Indian politicians rarely, if ever, engage with public international law in their personal capacity. Beyond the occasional invocation of sovereignty, or the articulation of a preferred legal outcome in specific disputes, there is little in the way of broader reflection or critical assessment of the state and health of international law and its institutions. This is not merely unfortunate; it is ultimately self-defeating as international law is created, interpreted and enforced almost entirely through the participation and engagement of states and their institutions.Political leaders must therefore ponder, debate and take positions on contemporary international legal issues, lest their states forfeit their ability to shape the very rules and mechanisms that govern them.Shashi Tharoor’s article in The Hindu, “International law, ‘optional’ for powerful states (May 30, 2026)” is therefore a welcome contribution. It offers an astute and timely take on what ails public international law today, particularly the increasing tendency of states to resort to unlawful uses of force. It is an article that deserves to be read not only by lawyers and policymakers, but anyone interested in how our world is structured and functions.While it is difficult to disagree with Tharoor’s identification of serious and high-profile violations, taking a broader view of the field of international law reveals that while there may be non-compliance with certain fundamental rules of international law (particularly those relating to the prohibition on the use of force and the protection of human rights), there remains remarkably high degree of compliance with the vast majority of international law rules. These include the silent but critical network of treaties and agreements that regulate and facilitate diplomatic relations, telecommunications, internet access, air travel, road traffic, customs procedures, and public health, including vaccine standardisation.Indeed, several of the foods and ingredients that constitute a typical tiffin or chai-nashta are likely to have been sourced, transported, or regulated under international frameworks that rely on state cooperation and compliance. In this sense, the quotidian operation of international law witnesses high level of compliance – quite in contrast to domestic legal systems, where a state typically devotes significant energy in enforcing “major” rules while “minor” rules may often be neglected.What states can do to protect and strengthen international lawThat said, Tharoor’s central charge that there has been an erosion of the edifice of international legal norms cannot be dismissed. The pressing question, then, is what states, particularly states such as India that aspire to play a greater role in the global order, can do to protect and strengthen international law and its institutions.To begin with, states committed to the rule of law in international relations must play an active role in articulating, advocating, and seeking enforcement of legal rules they believe to be essential to the stability of the international order. At a minimum, this requires clear and principled reactions when there are violations of fundamental rules of international law, such as the prohibition on the use of force enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter – described by the eminent Indian jurist Judge Nagendra Singh as “the very cornerstone of the human effort to promote peace in a world torn by strife.”State reactions in the form of public statements, transmitted documents and exchanges made in multilateral settings are often elements that are considered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in deciding whether a dispute exists under international law, and they can also play an important role in influencing the behavior of non-complying states as well as building consensus around the collective action to be taken. In fact, the wave of public statements (from both large and small states) criticising United States’ military operations against Iran, for example, contributed directly to the issuance of a formal legal justification by the US State Department’s Office of the Legal Adviser in April 2026, asserting that “the United States is acting well within the recognised contours of international law relating to the use of force and self-defense.”Whatever one’s assessment of that position, its very articulation underscores an important point: even powerful states continue to feel compelled to frame their conduct in legal terms. Such justificatory discourse would be far less likely in the absence of sustained external scrutiny rooted in law.Yet too often, diplomatic statements and reactions are couched in vague and Delphic language that obscures rather than reinforces legal norms. Expressions of “concern” simpliciter and calls for “all sides” to exercise restraint frequently fail to identify either the violated rule or the responsible party. Such statements do little to protect the edifice of international law and they risk becoming perfunctory and performative exercises.States that do not effectively promote and protect international legal norms that protect the collective interests of the international community will eventually have to live in a world where those norms are so weakened that they are unable to protect them.It is also important to note that the responsibility for upholding international law, and in that process shaping the law’s application in a manner that accommodates national interests, does not rest solely with foreign ministries or the executive branch. It is a broader institutional task that ought to engage multiple stakeholders, including Parliament. In this regard, relevant parliamentary bodies – such as the Standing Committee on External Affairs, chaired by Tharoor himself – have a potentially significant role to play.An excellent practice worth emulating is that of the UK parliament, which convened a briefing on the legality of the January 2026 US military operation to capture Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro in the aftermath of the event. Notably, this briefing invited domestic and foreign legal experts to give testimony before the relevant committee of parliament and was undertaken despite the UK Government’s position that it had not been involved in the operation. Incorporating similar expert briefings into the work of the Indian parliament would