For some time now, it has been a national pastime to watch, often with barely concealed schadenfreude, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s poaching of political stakeholders, famously lauded as ‘Operation Lotus’ by sections of a “committed media”; unabashed misuse of institutions, most notably the Election Commission of India); the gerrymandering of election outcomes through the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, which was blithely endorsed by a “committed Judiciary”; and the consequent weakening of opposition parties. Whatever one’s view on the legality of these manoeuvres may be – which surprisingly is dictated not by constitutionality, but by which side of the ideological spectrum one falls – it is important to look beyond the immediate, and reflect on the structural implications for India’s democracy. BJP’s second democratic upsurgeSitaram Yechury once framed the rise of regional parties as a deepening and maturing of Indian democracy. He posited that regional parties arose both from the evolving aspirations of India’s electorate, and from the Indian National Congress’s growing inability (or unwillingness) to accommodate these demands within itself. Characterised as the second democratic upsurge, regional parties captured the vacuum left by the Congress. These parties often splintered from the Congress, and reorganised politics around local realities, such as caste and linguistic identities, and subnational priorities. Interestingly, and as a side note, these primordial markers overtook the once-dominant axis of haves versus have-nots which shaped Indian politics, once popularised by Garibi Hatao (eradicate poverty) and the Left’s oversized influence on the polity.Over the past two decades, the BJP has systematically reversed the upsurge that began in the 1970s-80s. The BJP has deliberately deployed three strategies to grow at the cost of regional parties. The first phase of its playbook, which started well before 2014, rested on a calibrated engagement with regional parties. The BJP consciously entered as a junior partner in many states, allowing it to gain access to the state machinery, build organisational muscle, pursue its ideological agenda (which included positioning committed stakeholders in key levers of power) and expand its voter base without immediately confronting dominant regional parties head-on. But once that foothold was secured, the relationship invariably shifted, with the BJP growing primarily at the cost of its own allies. This pattern has been visible across multiple states, albeit with local variations.For example, factions emerging from the Janata Parivar lineage in Karnataka aligned with the BJP – for instance, the Lok Shakti Party – only to be absorbed into its expanding structure, contributing significantly to BJP’s ascendance in Karnataka. Similarly, although the Janata Dal-United (JDU) oscillated between alliance and opposition to the BJP in Bihar, it has been methodically circumscribed, and it is only a matter of time before it is absorbed into the BJP. Likewise, despite its iron-clad support in various fora, the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) was successfully dislodged from Odisha by the BJP. In a similar vein, the BJP’s allies – in Tamil Nadu, the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam; the People’s Democratic Party in Jammu and Kashmir; Asom Gana Parishad in Assam; and in Punjab, the Shiromani Akali Dal – have all seen their influence waning because of their alliance with the BJP. In Maharashtra, the BJP went even further and directly engineered high-profile splits from both the Shiv Sena and the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) to bolster its strength. The BJP’s second strategy was to accelerate its sabotage-from-within by swallowing up leaders from opposition parties and its allies. It was able to do so post 2014 by leveraging investigative agencies and law-fare to exert pressure on regional parties and legislators. Between 2014-2024, over 805 legislators – across parliament and assembly – have defected from various parties, mostly joining the BJP. It is no coincidence that 95% of Enforcement Directorate cases initiated against politicians since 2014 were against opposition leaders. The BJP also couples this with the misuse of other federal institutions, like the Election Commission, the administration, and by relying on particularist strategies including the SIR. This strengthened BJP substantially, given each political leader brings along a supporting cast of workers, connections, and resources.And the final play in BJP’s toolkit has been to reduce regional parties to rump political stakeholders, without formally absorbing them. The BJP forced them to become proxy parties furthering the BJP’s agenda through gubernatorial interventions or legal harassment. Parties such as the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), YSR Congress Party (YSR-CP), Telugu Desam Party (TDP) etc. have all had their political choices and freedoms curtailed, and they are invariably forced to kowtow to BJP’s electoral and policy manoeuvres (earning them the B-team moniker in popular parlance). In every controversial policy decision or law, whether it was the farmer Bills, the citizenship amendment law, the delimitation Bills etc., these parties voted against their own self-interest and supported the BJP. In election after election, they have also propped up candidates in ways that fragment the opposition and blunt its ability to mount a credible challenge to the BJP. One could argue that these parties have a democratic right to do so, which is technically correct. However, such criticism fails to recognise that such regional parties have long stopped serving as vehicles to champion the voices of those they claim to represent and that when such parties contest in states where they have no real base, it suggests deliberate collusion with, and strengthening of the BJP.BJP’s three-pronged, concerted and consistent attack on regional parties has been exacerbated by the faultiness within regional parties themselves. Most have plateaued in terms of social outreach, given they are rooted in specific caste, community, or linguistic bases that limit broader expansion. This has been compounded by leadership succession, with insufficient cultivation of second and third-tier leadership, and mushrooming nepotism. Finally, ideological coherence is frequently thin, making parties more susceptible to fragmentation when confronted with sustained political pressure. The BJP has cleverly capitalised on these fault-lines. Structural possibilities: Increased bipolarityThis raises a larger structural question about the future of Indian democracy. One possibility is the emergence of increased bipolarity in both national and regional politics. This is of course predicated on the revitalisation of the Congress Party. For this to materialise, the Congress would have to once again become the Congress Movement, and integrate regional aspirations and leaders. This means attracting communities currently outside the Congress fold while ensuring that there is at least a common foundation solidly aligned with the party (it is noteworthy that the Congress System of yore could boast of Dalit, Muslim and Brahmin consolidation in every election, which was topped up by one dominant