Managing nearly a billion electors leaves no practical alternative to a robust, fully computerised electoral database. A well-designed ECINet should enable rapid searches, duplicate detection, anomaly alerts and timely corrections under electoral rules; and clear standard operating procedures (SOPs), whether applications are submitted online or on paper for authorised entry. The challenge is not computerisation itself, but ensuring that the technology is transparent, reliable and accountable.The recent Azamgarh case in Uttar Pradesh (UP), involving multiple entries under the same name “Vikas Yadav”, with incorrectly recorded particulars, illustrates how effective digital checks should detect manual errors, flag discrepancies and trigger verification. Similar flaws reportedly found in Karnataka and Telangana’s electoral rolls reinforce the risks of manual data entry without adequate digital validation. These cases underline the need to couple computerisation with robust verification.More serious, however, are recent developments that raise concerns about control of the digital system. In UP’s Pilibhit district, large-scale electoral-roll deletions reportedly led to the suspension of two electoral registration officers (EROs) – both sub-divisional magistrates (SDMs) – and a computer assistant. The chief electoral officer (CEO) of UP also announced the deactivation of ECINet access for computer assistants statewide. In West Bengal, the Election Commission of India (ECI) has proposed enabling tribunal judges to e-sign and upload their orders, bringing digital authentication and institutional accountability into focus. Taken together, these developments raise a fundamental governance question: are statutory authorities exercising effective control over the digital system, or becoming subordinate to the computer personnel who operate it?Systemic weaknessesThe problem with the Special Intensive Revision (SIR), initiated by the ECI in June 2025, lies with poor governance of the exercise. Reported changes to underlying algorithms and code, coupled with inadequate transparency and accountability, expose six interconnected weaknesses that warrant scrutiny.Defective legacy data undermines the mapping process. The 2002-04 electoral rolls, prepared largely by pen and paper and subsequently digitised, contain spelling and transliteration errors, incomplete addresses and inconsistent family details. Yet, they are being used to map electors decades later without adequate validation. Even when voters correct their particulars or secure inclusion in subsequent elections, updated records risk being disregarded in favour of defective historical entries. Digitisation cannot make unreliable legacy data accurate; historical records must thus be validated before they are used to determine current eligibility.Opaque and evolving logical-discrepancy rules risk unfairly flagging eligible electors. Form 6 declarations expanded family-linkage requirements from one family member to three. The six discrepancy categories in SIR 2.0 reportedly grew to 11 in SIR 3.0, covering mismatches in ages, surnames and family relationships. While such checks can be useful, the prescribed forms and rules must be public and legally compliant. Two election commissioners (ECs) reportedly objected to amendments made without notification by the Union government. A mismatch with defective legacy data does not establish ineligibility. The rules and algorithms must be open to scrutiny and safeguarded against wrongful exclusion.Bulk deletions and alleged code manipulation demand independent investigation. Reports from West Bengal and other states allege that bulk deletions were initiated by EROs, often without identifiable applicants or reasoned explanations. If left unchecked, such actions may attract penalties under section 32 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950. Reports also allege that inserted codes generated form 7 objections against eligible voters, like the recent irregularities in Pilibhit. An independent inquiry must establish who initiated these actions, the authority and evidence they relied upon and how arbitrary code insertion could have occurred.Also read: EC’s Latest Submission in SIR Case Suggests It’s Become Habituated to Filing False AffidavitsCentralised ECINet control threatens statutory accountability. Reports of restricted access suggest that EROs lacked the functionality to verify, correct or restore records. The ECs had also reportedly raised concerns about centralised software control and had even written to the cabinet secretary. Objections and refusals by EROs to undertake electoral duties were also reported from several places. Security controls must not override statutory authority: EROs need authorised access to fulfil their legal responsibilities.Inadequate planning, procedural gaps and policy reversals compounded these problems. A pilot could have tested legacy-data mapping, discrepancy rules, forms and correction mechanisms before large-scale implementation. Additional requirements in form 6 raise questions about compliance with prescribed amendments and notifications. Using form 6 to restore wrongly deleted names may also blur the distinction between a fresh application for inclusion and correction of an existing record. Legal scrutiny and pilot testing should have preceded an operation affecting nearly a billion electors.Lack of transparency has hindered independent scrutiny. In response to a right to information (RTI) request, the ECI declined to disclose details of the software used to detect electoral-roll errors or clarify whether automated flagging and AI-based tools were used. It also withheld information on how flagged anomalies are reviewed, while affirming that EROs remained the statutory authorities responsible for preparing and revising electoral rolls. The ECI must explain how flags are generated, who authorises consequential changes and what safeguards prevent false positives and wrongful deletions.Together, these weaknesses show why electoral technology must be auditable. Any investigation must distinguish software faults, incorrect configurations and unauthorised interventions, while also examining officials’ decisions and the access controls governing ECINet.Panic-mode corrections and policy flip-flopsFollowing SIR-related problems, the ECI announced that booth-level officers (BLOs) would collect documents from electors flagged as unmapped or having logical discrepancies, generally avoiding personal hearings unless required by the ERO. Without clear, uniform procedures, such reactive measures risk creating unverified records and fresh inconsistencies.Directing previously enrolled electors whose names were deleted or who had shifted residence to use form 6 may offer a temporary route to inclusion, but leaves the procedural flaw unresolved. A separate restoration form or clearly defined correction workflow, supported by digital record verification, is needed to distinguish wrongful deletion or relocation from a fresh application for inclusion.Also read: Five Takeaways From Bombay HC’s Rebuke to the ECI For Deletions Over Change in ResidenceThe commission’s repeated reversals have exposed policy inconsistencies. Form 6 declaration requirements varied between online and physical applications and across states. Following objections reportedly raised by two ECs, the ECI revised its position and eventually separated the declaration from form 6 in the digital workflow. These developments have also raised questions about collective decision-making within the commission.The larger question is: will ECINet faithfully implement the ECI’s decisions or undermine them through inconsistent execution?Technology must serve democracyECINet requires a comprehensive, independent technical audit by industry experts, potentially led by a technology leader such as Nandan Nilekani, former chairman of Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). The audit should examine discrepancy-detection rules, access controls, software configurations and audit trails. An academic review alone, as proposed in the ECI’s press note dated September 26, 2026, may be inadequate to establish the technical integrity and security of a system of this scale.The way forward demands sound planning, transparent procedures and institutional accountability – not panic-driven corrections. The ECI must establish clear processes for mapping, discrepancy detection, deletion, inclusion, correction and restoration, with decisions that are traceable and reviewable. No eligible voter should lose their right to vote over administrative failures. Proven wrongdoing must invite legal consequences, regardless of the officials’ rank.Therefore, technology must strengthen electoral integrity while remaining subject to human oversight, transparent rules and effective accountability.Rajeev Kumar is a former Professor of Computer Science at IIT Kharagpur, IIT Kanpur, BITS Pilani and JNU; and a former scientist at DRDO and DST. For our full coverage on the SIR and the issues it has brought to citizens, click here.