On May 30, 1949, Dr B. R. Ambedkar told the Constituent Assembly that the Comptroller and Auditor General was ‘probably the most important officer in the Constitution of India’. Ambedkar wanted to see that money voted by parliament was spent as parliament intended. Seventy-seven years later, the Comptroller and Auditor General seldom makes the news unless a report embarrasses a government. Take Audit Diwas, the CAG’s birthday, celebrated every November 16 since 2021. The guest list has always told you who the institution thinks matters: the Prime Minister in 2021, the Vice-President in 2022, the President in 2023, the Lok Sabha Speaker in 2024 and the Vice-President again in 2025. This year, at Bharat Mandapam, the chair of honour stood empty. No constitutional functionary opened or closed the day. The keynote went to a corporate veteran, R. Gopalakrishnan, formerly of Tata Sons, on ‘Embracing the Future’. There were awards, portals, dashboards and the presentation of a home-grown AI model. There was not a word on Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee, or on the thousands of audit findings that ministries have never answered.At least four former CAGs sat in the hall. Their careers, and the incumbent’s, tell a story the celebrations left out. To understand where the CAG is heading, we must first ask a simpler question. Who picks the CAG, and how?A warrant, a shortlist and one nameArticle 148 says only that the CAG ‘shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal’. It names no committee, no qualification and no procedure. So for 76 years the gap has been filled by a practice no one outside North Block could see.We now know more, because the Union has had to describe it on oath. In a counter affidavit of September 17, 2026 in Anupam Kulshreshtha v. Union of India, a petition by retired audit officers, the Union calls the process a ‘settled constitutional convention’. The Cabinet Secretariat shortlists candidates, the finance minister approves the shortlist, the prime minister recommends one name and the president signs. Press accounts of a companion petition describe the same sequence. There are, the petitioners say, no written criteria, no recorded comparison of candidates and no independent voice at any stage.The petitioners’ central argument is that the words ‘by warrant under his hand and seal’ appear in only four places in the Constitution: for Supreme Court judges, High Court judges, Governors and the CAG. Ministers, the attorney general and the Finance Commission are appointed in plainer words, without the use of the phrase ‘under the hand and seal’. The framers chose the grander phrase for the auditor on purpose, comparing him with the Chief Justice. And under the Government of India Act, 1935, the auditor-general was appointed by the king, not by the Governor-General’s council, precisely to keep him clear of the executive whose spending he checked The petitioners challenge no individual and their case is about structure. What follows tests that structure against the people it has produced.Let us pause on the finance minister. The CAG audits the Union’s accounts, and the Finance Ministry compiles and defends them. Its departments of Expenditure, Revenue and Economic Affairs are among the CAG’s largest auditees. Yet the minister in charge of all three approves the list from which the auditor is chosen. No listed company in India could choose its auditor like this; the Companies Act leaves that to shareholders, on the audit committee’s advice. The Government of India, the country’s biggest spender, picks its own auditor, from its own secretaries, behind closed doors.Three petitions now challenge this. The Kulshreshtha petition, on which the Supreme Court issued notice in January 2024, argues that a CAG chosen by the executive will feel indebted to it. The Centre for Public Interest Litigation wants a committee of the prime minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the Chief Justice of India. Lok Prahari, in August 2025, asked for a way to choose a ‘politically neutral’ CAG. The Solicitor General has replied that the petitioners are really seeking to amend the Constitution, and the bench has remarked, “We have to trust our institutions.”Earlier challenges failed for a revealing reason. When a former Chief Election Commissioner and a former Navy chief challenged Shashi Kant Sharma’s appointment in 2013, the Delhi high court found no criteria to test it against, fell back on his competence and integrity, and upheld it as following convention. The emptiness of the law became the reason the challenge failed.Why the conflict is built inThe CAG is picked from serving or just-retired Union Secretaries, usually on the eve of retirement. Shashi Kant Sharma moved from Defence Secretary to CAG in