G.N. Saibaba died on October 12, 2024, just seven months after the Bombay high court acquitted him in a prosecution under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA). Having spent much of the preceding decade in prison, the former Delhi University professor, who used a wheelchair because of severe disability, lived only briefly to enjoy the liberty restored by that judgment.Two years after his death, Maharashtra’s appeal against the acquittal remains on the Supreme Court’s docket. A recent procedural order has revived the question of what happens to a criminal appeal when one of the acquitted respondents dies.On September 28, Justice Sheel Nagu, sitting in chambers, directed the deletion of deceased respondent No. 2 from the array of parties in State of Maharashtra v. Mahesh Kariman Tirki and Others (2024). The court referred a disputed application concerning the participation of the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to the regular bench.However, it is important to note that the court does not name the deceased respondent or expressly record abatement against Saibaba.The court record shows Pandu Pora as Respondent No. 2 in the pending petition of the State of Maharashtra.The legal grounds on which Saibaba was acquittedSaibaba was arrested in May 2014 on allegations that he and five others were associated with activities of the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist). A Gadchiroli sessions court convicted the accused on March 7, 2017 under provisions of the UAPA and the Indian Penal Code. Saibaba and four others were sentenced to life imprisonment.The Nagpur bench of the Bombay high court set aside the convictions on October 14, 2022 on grounds concerning prosecution sanction. After the Supreme Court suspended that decision and, in April 2023, remitted the matter for fresh consideration, another high court bench examined the evidence and the legality of the prosecution.In its detailed judgment of March 5, 2024, justices Vinay Joshi and Valmiki S.A. Menezes set aside the convictions.Their findings went considerably beyond a procedural technicality: the statutory scrutiny intended to precede a terrorism prosecution had been deficient, the timing of sanction in Saibaba’s own case was fatal to the proceedings, search and seizure safeguards had been breached and the prosecution had failed to prove key electronic evidence in the required manner.Section 45 of the UAPA requires sanction by the competent government, preceded by consideration of a report from an independent authority reviewing the evidence. In relation to the five accused, the high court found that the reviewing authority’s terse communication supplied little more than a recommendation. It had no meaningful indication that the evidence had been independently examined.The court held that such an exercise defeated the purpose of an additional safeguard provided by parliament for prosecutions under a special law that envisages imposing strict penalties.The defect concerning Saibaba was particularly consequential. The trial court had taken cognisance and framed charges against him on February 21, 2015. However, sanction for his prosecution was given only on April 6, 2015. The high court held that the court had acted without the sanction necessary at that stage, and that subsequent permission could not retrospectively validate the proceedings.It also considered failures in observing the applicable statutory timelines.Also read: ‘I Refuse to Die’: Remembering Professor G.N. SaibabaThe judges separately considered the legality of arrest and seizure under Sections 43A and 43B of the UAPA. They found that although the prosecution depended heavily on electronic devices and documents allegedly recovered from the accused, the statutory requirements had not been followed.The high court’s analysis of the electronic record was detailed. The seizure memorandum relating to devices recovered from Saibaba’s residence failed to describe the computer hard disk adequately by serial number or other identifying particulars.The prosecution could not satisfactorily establish the relationship between the physical device allegedly seized and the electronic material presented in court.The judges also found the certificate relied upon under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act deficient because it did not identify the electronic record and describe the process by which it had been produced. They concluded that the material could not be relied upon in the manner proposed by the prosecution.Even when examining the contents of the disputed material on the assumption that it could be considered, the court found that political writings, speeches and material expressing sympathy with particular causes did not establish the specific offences alleged. In effect, the prosecution had failed to establish the foundation necessary for the statutory presumption (reverse burden of proof) under Section 43E of the UAPA.In the court’s assessment, the charges had to be proved through evidence satisfying the ingredients of the offences, rather than through inference from ideological association.The acquittal, therefore, rested on two connected conclusions: the prosecution had proceeded in violation of mandatory legal safeguards and the evidence failed to establish criminal liability to the required standard.What the latest Supreme Court order establishesThe findings so far remain the operative outcome of the high court proceedings, and will be subject to the outcome of Maharashtra’s appeal.On March 11, 2024, the Supreme Court granted leave to Maharashtra to appeal against Saibaba’s acquittal. Its order recorded that the state did not ask for a suspension of the acquittal, and the bench rejected that prayer. Saibaba died seven months later while the appeal was pending.The September 2026 chamber order records that respondent No. 2 is to be deleted from among the respondents in the case because of his death, at the appellant’s risk, and that the cause title must be amended. It also notes an objection to the proposed impleadment of the NIA because Maharashtra’s Anti-Terrorism Squad had investigated the case. The regular bench must decide that application.But in the high court’s appeal, Pandu Pora Narote was accused No. 2, and he died in August 2022 while pursuing his appeal against conviction. Saibaba was accused No. 6. This numbering makes Narote the