I still remember that morning in 1971 when I took the No. 9 bus as usual from Southern Avenue in South Calcutta to St. Xavier’s College on Park Street. I was in the final year of my B.Sc. degree. Suddenly, a shouting match erupted between a passenger and the bus conductor over incorrect change. The conductor retorted angrily, “Sir, don’t teach me to count – I have a Master’s degree in mathematics!” I thought, if someone with a Master’s degree in mathematics ends up being a bus conductor, what about my future?Little did I know then that decades later, the employment outlook would not be much brighter. During an exclusive interview with journalist Sudhir Chaudhary on January 19, 2018, Prime Minister Modi said, “If a person sets up a pakora stall outside your ZEE TV office and takes home Rs 200 at the end of the day, will you consider that employment or not? It won’t be recorded in any register, but it is employment.”Later that year, India Today reported that some 3,700 PhDs and 28,000 post-graduates applied for 62 peon posts in the UP Police. In July this year, Railway Minister Ashwini Vaishnaw admitted in the Lok Sabha that 1.08 crore candidates were competing for just 32,438 entry-level positions as pointsmen, track maintainers and assistants. This continuing scramble for government jobs underscores the severity of India’s employment crisis.It is hard to believe the rosy picture painted by official employment data. Under the government’s Usual Principal and Subsidiary Status (UPSS) framework, anyone who engages in an economic activity for at least 30 days during the preceding year, including frying pakoras on a pavement, is officially counted as employed.Obviously, such a definition cannot capture the true scale of India’s employment crisis. According to the ILO’s India Employment Report 2024, youth with a graduate degree faced a staggering unemployment rate of 29.1% in 2022, significantly higher than the 18.4% rate for those with a secondary or higher education.Furthermore, around two-fifths of technically qualified youth are trapped in jobs that don’t match their qualifications.In advanced economies, unemployment is highly “visible” because social safety nets allow workers to search for suitable jobs without risking starvation. They are not forced to eke out a living selling trinkets on the street. But in India, where there is no state safety net, open unemployment is a luxury reserved for those who can afford it.Also read: How Not to Misread Job Market NumbersAs a result, official employment figures tend to reflect distress-driven survival more than they do a healthy job market. Moreover, as millions are pushed into informal, marginal occupations, the country’s overall labour productivity is severely depressed. According to the ILO, around 90% of India’s workforce is now employed informally.This creates a massive problem of disguised unemployment – where workers are forced into low-skilled jobs well below their actual capacity. With roughly 1 to 1.2 crore young entrants joining the labour market each year on top of an existing backlog of 2 to 2.5 crore unemployed, the challenge of creating enough jobs compounds with each passing year.The vast pool of unemployed and underemployed people not only drag down wages but create the perfect conditions for worker exploitation. So, it is not surprising to find titans of industry like Infosys’s co-founder Narayana Murthy and Larsen & Toubro’s Chairman S.N. Subrahmanyan extolling the virtues of working 70-to-90-hour weeks, mostly without extra compensation.Yet, neither economic theory nor international experience suggests that worker output keeps rising the longer they work. On the contrary, productivity deteriorates sharply under grueling conditions. In advanced economies, competitive labour markets effectively deter CEOs from justifying or expecting such outlandish working hours.1. Labour utilisation and productivity: India vs Asian PeersThe IMF recently touted India as the fastest growing major economy in the world. Unfortunately, this headline has become a convenient mantra for politicians and the wealthy, even as the queue for entry-level government jobs keeps getting longer.According to the World Inequality Report 2026, inequality in India “remains among the highest in the world and has shown little movement in recent years…the top 10% of earners capture about 58% of national income, while the bottom 50% receive only 15%.”This extreme divide is driven by a growth model that fails to create well-paying formal jobs, forcing the vast majority of job-seekers into the informal sector at fraction of the wages. The depth of this wasted potential is clear when we look at the share of young people who are neither employed, in school, nor in training (NEET; Table 1 below).(function(){function e(){window.addEventListener(`message`,function(e){if(e.data[`datawrapper-height`]!