May 2013. Rajiv Mehrishi was appointed in 2017, the day after he retired as Home Secretary. G. C. Murmu went from Expenditure Secretary to Lieutenant Governor of Jammu and Kashmir to CAG. K. Sanjay Murthy, Secretary of Higher Education, was named in November 2024, barely six weeks before he was due to retire.,,Three things make the conflict structural, not personal. The first is timing. Audit looks backwards, often two to five years. So for much of his term a new CAG signs reports on decisions taken while he sat in the same government, sometimes in his own ministry. The second is gratitude. The Supreme Court, in the Election Commission case, spoke of the ‘legitimate power of reciprocity’: people tend to feel beholden to whoever appointed them. For a secretary about to retire, a six-year constitutional post is the biggest favour agovernment can give. The third is that the CAG cannot step aside. He is a one-man institution. If he recuses himself, no report can be signed at all. Courts call this the ‘doctrine of necessity’. It is really a confession that the system has no spare key.Six CAGs, one structureIf we look at the record, the structure shows through. None of what follows proves wrongdoing as CAG, and everyone named is entitled to the presumption of innocence.Under V. K. Shunglu, the CAG’s office gave the physical verification of Food Corporation of India stocks to SGS India without tender. His son worked in SGS’s marketing division. The Delhi high court found no real likelihood of bias, but said the CAG ‘would have been well advised’ to leave the choice to a responsible officer. The big disinvestments of 1999 to 2002 happened on his watch; the first full audit of them came only in 2006.V. N. Kaul came to the office from the Petroleum Ministry, after earlier stints as secretary in Chemicals and Fertilisers and in Coal. His office’s 2006 report on those sales did find flawed valuations. My own view, from inside the department at the time, is that it was handled with visible caution by a CAG who had sat on the government’s side of the table through those years. That is a judgement, not a finding. But it shows the problem: the reader can never know how much sharper a report might have been under an auditor with no past in the transactions.Shashi Kant Sharma had handled the AgustaWestland VVIP helicopter deal at three stages of his career, ending as defence secretary. As CAG he presided over the tabling of the audit of that very deal. In 2022 the CBI charge-sheeted him in the case, and he was granted bail. Nothing has been proved. But in 2017 Sharma also announced that the CAG would audit the fiscal impact of demonetisation. That audit never came.When the Rafale audit arrived in 2019, the Opposition asked Rajiv Mehrishi to recuse himself because he had been finance secretary during the negotiations. The government said he had never handled defence spending, and the dates do favour that answer. But a one-man CAG could not have stepped aside even if he wished. G. C. Murmu’s appointment superseded at least seven senior audit officers, one of whom went on what was described as protest leave. As CAG he signed reports on years in which he had been the Union’s expenditure secretary, and on the accounts of a Union Territory he had himself governed. No impropriety has probably been found in any of them. K. Sanjay Murthy was once private secretary to the then Telecom Minister Dayanidhi Maran, and was questioned by the CBI as a witness, not an accused, in the Aircel–Maxis matter. Today his office signs agreements with IITs and IIMs that sat under his old department, that of Secondary Education, which saw the CBSE marking mishaps and the NEET-UG paper leak, until weeks before he took charge.Some of these CAGs were robust and some were not, but the structure did not decide this, their character did. A Republic should not have to rely on luck.The former CAG who asked for threeThe most striking voice for reform came from inside, albeit in a report asked for by the Government which sought to pre-empt and perhaps slight the then CAG, Vinod Rai. In 2011, chairing the inquiry into the Commonwealth Games, V.K. Shunglu himself wrote to the prime minister that the CAG should become a three-member body, with one member a professional accountant, because a ‘monocracy’ bred inefficiency. The government said it had taken no decision. Fifteen years later, it still has not.An auditor chosen by the executive, from the executive, in private, will in time be pulled towards the executive. Not because anyone is corrupt, but because that is what the structure rewards. Part Two follows that pull: from fewer reports to parliament, to a quiet plan for the CAG to become an adviser to the very ministries it audits.P. Sesh Kumar is former Director General, CAG of India.