Academic texts are often limited to elite citizens and exclude the marginalised. Restricted by linguistic complexity, institutional gatekeeping, and high financial barriers, these texts are often circulated within elite academic circles, reinforcing existing inequalities in knowledge production and consumption. As a result, the ability to participate in scholarly conversations, whether in the social sciences, humanities, or other sciences, is limited to those with access to universities, libraries, and subscription-based journals. The following interview, conducted over email, is an endeavour to democratise access to academic research. Mark Tushnet’s work is foundational in understanding the role of the constitution, judges, and ultimately people in the discourse of democracy. Tushnet is the William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Emeritus, at Harvard Law School. One of the foremost scholars of constitutional law around the world, his work in critical legal studies challenges conventional faith in courts and constitutions, arguing that political forces ultimately determine how rights are realised and protected.He is a leading scholar in constitutional law and theory, with a particular focus on comparative constitutionalism. His work examines systems of constitutional review in the United States and globally, as well as the design of institutions aimed at safeguarding constitutional democracy. He has also made significant contributions to legal and constitutional history, including influential studies on the evolution of civil rights law in the United States and the history of the Supreme Court during the 1930s. He has authored several books, monologues and articles, including most recently Constitutionalism and its Discontent with Bojan Bugaric. Mark Tushnet.The following are edited excerpts from our conversation.Thank you for agreeing to this interview Professor Tushnet, We have seen attacks on the constitution in almost every major democracy from Europe to Asia. I begin asking you, do you think constitution matters in the age of majoritarian politics? You argue in your book Why Constitution Matters that the Constitution matters because it provides a structure for our politics. It’s politics, not “the constitution,” that is the ultimate – and sometimes the proximate – source for whatever protection we have for our fundamental rights. But how would you respond that, in certain contexts, constitutions may not merely fail to restrain majoritarian power but may actively enable it? In other words, what happens when the constitution itself becomes a site of oppression rather than a safeguard against it? Does this possibility challenge your claim about the continuing importance of constitutions, or does it instead reinforce the primacy of politics over constitutional design, which you seem to suggest?There’s no doubt that governments taking office after fair elections can adopt oppressive policies, and that constitutional texts often contain provisions that lawyers and courts could use to overturn those policies. And sometimes courts do indeed do that. But typically, and for reasons rooted in the structure of government, such interventions are short-lived or limited to minor features of the oppressive policies. The structural reason for this is that elected governments almost always have the ability to gain “control” over the courts through new appointments and similar techniques, Ina metaphor that’s become common, what courts can do is place “speed bumps” in the oppressive government’s way, slowing down the pace of its action and giving opposition leaders an opportunity to organise more effectively against the government. So, in the end, though constitutions can do something to affect the pace of oppression, ultimately only a mobilised population can prevent or overturn oppressive policies. And, of course, if a substantial majority of the population wants to oppress a minority, there’s really nothing – even a constitution – that can stop them.In your latest book Constitutionalism and its Discontents, you question the faith in constitutionalism as a safeguard against political excess. How do you explain the growing disillusionment with constitutional frameworks in many democracies, and does this signal a deeper crisis in the idea of constitutionalism itself?Many people have become disillusioned with constitutional frameworks because the governments created by and operating within them have failed to deliver substantive policies – alleviation of poverty, reduction in dramatic wealth disparities, fair treatment in social life – of a sort that those people believe governments should provide. These failures result primarily from choices made by political actors and can be remedied by making different choices – or by choosing different political leaders. I don’t think that the failures are rooted in significant features of constitutional design, though some national constitutions place so many obstacles in the way of enacting broad legislation that it takes extraordinary political leadership to push such legislation through.You have explored the limits of courts and constitutional design in constraining political power. In contexts where constitutional mechanisms appear to legitimise rather than resist authoritarian or majoritarian tendencies, what alternative institutional or political strategies do you see as viable for protecting democratic values? Scholars who have studied “democratic decline” generally agree that the primary actors are civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) rather than traditional political parties, and that the best strategies for resisting and reversing it are typically “moderate” rather than “extreme.” The usual examples of “moderate” demonstrations on the streets – civil society in action – versus “extreme” efforts in a general strike or through impeachment or other legalistic efforts to remove the non-democratic leadership.I will turn to some of your other important work in Taking Back to the Constitution. You argue that constitutional interpretation shouldn’t be left solely to courts – what do you see as the most realistic mechanism for popular constitutionalism to actually constrain or redirect judicial power in practice?First, widespread efforts by civil society organisations and NGOs to make available to the general population ideas about what a good constitution should do. Second, the mobilisation of the population, through street demonstrations as well as political campaigns, around new visions of what the constitution is or could be. These mobilisations will almost always include slogans that translate policy concerns – poverty, inequality, and the like – into constitutional terms.The U.S. Supreme Court in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (2023) effectively dismantled affirmative action. India’s Supreme Court, by contrast, has generally upheld and even expanded reservations. Does this contrast support your argument that courts are unreliable guardians of substantive equality?I’m vary cautious about using the experience of a single nation – here, the United States – as the basis for a generalisation about institutions generally. The US Supreme Court’s decision is the result of a particular confluence of events and ideas in the United States, and it seems clear to me that its current hostility to affirmative action is not the product of some characteristic shared by constitutional courts everywhere.You write for both an academic and a broader public audience. How do you think popular constitutionalism can be cultivated in a political culture where constitutional literacy is relatively low? What is the role of academics, you think in building and cultivating constitutional consciousness? Of course, there’s a difference between the way academics write for each other and the rhetorical methods most effective in reaching a broad public audience. Not all academics, even the best of us, can write in both modes, and not all academics, even those at the peak of their disciplines, should try to develop the skills needed to reach a broad audience. (They can rely on others, including journalists, to “translate” their ideas for that audience.) That said, I would encourage academics to try to learn how to write in ways that are readily understandable by nonspecialist audiences. I should add that it took me several decades to develop some facility in writing for a general audience, and even now I am much worse at doing so than are good journalists who have engaged with ideas about constitutional law.What is your message and piece of advice to the young scholars of constitutional law, especially those who come from the Global South? I used to end the main class I taught first-year law students with a series of slides showing athletes at the peak of their performance – a runner breaking a tape while setting a world record, a football player celebrating a win, and the like – and then telling them the lesson I hoped they would learn: “Do good work.” That’s my advice to young scholars everywhere: Do the work and do your best to ensure that it’s good.Rajesh Ranjan is a Chevening scholar, lawyer and researcher based in London. Contact: rajeshranjannluj@gmail.com.