement regarding the creation of a union territory-level elected body vested with legislative, executive and financial powers, under whose authority even the higher bureaucracy, including the Chief Secretary, would function.These developments are politically significant not merely because they address long-standing grievances, but because they reflect the success of a transformed political strategy in Ladakh. The achievements of the recent movement are closely connected with the emergence of a new form of politics that consciously moved beyond the traditional binaries that had historically fragmented the region. The coming together of Leh and Kargil through the Leh Apex Body and the Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA) represented a decisive shift away from sectarian and subregional politics towards a broader and more inclusive Ladakhi political identity. The success of the movement lay precisely in this transformation.Also read: Ladakh Groups Say In-Principle Deal Reached With Govt: Elected Legislature, CM and Path to StatehoodThe history of Ladakh’s union territory demandThe present phase of political struggle began soon after the reorganisation of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019 and the creation of the union territory of Ladakh without a legislature. Although the decision was initially celebrated in Leh, where the demand for union territory status had been articulated for nearly five decades, disillusionment soon emerged. Kargil, on the other hand, opposed the decision from the outset and viewed the new arrangement with deep apprehension.Smoke rises from buildings including the local office of Bharatiya Janata Party set ablaze during protests demanding greater autonomy in Leh, Ladakh, Wednesday, September 24, 2025. Photo: AP/PTI.The contrasting responses of Leh and Kargil in 2019 reflected the historical divisions that had long characterised Ladakh’s politics. The demand for union territory status had been articulated primarily by the Buddhist-majority district of Leh, especially through organisations such as the Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA). The demand was rooted in a long-standing aspiration for separation from Kashmir and direct central administration. Ladakhi Buddhist leadership had consistently argued that Ladakh possessed a distinct cultural and civilisational identity and should not remain subordinated within the Kashmir-centric politics of J&K.These sentiments had emerged soon after 1947. Ladakhi Buddhist leaders made representations to Maharaja Hari Singh, seeking either direct rule under the Maharaja, merger with Jammu or permission to join East Punjab. Similar representations were later made to Jawaharlal Nehru, emphasising Ladakh’s distinct identity and seeking separation from Kashmir. During the brief period of direct central administration following the Sino-Indian conflict, demands were raised for continuation of central control over Ladakh. Over time, the demand for union territory status became deeply intertwined with Leh’s political imagination of separation from Kashmir.How the demand became entangled with sectarian politicsThis politics, however, increasingly acquired a sectarian character. During the 1989 agitation led by the LBA, the demand for union territory status became associated with Buddhist identity politics and communal mobilisation. The agitation produced sharp polarisation between Buddhists and Muslims, severely damaging the centuries-old coexistence between communities in Ladakh. The politics of separation from Kashmir became intertwined with processes of ‘othering,’ where Kashmiris and Muslims increasingly came to be projected as political and cultural outsiders.Kargil responded very differently to these developments. The Muslim-majority district perceived the union territory demand as a project of Leh’s domination and feared that separation from J&K would politically and economically marginalise Kargil within a Leh-dominated Ladakh. Consequently, Kargil often aligned itself politically with Kashmir and opposed the demand for union territory status. Kargil’s politics evolved around two major concerns: resistance to Leh’s dominance within Ladakh and the demand for equitable political and economic representation.These divisions became more pronounced after 1979, when the single district of Ladakh was bifurcated into Leh and Kargil districts. The creation of Kargil as a separate district strengthened regional political consciousness and generated a more organised articulation of political grievances vis-à-vis Leh. While Leh’s politics centred increasingly around the demands for union territory status and separation from Kashmir, Kargil’s politics focused on resisting perceived domination by Leh and preserving its relationship with Kashmir.The divergent trajectories of Leh and Kargil politics were clearly visible during the 1989 agitation. While the LBA raised the issue of neglect of Ladakh by the state government and demanded an alternative administrative arrangement in the form of union territory status, Kargil leadership simultaneously articulated grievances regarding neglect within Ladakh itself and exclusion from Leh-dominated politics.Thus, for decades, Ladakh’s politics remained deeply fragmented along regional and religious lines. Leh and Kargil evolved through mutually antagonistic political frameworks. Leh defined itself politically in opposition to Kashmir and Muslims, while Kargil increasingly defined itself in opposition to Leh and Buddhist dominance. This fragmented politics continued well into the post-2019 period.2019: Celebration in Leh, anger in KargilThe decision to create the union territory of Ladakh in 2019, therefore, produced sharply contrasting reactions in the two districts. In Leh, the decision was celebrated enthusiastically as the fulfilment of a long-standing aspiration for separation from Kashmir. Celebrations reportedly continued for several days. In Kargil, however, the response was one of anger and despair. Political and religious organisations formed a Joint Action Committee and launched protests against the decision. The major demand initially articulated by Kargil leadership was reversal of the union territory arrangement. Other demands included equal representation for Kargil, parity in development with Leh and even the possibility of a separate union territory for Kargil if the earlier arrangement could not be restored.Leh, after the violent protests on September 24, 2025. Photo: Jehangir Ali.Despite these initial differences, both Leh and Kargil soon began confronting similar anxieties regarding