On September 16, a Special National Investigation Agency (NIA) Court in Jagdalpur sentenced ten Adivasis from Bastar to death for their role in the 2013 Jhiram Valley attack. The court had convicted them on September 5 . Most of them have already spent nearly 12 years in prison. The death sentences are currently pending confirmation by the Chhattisgarh high court.On May 25, 2013, a Congress convoy was attacked by Maoists in Bastar. Twenty-seven people were killed including senior Congress leaders Mahendra Karma, Nand Kumar Patel and Vidya Charan Shukla, as well as security personnel. Thirty-eight others were injured. The attack became one of the most significant episodes of the Maoist conflict in Chhattisgarh, and its legal and political consequences have continued for more than a decade.The ten Adivasis sentenced to death are Pramila Modiyam, Chaitu Lekam alias Munna, Sumitra Punem, Mukka Mandavi, Kawasi Kosa alias Kosaram, Ayta Madkam, Madkami Deva, Joga Madkami, Banjami Sanna alias Chamru and Mahadev Nag. All are from the Bastar region. Joga Madkami was arrested in August 2016 and Sumitra Punem in November 2019; the others had been in custody for longer. They were convicted under provisions of the IPC, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), the Arms Act and the Explosive Substances Act.The case therefore raises questions that go beyond the events of Jhiram itself. What does it mean to impose the most irreversible punishment available under Indian law on Adivasis who have already spent years in prison? And what should justice look like in a region where the government now claims that the Maoist conflict is approaching its end?Bastar and the question of peaceThe Jhiram case comes out of a conflict that has shaped everyday life in Bastar for decades. The conflict has brought a heavy security presence into the region, along with arrests, displacement and prolonged imprisonment of Adivasis accused of involvement with Maoist organisations. The ten people now on death row have spent years inside this criminal justice system, in cases arising from this prolonged conflict.The significance of this becomes clearer as the government now presents Bastar as a region moving towards the end of the Maoist insurgency. It points to the decline in armed Maoist activity, the growing number of surrenders and the expansion of state presence into areas where Maoists once exercised influence. The language is increasingly one of peace, development and return to normal life. But if the conflict is coming to an end, what happens to the punitive institutions and cases that were built during it?That question is particularly sharp in Jhiram. The government is encouraging Maoists to surrender and return to civilian life, while ten Adivasis remain inside the criminal justice system and now face the death penalty. An end to armed conflict cannot be understood only through the number of encounters or surrenders. It also has to raise the question of what justice means for those who have already been caught in the conflict’s legal machinery.The end of armed conflict, however, cannot by itself amount to peace in Bastar. Peace must also address the conditions in which Adivasis have experienced the state through security forces, arrests and prolonged criminalisation, as well as the cases and institutions produced by years of conflict. If the government is serious about bringing the conflict to an end, justice for those already caught in it has to be part of what peace means.What justice means after JhiramThe judgment in Union of India (NIA) v. Pramila Modiyam and Others, Special Case (NIA) No. 03/2016, delivered by the Special Judge (NIA Act), Bastar, at Jagdalpur, on September 5 , does not say that all ten accused played the same role in the attack. It describes different kinds of involvement, including attending meetings, arranging food and supplies, and helping with preparations for the attack. The court relied on the statements of former Maoist cadres, local witnesses and other evidence to conclude that the ten had knowingly participated in the attack.Some of the prosecution witnesses were former members of the Maoist organisation who had later surrendered. The judgment itself records that the injured and eyewitnesses to the attack, including the complainant Linus Kujur, did not identify any of the accused in court. It also records that no arms or weapons were seized from the accused in the Jhiram case. The prosecution relied, among other evidence, on the testimony of former Maoist members, and the court found their testimony credible. But when ten people are sentenced to death, the evidence used against them needs to be examined carefully. What did these witnesses actually know about the accused? What other evidence supported their statements? And how did the court assess the fact that these witnesses had themselves been members of the Maoist organisation?Also read: The End of Naxalism, the End of AccountabilityThe judgment also recognises that villagers could be forced to help Maoist groups. They could be made to provide food, carry supplies or do other work because they feared retaliation. The court accepted that such pressure could lead villagers to assist Maoist groups. It still found that the ten accused had knowingly participated in the attack. But since the court was deciding whether they should be sentenced to death, the question is how this reality was considered when assessing the actions and circumstances of these ten accused.The convictions also rest in part on Section 149 of the IPC. In simple terms, the provision allows members of an unlawful assembly to be held responsible for offences committed in pursuit of the group’s common object, even when it cannot be established who carried out each individual act. In Jhiram, the court used this provision to hold the ten accused responsible for the killings as members of the larger group involved in the attack. But this does not by itself answer why all ten should receive the death penalty. A conviction for a serious crime and a decision to execute a person are not the same question. In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the death penalty but held that life imprisonment must be the rule and death the exception. It established the “rarest of rare” standard, under which death can be imposed only when life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed. The Court also required judges to consider not only the circumstances of the crime but the circumstances of the person being sentenced.In Jhiram, the court sentenced all ten to death eleven days after convicting them. At the sentencing hearing, the defence pointed to their rural backgrounds, the absence of previous criminal records, the possibility of reform, the pressure under which rural people could be made to cooperate with Maoists, and the nearly twelve years they had already spent in custody.Also read: Sukma Women Who Gave Up Maoism Say Chhattisgarh Govt ‘Tricked’ Them Into Ramp Modelling The court considered these arguments but held that the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating ones. It found no possibility of reform and concluded that the case was “rarest of rare”. Yet the same judgment describes different forms of involvement for different accused. The question is whether those differences were given enough weight before the court arrived at the same, and most irreversible, punishment for all ten.The social composition of death row in India also matters here. A 2016 study by Project 39A of prisoners sentenced to death found that 76% belonged to backward classes or religious minorities. The study also found that 74.1% were economically vulnerable and that 61.6% had not completed secondary school. The ten people sentenced in Jhiram are all Adivasis from Bastar, and most had already spent years in prison before receiving the death sentence.The death sentences are now before the Chhattisgarh high court for confirmation. A Project 39A study of death sentences imposed by trial courts between 2000 and 2015 found that only 4.9% remained death sentences after the appellate process; the rest were either commuted or ended in acquittal.The questions that remainThe legal story of Jhiram, however, is not over. In 2020, Jitendra Uday Mudliyar, whose father was killed in the attack, filed a complaint seeking an investigation into a larger conspiracy behind Jhiram. The Chhattisgarh high court allowed the state police to proceed with the investigation, and the Supreme Court declined to interfere in 2023. At the time of writing, the investigation had not produced a chargesheet. The question of whether there was a larger conspiracy behind the attack therefore remains open, even as ten Adivasis have been sentenced to death.The government’s own approach to conflict-related prisoners has also begun to change. In July 2026, deputy chief minister and home minister Vijay Sharma directed officials to review cases against people imprisoned in Maoist-related cases where there had been no loss of life, and to examine whether eligible cases could be withdrawn and prisoners released through the legal process. If the government is now speaking of the end of the conflict and reviewing cases arising from it, the question of what happens to those still inside its criminal justice system becomes unavoidable. The high court should set aside the death sentences in Jhiram. The state should also review the cases of Adivasis who have spent years in prison on conflict-related charges, particularly where cases have remained pending for long periods.The death penalty has no place in the justice that follows a conflict. The ten people sentenced in Jhiram have already spent years in prison. If peace in Bastar is to mean more than the end of armed confrontation, it cannot carry the conflict’s most irreversible punishment into the future.Rashi Agrawal is a PhD Research Scholar at the Centre for the Study of Law and Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.