The journey of Article 23 in the Indian Constitution represents one of the most dynamic and evolving areas of fundamental rights jurisprudence in India. From its initial invocation in the landmark People’s Union for Democratic Rights case in 1982 to the ongoing inter-state trafficking cases being monitored by the Supreme Court in 2025, the interpretation and enforcement of this provision prohibiting traffic in human beings and forced labour has undergone remarkable expansion, touching millions of lives across the country.The foundation of modern Article 23 jurisprudence was laid on September 18, 1982, when the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India – popularly known as the Asiad workers’ case – Justice P.N. Bhagwati, writing for the bench, transformed the understanding of forced labour by holding that payment of wages below the statutory minimum wage constitutes forced labour within the meaning of Article 23.The Supreme Court adopted an expansive interpretation of the word “force” to include not merely physical or legal compulsion but also economic circumstances that compel a person to work against reasonable remuneration. This revolutionary interpretation acknowledged the reality that poverty, hunger and destitution can be as coercive as physical chains, making seemingly voluntary labour arrangements violative of constitutional guarantees.Just months after the Asiad Workers’ Case, the top court in Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan on January 20, 1983, applied these principles to famine relief workers. The court struck down provisions of the Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Employees (Exemption from Labour Laws) Act, 1964, that permitted payment below minimum wages, holding that the state cannot exploit the vulnerable condition of drought-affected persons by paying them less than minimum wages even under the pretext of providing relief. This judgment affirmed that fundamental rights cannot be suspended or diluted merely because the beneficiaries are receiving state assistance during emergencies.Perhaps the most significant case in the early phase was Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, decided on December 16, 1983. This case, which originated from a letter written to Justice Bhagwati highlighting deplorable conditions of workers in stone quarries in Faridabad, Haryana, established several crucial principles.The court adopted a broad interpretation of bonded labour to include any system of forced labour arising from economic compulsion, even without formal debt agreements or physical coercion. Critically, the judgment imposed positive obligations on the state to proactively identify, release and rehabilitate bonded labourers. The court directed the establishment of vigilance committees and emphasised that rehabilitation must follow immediately after release, otherwise freed labourers would be driven back into bondage by poverty and desperation.Building on these foundations, the Supreme Court in Neerja Chaudhary v. State of Madhya Pradesh on May 8, 1984, further emphasised that rehabilitation is not merely desirable but mandatory under Articles 21 and 23. The top court established a presumption that any workman forced to provide labour for nominal or no remuneration is a bonded labourer unless the employer or state proves otherwise, thereby shifting the burden of proof in favour of vulnerable workers.The case for minimum wages of prisonersThe jurisprudence on prisoner wages in India has followed a turbulent trajectory. In the landmark case of Mohammad Giasuddin v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1977, the Supreme Court broke new ground by directing state authorities to provide prisoners with suitable work and compensation, recognising for the first time that unpaid prison labour constituted a form of bonded servitude that violated human dignity. This progressive stance gained momentum through the 1980s, as high courts in Kerala, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, and Himachal Pradesh issued successive rulings between 1983 and 1991 declaring that extracting unpaid labour from prisoners – even those sentenced to rigorous imprisonment – was unconstitutional and mandating that wages align with minimum wage standards to facilitate rehabilitation. These courts emphasised that while statutes permit imprisonment with hard labour, they nowhere authorise unpaid labour, and given constitutional prohibitions against forced labour under Article 23, states must, at minimum, compensate prisoners at the prevailing minimum wage rate. However, this judicial momentum was reversed in 1998 when the Supreme Court, in State of Gujarat v. Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat, held that rigorous imprisonment does not violate Article 23 and endorsed the practice of permitting states to deduct portions of prisoner wages for maintenance costs and victim compensation, though it maintained that residual wages should remain sufficient to support prisoners’ future rehabilitation. As Baljeet Kaur points out in a 2021 article, wages for the prisoners have remained meager till today. New dimensions of Article 23The 1990s saw the Supreme Court addressing new dimensions of Article 23. In Vishal Jeet v. Union of India decided on May 2, 1990, the bench of Justices S. Ratnavel Pandian and K. Jayachandra Reddy held that trafficking in human beings as prohibited by Article 23 includes trafficking for prostitution and sexual exploitation. The Supreme Court