In the dynamic between capital and labour, trade unions have historically served as the primary instrument for collective bargaining. With the notification of the Draft Industrial Relations (Central) Rules, 2025, the government has unveiled a new framework for union recognition. While the stated aim is to streamline negotiations, a closer reading of Chapter III and Rule 39 suggests a strategy that could entangle unions in procedural complexities and structural dependence.The rules introduce mechanisms for verification, threshold-based recognition, and facilities management that critics argue may fracture the collective voice of the workforce.The employer as ‘Returning Officer’A significant concern lies in the process of verification. Rule 9 sets out the procedure for determining the strength of trade unions through a secret ballot. While the use of a ballot appears democratic, Rules 9(3)(ii) and 9(4) mandate that the employer shall bear all expenses and make the necessary arrangements for this verification.This provision creates a potential conflict of interest. By compelling the union to rely on the employer’s infrastructure, funding, and logistical support for its own validation, the rules may compromise the autonomy of the process. Critics argue that a “secret ballot” conducted within the industrial complex, facilitated by the management it seeks to bargain against, is inherently susceptible to influence.The ‘sole union’ thresholdRule 9(2) introduces a provision with significant implications: where there is only one registered trade union in an establishment, it can be recognised as the sole negotiating agent if it commands just 30% of the membership.Legal experts warn this could function as a backdoor for “company unions”. In a new factory or unorganised sector, management could arguably encourage a docile union, ensure it reaches the 30% threshold, and secure its recognition. This would effectively lock out independent unionisation efforts, as the “negotiating agent” slot would be legally occupied by a minority union favored by the employer.The negotiating councilFor establishments with multiple unions, Rule 9(6) sets a high bar: a single union must command 51% of the workforce to be recognised as the sole agent. If no union reaches this mark, the employer negotiates with a “Negotiating Council” comprising representatives from unions holding at least 20% membership.While this mimics proportional representation, in adversarial industrial relations, it may lead to paralysis. Instead of facing a united front, the employer negotiates with a divided house. This structure empowers management to potentially play rival unions against one another, dissolving solidarity into competing percentages.The limits of negotiationRule 9(1) explicitly lists ten “matters for negotiation”, covering wages, hours, leave and safety. While these are vital, the codification acts as a containment. By defining exactly what can be negotiated, the state implicitly defines what cannot.This limits the scope of bargaining to pure “economism”. Issues such as the introduction of labour-displacing technology (AI) or environmental impacts of production – matters of increasing relevance to the workforce – may fall outside the statutory definition of negotiable matters, leaving the broader prerogatives of management unchallenged.Structural dependencyOnce recognised, Rule 9(7) mandates that the employer provide “facilities”, including office accommodation and the deduction of subscription fees from wages (the “check-off” system).This creates structural dependency. When a union operates from a company-provided office and relies on the company’s payroll department to collect its funds, the organic link between leadership and the shop floor can be weakened. Furthermore, the check-off system provides management with a precise list of union members, raising concerns about surveillance and data privacy.The ‘protected worker’ capRule 39 limits the number of “Protected Workers” – office-bearers shielded from dismissal during disputes – to just 1% of the total workforce (subject to a maximum of 100).In mass movements, leadership is often diffused, residing in shop stewards and floor mobilisers, not just the top office-bearers. By capping protection at 1%, the rules allow the employer to potentially target second-rung leadership who are not on the “official list”. This could hollow out the union’s operational capacity by targeting emerging activists without technically violating the law.Finally, the Draft Industrial Relations Rules, 2025, represent a shift towards the management of dissent. By mandating employer-funded verification, creating low thresholds for minority unions, and limiting the scope of protected leadership, the framework risks transforming unions into administrative units. While intended to foster industrial harmony, these rules may ultimately weaken the independent agency of the working class.