the actual functioning of the new union territory. It gradually became clear that the new arrangement had resulted not in political empowerment but in increased centralisation and bureaucratic control. Unlike the union territory of J&K, Ladakh had been constituted without a legislature. As part of the former state of J&K, before 2019, Ladakh had representation through four Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), two Members of the Legislative Council and participation in state-level political institutions. There was also usually a minister from Ladakh in the state government. After 2019, however, Ladakh’s political representation was reduced to a single Member of Parliament (MP).The new administrative structure concentrated authority in the office of the Lieutenant Governor. Although the Autonomous Hill Development Councils in Leh and Kargil continued to exist, their powers became increasingly constrained within this highly centralised framework. Even before 2019, tensions existed between elected hill council representatives and the bureaucracy. After the formation of the union territory, these tensions intensified because real authority increasingly shifted towards bureaucratic institutions. The absence of a legislature created a widespread perception that elected political representatives had become largely ineffective while bureaucratic control had expanded considerably.Anxieties about land, employment, demography and cultural survivalSimultaneously, the new set up generated deep anxieties regarding land, employment, demography and cultural preservation. Under the earlier constitutional arrangement, Ladakhis, like other residents of J&K, possessed permanent resident status, which safeguarded their rights over land ownership and state employment. With the removal of these protections, fears emerged regarding possible demographic change, entry of outside capital, land alienation and cultural marginalisation.These concerns were particularly acute because of Ladakh’s fragile ecological conditions and sparse population. There was apprehension that opening the region to unrestricted outside economic activity could threaten local land rights as well as Ladakh’s environment, culture and traditional social structures. The demand for constitutional safeguards under the Sixth Schedule, or on the lines of Article 371, emerged directly from these concerns.Employment-related anxieties also intensified after 2019. As part of the former state of J&K, Ladakhis benefited from reservation policies within a relatively limited competitive framework. Since a large proportion of Ladakh’s population belongs to Scheduled Tribes, they could effectively compete within the state structure. After the formation of the union territory, however, recruitment increasingly came under national-level institutions such as the Union Public Service Commission. This generated fears that Ladakhis would be disadvantaged in competition with candidates from across India. The absence of a separate Public Service Commission for Ladakh further deepened these insecurities.These shared concerns gradually transformed political thinking in both Leh and Kargil. Leh realised that separation from Kashmir had not automatically resulted in political empowerment. Instead, Ladakh had become subject to a highly centralised administrative system lacking democratic accountability. Kargil, meanwhile, began moving away from its earlier pro-Kashmir orientation and increasingly focused on questions of representation, autonomy and empowerment within Ladakh itself.It was within this context that the Leh Apex Body and the KDA came together, marking a historic shift in Ladakh’s political trajectory. Consensus emerged around a common programme, including statehood for Ladakh, constitutional safeguards for land and employment, separate parliamentary representation and immediate recruitment to government posts.Also read: Ladakh ‘Breakthrough’ Spurs Calls For Unity in J&K as Statehood Restoration Promise Remains UnfulfilledUnity as a strategyThis development was politically remarkable because it required overcoming decades of mistrust, sectarian mobilisation and regional rivalry. Historically, it would have been almost unimaginable for Leh and Kargil to jointly lead a political movement. Yet, the leadership on both sides consciously recognised that fragmented politics would weaken their struggle.The emergence of a joint movement, therefore, reflected a significant degree of political maturity and strategic wisdom. Both sides consciously avoided falling back into older sectarian or regional binaries. More importantly, the movement consciously projected itself as a struggle for all Ladakhis rather than for any particular religious or regional group. This represented a major transformation in the character of Ladakhi identity politics. Earlier politics in the region had largely been based on communal and regional ‘othering.’ This transformation explains much of the movement’s success. The unified mobilisation of Leh and Kargil significantly strengthened Ladakh’s negotiating capabilities vis-à-vis the Union Government. The movement acquired broader legitimacy precisely because it was no longer seen as representing only one region or one community. Instead, it projected itself as a collective struggle for democratic representation, constitutional safeguards and regional empowerment.Co-chairman of the Leh Apex Body Chering Dorjay Lakrook (L) and the Kargil Democratic Alliance chief Asgar Ali Karbalai (second from left) and climate activist Sonam Wangchuk (second from right), and others who attended the meeting in New Delhi on May 22, 2026. Photo: By arrangement.The dividends of this political unity had become visible even before the recent crucial meeting of the High-Powered Committee’s sub-groups. The union government had already expanded reservations in government employment for local residents, introduced domicile-based safeguards to protect Ladakhis’ access to jobs and created additional districts within the region. The emerging consensus now appears to address most of the major concerns articulated by Ladakhi leadership. Constitutional safeguards under Article 371, the establishment of an elected legislative body and the subordination of the bureaucracy to an elected executive together hold the potential to institutionalise democratic accountability and regional autonomy in Ladakh. Once formalised, these measures would substantially fulfil the core demands that Ladakhis have consistently raised since 2019.Rekha Chowdhary was formerly a professor of Political Science at the University of Jammu.