The 2026 assembly elections in four states and one Union territory mark a decisive turning point in Indian politics. More than routine electoral contests, these elections signal the consolidation of a majoritarian political order under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The defeats of the Trinamool Congress (TMC) in West Bengal and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) in Tamil Nadu are not merely setbacks for powerful regional parties, but evidence of a deeper ideological transformation reshaping Indian politics at both the national and state levels.The BJP has now established structural dominance across India. With the exception of parts of southern India, its footprint stretches across north, east and west. Its expansion in eastern India, particularly in Assam, Odisha and now Bengal, has transformed the region into a major pillar of its political power.This dominance rests on an unprecedented consolidation of the Hindu vote that conventional electoral explanations – anti-incumbency, welfare provision, redistributive politics or women’s support – cannot fully account for. The BJP’s mobilisation is driven by narratives of suspicion, insecurity and the systematic othering of Muslims. In several states, it has succeeded in bringing more than half of the Hindu electorate into its fold through such mobilisation, with southern states remaining notable exceptions.This was most starkly visible in Assam and Bengal, where communal polarisation formed the central axis of the BJP’s campaign. Longstanding grievances over governance failures, unemployment, migration, corruption and violence were recast through a majoritarian lens, with “ghuspaithiya” and “illegal infiltration” emerging as central electoral themes.At the same time, the BJP’s expanding use of institutional power, including the Election Commission and other state agencies, shaped both the electoral process and its outcomes. The special intensive revision of electoral rolls, widespread disenfranchisement and gerrymandering further reinforced this tainted pattern. This election raised serious concerns about electoral integrity: around 2.7 million voters were removed from the rolls in Bengal, even as the Supreme Court adopted a deferential stance toward a grave assault on democratic fundamentals.Overall, Bengal is not an exception but the clearest expression of a wider transformation underway in Indian politics. It reflects not simply the emergence of a one-party dominant system, but of one led by a far-right formation fundamentally different from the Congress’s one-party dominance in the early decades after Independence.Unlike the Congress, which Rajni Kothari famously described as a “party of consensus” that accommodated diverse ideological, social and economic interests, the BJP has in the last decade forged a majoritarian bloc across much of India. That bloc has been bolstered through the homogenisation of identity within an ideological framework structured around anti-Muslim politics.The roots of this development go back to 2014. At the time, many analysts interpreted that victory primarily through the lens of development (“acche din”), anti-incumbency and corruption scandals surrounding the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government. In retrospect, however, 2014 marked the beginning of a deeper ideological realignment. The BJP’s success in Uttar Pradesh was not simply an electoral breakthrough, but the starting point of a broader restructuring of Indian politics.What has unfolded since then is not merely a shift from electoral democracy toward electoral autocracy, as noted by many scholars and institutions such as V-Dem, but a transition toward a majoritarian democracy in which the dominant community increasingly becomes the political foundation of the state itself. Home minister Amit Shah underlined the ideological import of the victory in Bengal when he declared: “The victory in West Bengal is significant, because after 100 years of ideological continuity, we have a government from every state from Gangotri to Ganga Sagar.”The readiness of large sections of voters in states such as Bengal to embrace openly communal politics suggests that this realignment is not merely electoral, but social and ideological as well. Electoral dominance, institutional power and ideological consolidation are now reinforcing one another.It is precisely this new political reality that much of the opposition has failed to fully grasp. Opposition parties continue to view the BJP primarily in terms of electoral performance and institutional manipulation, underestimating the depth of its social support base. The assumption that regional parties could continue resisting the BJP within their respective states now stands badly shaken.The defeats of the TMC in Bengal, the DMK in Tamil Nadu, the Rashtriya Janata Dal in Bihar and the Aam Aadmi Party in Delhi reveal the vulnerability of even powerful regional formations. More strikingly, Mamata Banerjee, M.K. Stalin and Arvind Kejriwal – three of the opposition’s most prominent leaders – have all lost their seats.Part of the explanation for opposition unravelling lies in the BJP’s extraordinary structural advantages: unmatched financial resources, a formidable election machine, deep media penetration and total control over key state institutions.But structural asymmetry alone does not explain the opposition’s weakness. Equally important is the inability of most regional parties to offer a compelling ideological alternative. Many of these parties have proved far less adept at confronting the BJP than they once were at mobilising against the Congress through anti-Congressism. Moreover, they have failed to move beyond identity-centric politics, whether regional or caste-based.The implications are no less serious for the Congress, the BJP’s principal opposition party. It can no longer assume that anti-incumbency alone will revive its fortunes, nor can it rely primarily on caste-based or minority mobilisation. If it is to remain politically relevant, it will have to build a genuinely federal and democratic coalition capable of defending constitutional pluralism, state rights and economic equality – an imperative in a country marked by deepening inequality.That would require ideological clarity, organisational rebuilding and a willingness to accommodate regional forces without seeking to dominate them.It is noteworthy that the opposition’s most consequential success came in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, when the INDIA bloc presented a united front and reduced the BJP’s tally from 303 to 240 seats. That result suggested that opposition unity could place meaningful limits on BJP dominance. But the structure of India’s party system, marked by regional ambitions, local rivalries and leadership conflicts, continues to undermine such cohesion at the state level.This tension between national coordination and persistent regional fragmentation remains central to understanding the uneven trajectory of opposition politics in India. India’s opposition parties, unlike some of their counterparts elsewhere, have not fully internalised the dangers posed by far-right politics in comparable terms. Even so, opposition unity remains the most viable basis for challenging the BJP’s dominance.The weakening of the Left has further deepened this fragmentation. From the UPA in 2004 to the INDIA bloc in 2023, Left leaders such as Harkishan Singh Surjeet and Sitaram Yechury often played a crucial mediating role in bringing the Congress and regional parties together around a common programme. With the Left now considerably diminished, there is no comparable force capable of sustaining coordination and political trust between the Congress and regional parties on a shared political platform.Nevertheless, a united opposition may still be able to leverage the electoral fluidity revealed by this round of assembly elections. Although the BJP registered notable successes in Bengal and Assam, it continues to struggle in Tamil Nadu and Kerala, two states that remain strongholds of opposition politics. Their resistance could form the basis for a broader anti-BJP coalition as new alignments and negotiations evolve in the coming years.Zoya Hasan is professor emerita, Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.