community’s support in each state). Effecting this social engineering would mean going back to the drawing board, and recalibrating operational methodologies urgently. It would also mean exercising ruthless pragmatism to redress organisational pathologies, and building in-house capabilities to tackle the BJP. It also means posing an inspiring contrast with the BJP and other incumbent governments (where they exist). Mere opposition is not enough. Nor is relying on populist promises, or creating a narrative wave (mahaul) which won’t cut ice given the BJP has a chokehold on the media and is circumscribing digital media. Ultimately, there is no substitute for boots on the ground, and connecting with those who don’t agree with you. Unless one is able to convert those who are fence-sitters or those on the other side, we won’t be able to enhance our vote and seat shares. It’s simple arithmetic. This means having difficult conversations with people who don’t agree with you, and convincing them to give you a chance. Given the cynicism citizens have towards political leaders and parties, the bare minimum they expect is that a leader/party will be an accessible institutional mechanism through which they can make claims on the State. This requires an engaged and consistent cadre. Political consultancies cannot do any of this, because their business model is predicated on capital-intensive campaigns. Plus they cannot repair the relationship between the cadre and the citizenry. Indefinitely prolonging the hard task of organisational revitalisation invariably returns as high electoral costs, as Peter Mair’s has shown when describing why European social-democratic parties lost ground in his book “Ruling the Void” (Verso, 2013). Single-party nationIf the Congress does not recalibrate in the next 1,100 days – the time left for the next Lok Sabha election – there is a very real possibility that India will drift into a de-facto single-party nation. Any meaningful electoral competition would persist only in name, and India’s vast diversities – linguistic, regional, religious, caste, gender etc – would invariably be bulldozed. Like the Communist Party of China (CCP), the BJP wouldn’t just become the only means of dialogue and negotiation – a prospect that some frustrated with the slow churn of democratic policymaking might even welcome – but it would also inevitably impose one nation, one leader and one ideology. As the RSS approaches its centenary, the BJP is tantalisingly close to realising its ideological agenda, without the need to formally amend the Constitution. This is not to discount the internal dynamics within the BJP itself. The party is currently centred around the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Home Minister Amit Shah. They have consistently elevated personal loyalty above organisational strength and ideological commitment. Consequently, strong regional and second-rung leaders like Nitin Gadkari, Rajnath Singh, Vasundhara Raje, Shivraj Chauhan, Raman Singh etc have all been cut to size, and the duo rely more on technocratic ministers, either elevated from the bureaucracy or imported from other parties. Similarly, BJP states are ruled by rootless and lacklustre leaders and anyone would be hard-pressed to name more than five BJP chief ministers or ministers from the 16 states it is in government. The Modi-Shah duo have also substantially emasculated the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), either by co-opting influential Sangh stakeholders with inducements – a pattern evident across many districts – or by ensuring that advancement within RSS ranks is largely reserved for Modi-Shah loyalists.It is partly because of these self-inflicted factors that the BJP has to rely on underhand and illegal tactics to enhance its electoral strength. This partly proves that neither the BJP organisation nor the RSS are as socially embedded as they claim to be (or may once have been). Nor is Prime Minister Modi as electorally sellable as he once was. If either of these were still true, the BJP wouldn’t need to rely on imported leaders or underhand tactics or even the promise of freebies to win elections. But it would be foolhardy to wait for the BJP to collapse under its own weight, as some have privately suggested. There is no telling when that might happen, and no guarantee that what follows would be any more progressive. Knowing how relentless the BJP is in its maliciousness, it could well prop up an alternative formation as wedded to its ideological proclivities anticipating any anti-incumbency. Furthermore, this line of thinking rests on political and ideological passivity that is unacceptable given the tangible risks facing the constitutional idea of India.Given this existential threat to the nation, the time to act is now. We cannot keep tolerating election loss after another, that change will somehow magically arrive on its own. With each loss, millions of conscientious patriots wedded to the constitutional idea of India are losing hope and reluctantly reigning themselves to the BJP’s inevitability. This is simply unacceptable, and the onus is each one of us to disrupt the status quo. It is high time we stop outsourcing the difficult work of saving the nation to political parties, and get involved in whatever way we can. It is imperative to shake off the reverie progressives find ourselves in, and comprehensively recalibrate our operational methodologies. This necessitates hard choices and ruthless pragmatism. For example, civil society and movements will have to be much more electorally engaged, given advocacy and activism has very limited efficacy and since the BJP can’t be named and shamed into course-correction. Progressive parties, especially the Congress, will have to showcase an inspiring model of governance that can be juxtaposed against the BJP states. The Congress will also have to increase the size of its army to win this war without losing ideological coherence; ensure all its stakeholders – from the panchayat to the parliament – are as ideologically clairvoyant and articulate as Leader of Opposition (Lok Sabha) Rahul Gandhi and party president Mallikarjun Kharge; and will need to urgently redress organisational pathologies and shed everything holding it back. Likewise, where they still can, Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA) parties will also need to step up where it is still possible. Where they’re not capable, they must recognise their weaknesses and cede space to forces most likely to win against the BJP.This is not to discount the infinitely more complex question of what the INDIA bloc should do if the electoral process itself, along with the institutions meant to safeguard free and fair elections, are compromised. There is no easy answer to this, and there are merits to both sides – those arguing for boycotting, and those arguing for fighting elections with deeper granularity. However, as Karnataka, Telangana, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh in 2017, and West Bengal until recently proved, the juggernaut can be checked and even reversed. The next 1,100 days will undoubtedly be arduous, but the effort, which per force has to be collaborative, has to begin now. India demands nothing less. Pushparaj Deshpande is Samruddha Bharat Foundation’s Director and Editor, The Great Indian Manthan (Penguin).