enable legislators – and, by extension, the public – to engage more meaningfully with complex legal questions arising from contemporary conflicts.The same logic applies to major policy forums such as the Raisina Dialogue, co-organised by the Observer Research Foundation and the Ministry of External Affairs. Despite being India’s flagship foreign policy conference, there is hardly any discussion of international law in any of the panels. Dedicated panels discussing contemporary international legal issues (which are invariably connected with political issues) would allow legal reasoning to more explicitly inform political decision-making while simultaneously strengthening international legal frameworks.Another forum through which states can, and have, sought to uphold international law is the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ’s docket has expanded significantly in recent years, reaching a historic high of 25 cases last year. Many of these arise from ongoing conflicts – including those identified by Tharoor, such as Ukraine, Gaza, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Myanmar – and have been brought not only by directly affected states (for example, Ukraine v Russia and Armenia v Azerbaijan concerning the conflicts between those parties, respectively) but also by third states relying on procedural tools granting them standing to invoke obligations owed to the international community as a whole (for example, South Africa v Israel concerning alleged acts of genocide during Israel’s military operations in and against Gaza, and Gambia v Myanmar concerning alleged violations by the latter of the Genocide Convention through acts against members of the Rohingya group).The international community has shown strong interest in these cases, with numerous states exercising their right to intervene, inter alia, under Article 63 of the ICJ Statute in order to present their interpretations of the relevant legal provisions. For instance, 33 states are seeking to intervene in Ukraine v Russia, 23 states are seeking to intervene in South Africa v Israel, and 11 states are intervening in the Gambia v Myanmar case. The purpose of such interventions is not to take sides in the dispute between the parties, but to put forward an interpretation of the law that the intervening state considers correct so that it may be taken into account by the court.Of course, the interventions and the underlying cases themselves may be seen as a tribute by these states to the rule of law demonstrating a their commitment to resolving these disputes in accordance with international law and to stay “within the system”, even while other, potentially more appropriate, resolution mechanisms under the system such as the UN Security Council remain paralysed. India has not intervened in any of these cases, but the court’s interpretation of the relevant treaty provisions at the heart of the disputes will inevitably shape the content of international law and, by extension, India’s own legal obligations.A similar pattern is evident in advisory proceedings, where India’s recent participation has been selective. While it did participate in the landmark proceedings concerning Obligations of states in respect of Climate Change, it abstained from two recent proceedings of significant import. The first pertaining to the Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory which resulted in the Advisory Opinion of July 19, 2024, and the second concerning Obligations of Israel in relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory which resulted in the Advisory Opinion of 22 October 2025.Issues deeply relevant to IndiaBoth opinions resulted in authoritative legal clarifications on the scope and applicability of the law of military occupation, as well as on the legal nature of the right to self-determination. The latter opinion also addressed how tensions between a state’s security concerns and its obligations towards the UN are to be addressed. These are not merely issues central to several conflicts identified by Tharoor, they are also issues deeply relevant to India given its territorial disputes and national security context.While participation is not mandatory, it is important to note that advisory opinions have long been the vehicle through which the ICJ clarifies international legal principles and obligations, which can spur the crystallisation and development of international law, and that non-participation effectively amounts to relinquishing the opportunity to influence that development.It is often suggested that that considerations of political neutrality justify such non-participation. Yet, India certainly possesses the legal expertise and diplomatic capacity to articulate carefully calibrated legal positions that advance both national and international interests without straining its relationships. Indeed, advisory proceedings offer precisely such an opportunity where states can contribute to the protection and development of international norms while clarifying any limits that they believe ought to exist (these limits invariably tend to align with the national interests of the state making the submission).Case in point being China’s written submissions to the ICJ in the aforementioned advisory proceedings, where it supported the Palestinian right to self-determination while simultaneously stressing that “[u]nder international law, there is no such right as the so-called ‘remedial secession’ or ‘remedial self-determination’” – which would presumably grant similar rights to national minorities within states.Tharoor is right that international law “remains humanity’s best defence against chaos”. The question that must follow is what states are prepared to do to reinforce that defence. International law’s collectivist nature may be one its weaknesses, but it is also one of its great strengths as the law recognises that certain obligations, such as the prohibition on the use of force, are owed erga omnes, i.e., owed to the international community as a whole, and consequently all states have a legal interest in seeing the obligation upheld – including through the taking of legal, political and judicial measures to induce compliance. What measures we take will ultimately determine whether, to borrow from Lincoln, “we shall nobly save or meanly lose the last best hope on earth.”Yateesh Begoore Shivaswamy is an international lawyer.