==void 0){var t=document.querySelectorAll(`iframe`);for(var n in e.data[`datawrapper-height`])for(var r=0,i;i=t[r];r++)if(i.contentWindow===e.source){var a=e.data[`datawrapper-height`][n]+`px`;i.style.height=a}}})}e()})();Comparing India’s progress between 2005 and 2025 against seven Asian peers (China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) reveals a stark failure. While countries like China and Malaysia reduced their NEET rates rapidly from already lower levels, India has almost always maintained a higher proportion of completely disengaged youth. Today, India’s NEET rate remains stubbornly high at 24.3%, only modestly down from 29.9% two decades earlier.If India is to actually become a developed nation (Viksit Bharat), it must bridge this massive gap in human utilisation. Chart 1 (above) shows that while India successfully reduced its NEET rate coming out of the pandemic (2020-2023), the gap relative to China and a weighted average of six peers remained virtually unchanged over the past 20 years.Table 2 (below) presents further evidence of a struggling workforce. According to the World Bank, roughly 42% of Indian workers are still stuck in the agricultural sector. By contrast, the average share across China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam is just 24.6%.India also has the lowest manufacturing share of GDP and the lowest female labour force participation rate among the eight countries. Recent gains in the latter are probably driven by unpaid family labour in farms and elsewhere rather than women in formal factories and office jobs.This underperformance extends to global trade. The last column of Table 2 shows the ratio of two shares – the numerator measures the share of the country’s goods exports in world goods exports (or export performance) while the denominator, which is the share of the country’s GDP in world GDP, measures its overall economic weight. Hence, the ratio captures a country’s export performance relative to its economic weight.A country’s ability to export goods is the primary channel for moving low-skilled rural workers into formal factory jobs. When we look at a country’s share of global exports relative to its overall economic size, Vietnam punches well above its weight with a ratio of 3.85 while India (0.53) sits at the absolute bottom. India’s export engine is deeply depressed even before it has undergone a true industrial takeoff, cutting off the main escape route for surplus rural labour.China’s modest ratio in 2025 (0.87) reflects the fact that as an economy reaches its massive size (second-largest in the world at around $18 trillion), it becomes increasingly difficult for exports alone to drive economic growth. The tail-end ratio does not capture the fact that Chinese exports punched heavily above the country’s weight during the decade following its entry into the World Trade Organisation in 2001 when this ratio peaked at around 1.5.(function(){function e(){window.addEventListener(`message`,function(e){if(e.data[`datawrapper-height`]!==void 0){var t=document.querySelectorAll(`iframe`);for(var n in e.data[`datawrapper-height`])for(var r=0,i;i=t[r];r++)if(i.contentWindow===e.source){var a=e.data[`datawrapper-height`][n]+`px`;i.style.height=a}}})}e()})();While these indicators diagnose the problem, we must also look at productivity – the actual economic output generated per worker. Table 3 (below) presents this data adjusted for the cost of living and what people typically consume (Purchasing Power Parity, or PPP). We include Japan as a high-income Asian benchmark, especially since India’s nominal GDP is expected to surpass Japan’s by 2027.The drumbeating about the “fastest growing economy” starts to fade when we consider overall labour productivity. In 1991, a Chinese worker’s output was about half that of an Indian worker. By 2025, the Chinese worker produced nearly twice as much. Vietnam, heavily ravaged by war, also started below India, yet its productivity growth accelerated rapidly between 2015 and 2025.Conversely, India’s annual productivity growth actually fell – from 4.32% between 1991 and 2013, down to just 2.53% between 2015 and 2025 under the Bharatiya Janata Party government.The reason India’s productivity growth slowed is that, between 1991-2013 and 2015-2025, GDP growth slowed while employment grew faster. The ILO reports that India’s labour force surged from 53.1 crore in 2019 to 61.8 crore in 2025. Because much of this growth came from unpaid family and farm work, the additional workers added little to output. Today, except for the Philippines, every single Asian peer has surpassed India in labour productivity.(function(){function e(){window.addEventListener(`message`,function(e){if(e.data[`datawrapper-height`]!==void 0){var t=document.querySelectorAll(`iframe`);for(var n in e.data[`datawrapper-height`])for(var r=0,i;i=t[r];r++)if(i.contentWindow===e.source){var a=e.data[`datawrapper-height`][n]+`px`;i.style.height=a}}})}e()})();Economic size is a deceptive proxy for citizen welfare. The IMF projects India’s nominal GDP to surpass Japan’s by 2027, but by 2025, the average Indian worker produced just 28% of what a Japanese worker produced. With a population that is about 12 times larger, one would expect India’s nominal GDP to eventually surpass Japan’s. Meanwhile, Japan’s labour productivity remains nearly double China’s, even as the latter rose to become the world’s second-largest economy.Chart 2 shows that India’s productivity gap with China widened significantly in constant PPP terms from the early 2000s when the two countries were nearly at par, to just about half of China’s by 2025. However, while Indian labour productivity increased over the entire period from nearly 42% to 65% of the weighted average productivity of the six Asian peers, the absolute productivity gap actually widened from roughly $8,929 to over $13,400.Also read: India Out of Work: Unemployed Youth Become ‘Discouraged Workers’Adam Posen, President of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, emphasises a core economic reality: a country’s standard of living cannot outpace its labour productivity. If median worker output remains depressed, real wages will stagnate no matter how fast the broader economy grows.The fact that the real wages of a wide swath of India’s population have been stagnating in recent years despite the economy growing at a brisk pace is a testament to Posen’s theory.When GDP growth is driven by debt-financed public infrastructure