The constitution of the 8th Central Pay Commission (CPC) in late 2025 was initially greeted with cautious optimism, but it soon disappointed. Its very composition signalled its bias before writing a single line of recommendation. Institutions speak through their design, and here, the design conveys a doubtful picture of neutrality.With Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai as Chairperson and a lone part-time member, the CPC’s operational core rests overwhelmingly on its Member-Secretary, a serving IAS officer. This is not a procedural detail but the structural fulcrum of the commission. And it raises a fundamental question: can a body meant to impartially determine compensation across services be guided by a representative of the single most influential stakeholder?The Member-Secretary’s role is not clerical but decisive in the CPC. The role controls data aggregation, shapes inter-ministerial consultations, filters representations and anchors the drafting process. In effect, it determines what is heard, how it is interpreted and what finally reaches the commission’s formal consideration. When this pivotal role is occupied by a serving officer from one of the services, embedded within a network of bureaucratic peers across ministries, the process risks becoming a closed loop of institutional self-reference.Natural justice rests on the principle that no party should be a judge in its own cause, but when the person managing the commission belongs to the very service that stands to gain the most from maintaining status quo – specifically the “two-year edge” in pay and promotion – the impartiality of the entire exercise is compromised.This “edge” ensures that Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officers reach higher pay levels significantly faster than their peers in the Indian Police Service, Indian Revenue Service or the Indian Railways, despite all of them qualifying through the same Civil Services Examination. By placing such an officer at the helm of the secretariat, the government has inadvertently signalled that the IAS-first hierarchy is not up for debate.Also read: A Supreme Court Judgment Exposes Bureaucratic Subterfuge Over the ‘Creamy Layer’History offers little comfort. Successive pay commissions have disproportionately benefitted one service, often to the detriment of other Group A services and even the armed forces. To understand why this bias is so galling, one must look back at the Seventh Pay Commission. In a historic moment, the majority of that commission – the chairman, Justice A.K. Mathur and member, Dr Rathin Roy – explicitly recommended the abolition of the colonial-era “edge”. They argued that in a modern administration, no single service should have an automatic superiority over others.However, this majority view was effectively derailed by a lone dissenting note from the member-secretary on the panel and unanimously supported by the Committee of Secretaries. Needless to say, all belonged to the IAS. The colonial legacy – a vestige of the British Covenanted Civil Service designed to create an elite class of “heaven-born” administrators to oversee “native” services – was preserved. The eighth CPC’s composition suggests that instead of learning from this internal fracture, the establishment has reinforced the walls, ensuring that dissenting, progressive voices are kept at arm’s length.Specialist services, be it engineering, accounts, diplomacy, policing or scientific cadres, have repeatedly argued that their domain expertise is undervalued in a structure that privileges generalist control. Yet, each commission has, in effect, reinforced a pyramidal hierarchy with the IAS at its apex. The concern today is not speculative; it is empirical. If past commissions have tilted the scales, what assurance exists that a similarly configured body will act differently now?In a technology-driven governance ecosystem aimed at achieving Viksit Bharat, defined by artificial intelligence, data analytics, cybersecurity and domain-specific policymaking, the premium must shift toward expertise, not generalist dominance. Why should a domain specialist in finance, defence technology or environmental science be structurally disadvantaged vis-à-vis a generalist administrator? Compensation frameworks must reflect functional value, not legacy hierarchies.Global practices offer instructive contrasts. In the United Kingdom and Australia, pay review bodies are consciously designed to ensure independence. They comprise a balanced mix of economists, labour market experts, retired public servants and external professionals, with strong safeguards against conflicts of interest. The secretariat is not drawn from a service that stands to gain from the outcomes. Transparency, diversity of expertise and procedural insulation are the hallmarks of credible pay-setting mechanisms.What, then, is the way forward for India?First, the composition of the commission must be revisited. The Member-Secretary should be an independent professional, an external expert in public finance, with no direct stake in the outcome. Alternatively, a multi-member separate secretariat (not the finance ministry), representing diverse services, should be set up to ensure impartiality in recommendations.Second, the commission must be transparent in its processes. It must publish data sources, methodologies and draft frameworks for public scrutiny as also subject its recommendations to wider expert evaluation to reduce the risk of insular decision-making.Third, specialist representation must be brought on board, but not as token consultation. There must be integral participation of domain specialists in both the deliberation and drafting stages. Defence services, in particular, require a distinct and equitable framework that recognises their unique operational and career conditions.The 8th Pay Commission stands at a critical juncture. It can either perpetuate a legacy of perceived bias or mark a departure toward institutional integrity. But that choice begins not with its recommendations: it begins with its composition.Yashovardhan Jha Azad is a former Central Information Commissioner and a retired IPS officer. He served as Secretary Security, Government of India and as Special Director, Intelligence Bureau.