Bihar, many can argue, is one of India’s most political states. Yet, on polling day, this political fire often cools to a flicker. The turnout figures are a persistent puzzle. For a state that lives and breathes politics, a significant portion of its people do not vote.Behind these numbers is a complex narrative that depends on migration, economic hardship, and a breakdown of trust between the voter and the voted. First, the numbers. Bihar has consistently posted lower voter turnouts compared to its neighbours and the national average. As the historical data shows, Bihar’s voter turnout has been stubbornly low for decades. It has never, in 60 years, crossed the 63% mark. Compare this to its neighbour West Bengal, which routinely clocks turnouts well above 80%. Even Uttar Pradesh (62.2% in 2024), another state with a reputation for low participation, does better while Jharkhand outstripped Bihar with 68.34% voters turning up in their latest Vidhan Sabha elections in 2024. While the 1990s, the peak of the Mandal movement, saw a surge in participation, the 2000 Lok Sabha election saw 62.6%. The crucial 2005 Vidhan Sabha elections that ended the Rashtriya Janata Dal’s 15-year rule saw a turnout of just 46.5% (February) and 45.8% (October). The most recent 2020 election recorded a turnout of 57.3%.Migration and a hollowed-out electorateThe most significant structural barrier to voting is the sheer absence of voters. Bihar is the epicentre of India’s internal migration, contributing roughly 15% of the nation’s total migrants. These are the youth, the workforce, and the demographic dividend – and on polling day, they are in Delhi, Mumbai, or Ludhiana, economically unable to return.This creates a ghost electorate. When we speak of Bihar’s 7.42 crore registered voters (according to the SIR 2025), we must account for the lakhs who are voters only on paper. Their absence deflates the overall turnout percentage and leaves behind an electorate skewed towards the elderly and dependent, altering the political dynamics on the ground.A statistical look at voter disillusionmentThis is where the story gets technical, and revealing. The core of voter disillusionment can be measured by an index psephologists call DISP (Disproportionality Index). DISP measures the gap between a party’s vote share and its seat share. A high DISP means the election result does not reflect the popular will and a low DISP suggests a representative outcome.Bihar’s political history, when viewed through the lens of DISP, is a story of broken promises. When Lalu Prasad Yadav first came to power in 1990, the DISP was low. The mandate was clear, the trust was high. The government, for better or worse, reflected the people’s will. In 1995, Lalu retained power, but the DISP doubled. His party, the Janata Dal, increased its seat tally from 122 to 167, but its vote share barely moved. This was the first statistical sign of a dissatisfied electorate. By 2000, the fodder scam had broken. The DISP value dropped dramatically. This might seem good, but it meant the RJD’s reduced seat tally was a genuine reflection of its dwindling support. The electorate was speaking clearly again.The 2010 result recorded the highest DISP ever. The Nitish Kumar-led NDA won a landslide of 206 seats, more than seven times the opposition. But in terms of votes, they secured only 50% more. The DISP value hit 35.4. The verdict was built on a strong “seat-support,” but a much weaker “vote-support.” It was a mandate won on thin margins, a statistical illusion of overwhelming popularity.In 2015, the DISP was again on full display. The BJP emerged as the single largest party by vote share, securing a massive 24.4% of all votes. Yet, it won only 53 seats. The RJD, with a much smaller 18.4% vote share, won 80 seats.The 2020 election provided the most glaring example of this vote-seat disconnect. This time the DISP was 22.22. The two major alliances, NDA and Mahagathbandhan, secured an identical vote share of 37.2%. Yet, the NDA formed the government with 125 seats, while the Mahagathbandhan was left in opposition with 110 seats. This means that the difference between victory and defeat was not a matter of popular will, but of vote distribution efficiency. This plays a role in the Bihari voter’s cynicism. The high DISP, coupled with the frequent political “U-turns,” leads to a profound trust deficit that suppresses the motivation to participate.Does voter participation predict political change?This leads to a crucial question: If so many voters are disengaged, what does a sudden increase or decrease in turnout signal for the fortunes of political parties? There is anticipation that the turnouts may spike due to two reasons. One, the Special Intensive Revision (SIR), dubbed as ‘vote chori’ by the Mahaghatbandhan. And two, the launch of political consultant Prashant Kishor’s Jan Suraaj Party. The conventional wisdom is that a turnout spike spells doom for the incumbent. In Bihar, however, the data reveals a more complex relationship.In moments of foundational change, the theory worked perfectly. In 1967, turnout in the Lok Sabha jumped by 7 points to 51.5%, ending Congress’s long rule. In 1990, a 5.7-point surge to 62% heralded the Mandal revolution and brought Lalu Prasad to power. In these cases, a newly mobilised electorate came out specifically to overthrow the old order.The 1977 post-Emergency election defied the rule. There was an inevitable wave when turnout did not matter. Despite being the most decisive power shift in Indian history, turnout in Bihar actually dropped to 50.5% in the Lok Sabha elections and by 9 percentage points to 51.9% in the Vidhan Sabha elections. The anti-Congress sentiment was so absolute that the outcome was seen as a foregone conclusion, reducing the urgency for the marginal voter to participate. Beginning with the 2000s, there was a strategic realignment, when power changed on low turnout. This is the most telling pattern for modern Bihar. In 2005, the RJD’s 15-year rule ended. But this historic change occurred on the lowest turnout in over 30 years – a dismal 45.8%. This was not a populist wave, the victory was achieved not by energising new voters, but by the strategic realignment of existing caste blocs (Kurmis, Koeris, EBCs) away from the RJD and towards the new JD(U)-BJP coalition. Power changed hands not because more people voted, but because the same people voted differently.Therefore, the Bihari does not vote in large numbers because of a perfect storm; they are physically absent due to migration, they are economically exhausted by a vicious cycle of poverty. and they are politically fatigued by a system where their mandate is routinely distorted and betrayed.