or niche sectors like IT, the financial returns tend to accrue to the owners of capital rather than to the working class. If growth does not improve the living standards of the majority, celebrating India’s rising rank in global GDP is an empty exercise.2. First steps to job creationIt is impossible to outline, in a single article, every policy required to generate formal employment. However, if the government intends to create good quality jobs, it must urgently confront a few critical bottlenecks.First, India must expand the actual value generated by domestic manufacturing, taking a page from the experience of its Asian peers. Vietnam integrated into global supply chains by maintaining low import taxes on intermediate parts and aggressively pursuing free trade agreements. China and Taiwan built dense industrial clusters where component suppliers and final assembly plants operate side-by-side.Malaysia successfully absorbed surplus rural labour by developing export-processing zones that attracted massive foreign direct investment in electronics. Korea achieved its rapid industrial takeoff by strictly tying government support for manufacturers to their global export performance and workforce upskilling. In contrast, India’s industrial policies have tended to rely on heavy import tariffs and offer output-linked incentives like PLI schemes to companies.While these schemes boost headline manufacturing numbers, they generate few jobs and fail to build deep domestic supply chains. Real manufacturing growth requires lowering import taxes, building integrated industrial hubs, and completely overhauling an education system that relies on rote learning rather than teaching marketable skills.Also read: The Cramming Trap: How Rote-Learning and Coaching Culture Fuel India’s Employment CrisisSecond, massive employment potential exists in hospitality, tourism, and healthcare. For instance, India suffers from a severe shortage of healthcare workers, particularly in rural districts. Investing in rural clinics and offering targeted tax incentives to newly qualified doctors and nurses to work outside major cities would simultaneously fix a social crisis and create hundreds of thousands of stable jobs.Finally, despite rapid headline GDP growth, private investment remains weak. Data from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) CapEx database show that new private-sector investment projects dropped from Rs 32.4 lakh crore in 2022–23 to Rs 30 lakh crore in 2024–25. The National Statistical Office (NSO) indicates a further 16.5% decline in planned corporate spending for 2026–27.This corporate hesitation is a direct result of labour-market distress. Because widespread underemployment has suppressed wages, most Indians barely have enough money to spend beyond necessities. This restricted purchasing power not only stifles domestic corporate spending but also deters new foreign direct investment in the consumer market.After all, businesses have no incentive to build new factories if everyday citizens cannot afford their products. Fixing this requires supportive macroeconomic policies with ongoing governance reforms such as enforcing regulatory predictability, safeguarding property rights and easing the compliance burden so that growing enterprises feel safe investing in the future.3. ConclusionEconomic modernisation is impossible when a nation’s most fundamental resource – its people – remains drastically underutilised. An economy cannot attain broad-based prosperity when over 40% of its workforce is anchored in low-level agriculture and the vast majority of the rest barely survive in the informal sector. India cannot leapfrog into a Viksit Bharat without first catching up to, and then surpassing, its smaller Asian peers.Prime Minister Modi’s defense of the pakora stall may accurately describe how Indians survive without a social safety net. However, it is not a tenable blueprint for national development. Building multi-lane expressways, modernising airport terminals, and heavily subsidising corporate assembly lines may swell corporate balance sheets and aggregate growth rates, but they cannot absorb the hundreds of millions of citizens who lack the education to participate.Also read: Has India’s Agricultural Productivity Really Tripled Over 2015-2025, or Are the Statistics Flawed?If India is to avert a demographic disaster, policy must pivot away from celebrating capital-heavy infrastructure projects and aggressively focus on upgrading the capacity of its workforce. This demands a structural reorientation: replacing corporate cash subsidies with employment-linked incentives, radically upgrading public schooling and vocational training, and building shared industrial hubs that allow small enterprises to scale.The window to capitalise on India’s youthful population is closing much faster than official complacency suggests. No nation has ever leapt into the ranks of the developed world by leaving its youth overeducated, underemployed and stranded in informal subsistence.India will only become developed when it builds the institutional ladders necessary to transform millions of underemployed citizens into a dynamic, highly productive workforce. Until then, celebrating the fastest-growing GDP in the world while millions of overqualified youth queue for peon posts is nothing more than an exercise in self-deception.Dev Kar is the chief economist emeritus at Global Financial Integrity and a Fellow at Yale University. Prior to this, he was a senior economist at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) where, in a career spanning nearly 32 years, he worked in various departments and visited many countries on missions.