directed comprehensive measures for eradicating practices like the Devadasi system and child prostitution, emphasising preventive rather than punitive approaches.The child labour dimension received extensive treatment in M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu, with an initial order on October 31, 1990, and comprehensive directions on December 10, 1996. The top court mandated the establishment of a Child Labour Rehabilitation-cum-Welfare Fund, ordered employers to pay substantial penalties, and directed that either adult family members be provided employment or compensation is be paid into the fund. These directions created an economic disincentive for child labour while ensuring rehabilitation of affected children.The late 1990s also witnessed Gaurav Jain v. Union of India on July 9, 1997, where the top court addressed the rights of children of prostitutes and women trafficked into flesh trade. While the judgment was later partially modified, it established important principles regarding the state’s duty to provide care, protection and rehabilitation to victims of trafficking and their children, viewing them as victims rather than offenders.As the new millennium progressed, the focus shifted to implementation and monitoring. Bachpan Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, decided on April 18, 2011, addressed child trafficking in circuses, leading to a complete ban on employment of children in circuses and comprehensive rescue and rehabilitation directives. The Supreme Court appointed the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights as the nodal agency for implementation.Public Union for Civil Liberties v. State of Tamil Nadu decided on October 15, 2012, established ongoing NHRC oversight of Bonded Labour Abolition Act implementation, requiring states to submit status reports every six months and emphasising the establishment of vigilance committees. Cases like Budhadev Karmaskar v. State of West Bengal directed rehabilitation of sex workers and formation of rehabilitation panels with adequate funding.The most recent phase, beginning in 2024, marks a significant expansion in the understanding of Article 23’s scope. On October 3, 2024, the Supreme Court in Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India delivered a landmark judgment addressing caste-based discrimination in prisons. Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, writing for a three-judge bench, held that prison manuals across various states that assigned labour based on caste, segregated prisoners by caste, and labelled denotified tribes as habitual offenders violated Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, and 23. The top court declared that assigning menial tasks like sanitation and manual scavenging exclusively to Dalits and other marginalised castes perpetuates untouchability and constitutes forced labour violative of Article 23. The judgment directed all states to revise their prison manuals within three months and took suo motu cognizance of the broader issue of discrimination inside prisons, listing it henceforth as “In Re: Discrimination Inside Prisons in India.”Most significantly, the Supreme Court is currently monitoring several matters related to inter-state trafficking and bonded labour that remain pending. On November 21, 2024, a bench of Justices B.R. Gavai and K.V. Viswanathan issued crucial directions in a writ petition filed in 2022 concerning enforcement of fundamental rights of persons trafficked as bonded labourers. The top court termed it “alarming” that in Uttar Pradesh, of 5,264 bonded labourers released, only 1,101 had received immediate financial assistance under the Central Sector Scheme for Rehabilitation of Bonded Labourers.On January 24, 2025, when the matter came up before a bench of Justices B.R. Gavai and Augustine George Masih, Attorney General R. Venkataramani informed the top court that pursuant to the November 2024 directions, a committee had been constituted and recommendations formulated. The Supreme Court observed that this is “not an adversarial litigation” but a matter concerning fundamental rights enforcement, emphasising the need for cooperative federalism in addressing bonded labour and trafficking. The case has been posted for further hearing with directions for petitioners to provide their suggestions on the committee’s recommendations.These ongoing proceedings reflect the Supreme Court’s continued vigilance in ensuring that constitutional guarantees under Article 23 are not merely theoretical but translate into tangible protection for vulnerable populations. The evolution from the Asiad Workers’ Case in 1982 to the current inter-state trafficking matters demonstrates how Article 23 jurisprudence has expanded from addressing minimum wage violations to encompassing complex issues of trafficking, rehabilitation, caste-based forced labour, and inter-state coordination.Throughout these four decades, the Supreme Court has consistently held that Article 23 imposes positive obligations on the state, is enforceable against both public and private entities, and must be interpreted liberally to achieve its emancipatory purpose. The Supreme Court has also established that public interest litigation is an effective tool for enforcing these rights, that rehabilitation is as important as release, and that economic circumstances can constitute the “force” that makes labour involuntary.This is part two of an analytical series on the domestic workers judgment. Read part one here.