likely person referred to in the Supreme Court’s deletion order. The Supreme Court cause title, as reproduced here, establishes this conclusively.The order, as published, does not say that the state’s appeal against Saibaba has been declared abated.Abatement: the statute and the Jayalalithaa precedentThe legal rule is clearer than the present state of the docket. Section 394(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, provides that an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 finally abates upon the accused person’s death. The parallel provision is now found in Section 435 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita.A Supreme Court judgment of December 19, 2025 also explained the basic distinction: an appeal against an acquittal abates when the accused dies because criminal responsibility cannot thereafter be adjudicated against that person, whereas relatives may in limited circumstances continue an appeal against conviction.Narote died while challenging a conviction, when the interest in setting aside that conviction could survive through recognised statutory routes. Saibaba died after securing an acquittal, when the state was pursuing the opposite objective of overturning it. The Bombay high court had treated Narote’s appeal as surviving; the state’s appeal against Saibaba raises the rule applying to appeals against acquittal.Also read: G.N. Saibaba’s Life Is Not Just a Chronicle of His Times, but Also What the Times Refused to ChronicleAn illuminating comparison arises from the disproportionate assets case against former Tamil Nadu chief minister J. Jayalalithaa. After a Bengaluru trial court convicted her and three co-accused, the Karnataka high court acquitted them in May 2015. Karnataka appealed, but Jayalalithaa died on December 5, 2016 after the Supreme Court had heard arguments and pronounced judgment.In State of Karnataka v. Selvi J. Jayalalitha and Others, decided on February 14, 2017, the Supreme Court expressly recorded that the appeals against her had abated upon her death. It nevertheless examined the evidence concerning the alleged conspiracy to decide the appeals involving her surviving co-accused, V.K. Sasikala, V.N. Sudhakaran and J. Ilavarasi, whose trial court convictions were restored.Karnataka then sought review, including in relation to the fine imposed on Jayalalithaa; the Supreme court dismissed the review petitions on April 5, 2017.The precedent demonstrates that abatement can be personal to the deceased respondent without necessarily terminating the litigation against surviving co-accused. In Saibaba’s case, the logical consequence of the same principle is important, but the precise formal status of the appeal against him still requires confirmation from the amended cause title or a separate judicial order.Keeping the legal effect distinct from the wording of the latest order avoids attributing a finding to the court that it has not expressly made.Why the acquittal calls for examination of the UAPAWriting in the Hindu on Saibaba’s second death anniversary, constitutional lawyer Gautam Bhatia argues that vaguely drawn UAPA offences, stringent bail restrictions and inconsistent judicial interpretations have enabled prolonged incarceration of activists, scholars and journalists. He draws particular attention to the expansive approach to alleged membership of unlawful organisations, the breadth of terrorism related offences, and a bail regime that can give disproportionate weight to accusations before they have been tested at trial.Also read: Seizing Devices Needs Due Process. So Does Remote Accessing Via SpywareSaibaba’s acquittal adds a distinct lesson to that critique. Even before a court addresses the ultimate merits, the statutory review of evidence and the grant of prosecution sanction must serve as effective restraints upon State power. The high court’s findings demonstrate how that restraint can fail when an independent review becomes a cursory endorsement and the legal requirements for taking cognisance are disregarded.The same judgment exposes the consequences of poor forensic documentation in a prosecution built largely around electronic material.Reform should therefore address the precision of offences relating to membership, support and conspiracy, the standard of judicial scrutiny under Section 43D(5) at the bail stage, mandatory and meaningful review of extended detention and enforceable independence in prosecution sanction.Equally important is the integrity of electronic evidence, including seizure records, preservation, identification and certification. These are safeguards that should operate from the beginning of a prosecution, rather than becoming decisive only after years of incarceration.An additional question concerns remedy. The Law Commission of India’s 277th Report, published in 2018, recommended a legal framework to address wrongful prosecution and miscarriages of justice. A carefully designed compensation mechanism could consider the extent of unjustified incarceration and the nature of official failures, while distinguishing an acquittal resulting from insufficient proof from an affirmative finding of misconduct.Saibaba’s death so soon after his acquittal gives particular urgency to the consequences of delay, disability and impaired health.Maharashtra retains the right to pursue its appeal against the surviving respondents in accordance with law, and the Supreme Court must determine any outstanding procedural questions from the actual party record. Yet the enduring significance of Saibaba’s acquittal lies in what the high court identified long before those appellate questions arose: an investigation and prosecution under a powerful anti-terror statute had failed safeguards intended to protect individual liberty and had not produced evidence sufficient to sustain the convictions.The essential challenge for the legal system is to ensure that those safeguards function when arrest, prosecution and prolonged detention are being authorised. By the time an appellate court corrects a conviction after years of imprisonment, some of the resulting harm may be beyond repair.Saibaba regained his freedom in March 2024 and died in October. His case leaves a pressing question for both parliament and the courts: how much of that lost time could effective legal safeguards have prevented?V. Venkatesan is a contributing editor at Supreme Court Observer.