Below is a copy, translated from Hindi, of the “top secret” Special Investigation Team (SIT) constituted in Uttar Pradesh to assess the scale of theft at the Ram Temple in Ayodhya as well as to identify the culprits. This report was submitted on June 23, 2026, to the state government (Additional Chief Secretary in charge of Home) and it was also discussed at the recent meeting of the trustees of the board overseeing the temple. The report holds counting staff and supervisors responsible, either directly or indirectly, for the fraud. It says precious items donated to the temple were not kept safe and secure – apart from a few that were reported in the media, which could all be identified or traced. It said the temple trustees did not properly supervise counting or security of the counting premises itself. In fact, at one point, the temple stepped up security measures in sync with a bank – but did not implement those measures, and even watered them down. The thefts were possible because of this laxity, it finds. “This was not merely a technical or procedural error, but rather deliberate negligence, which led to the theft/embezzlement,” is one of the SIT’s preliminary report’s observations. Another observation in the report is about the counting staff’s salaries of roughly Rs 20,000 per month and the recoveries made of Rs 78 lakh by the trust itself, before the current controversy exploded. It also says at one point that “All Trust personnel/officials accountable for implementing, supervising and monitoring the counting management process are responsible for this serious lapse.”It has been presented as a “preliminary” report on the “theft/embezzlement of gift/offering money during the counting process at Shri Ram Janmabhoomi Temple, Ayodhya”. It says the final report will be based on the SIT examining a different set of issues and persons than the preliminary one did. The full report, translated by Naushin Rehman, is below. Some parts have been highlighted but no other changes have been made. Sir,The preliminary investigation report in the above case is as follows:Context, introduction and scope of investigationThis report is being submitted on the basis of the investigation conducted by the Special Investigation Team (SIT) constituted by the Government of Uttar Pradesh, Home Department, through Order No. 1387 ख/छ: – पु – 4 – 2026. The above investigation was conducted in response to a letter sent by the Shri Ram Janmabhoomi Teerth Kshetra Trust on 12.06.2026, in which a request was made to conduct an investigation by a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to address public concerns arising from reports in various media regarding the receipt and counting process of the offerings/donations received by the Trust at the temple, and in light of the concerns raised by the matter being related to public sentiment, faith and belief.The present report relates to the theft/pilferage of funds during the counting process of the offerings/donations. The investigation is ongoing regarding the management of the offerings/donations, gold, silver, jewellery and other valuables, supervisory failures, administrative accountability, institutional deficiencies and corrective suggestions.For this report, the Special Investigation Team examined CCTV footage of the counting room and strong room area, statements/explanations obtained from Trust officials, bank officials, security personnel and counting personnel, seizure records, bank account details, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), minutes of meeting and other relevant documents. The investigation revealed, prima facie, that some personnel engaged in the counting process had committed theft/embezzlement of offering funds. Serious supervisory lapses were committed by those responsible for maintaining prescribed security measures, which enabled these personnel to commit criminal acts.Management of offering funds and cash movement to the counting roomDevotees present offerings to the Shri Ram Janmabhoomi Temple through three primary channels. First major method is the submission of cash, coins and other valuables in offering pots/hundis installed within the temple premises. Additionally, offering funds are also received through designated counters and the Trust office.Cash received from hundis was required to be handled under a clear chain of custody. According to information provided to the Special Investigation Team, the hundis were opened in the joint presence of Trust and bank representatives. The cash and other items received were placed in boxes, sealed and locked and then brought to the counting room located in the PFC building.In the counting room, the cash was sorted, bundled and counted. After counting, the funds were deposited into the Trust’s bank account. If any valuables were found in the boxes during this process, they were deposited in hundi No. 12, located in the counting room. Hundi No. 12 was opened jointly at regular intervals and the collected valuables were weighed and recorded, including the type and weight of the item.The investigation revealed serious deficiencies in this process even at the initial stages. Although there was a system of hundi-wise recording and hundi-wise counting, in practice, the contents of different hundis were often mixed before counting. There was no system for numbering and tracking the boxes used for cash transportation to ascertain how many boxes came from which hundi on any given day, how many were counted and how many remained. Given the increasingly large public offerings, this proved to be a serious flaw in auditing and accountability.The investigation revealed significant systemic deficiencies not only in the cash counting process but also in the management of valuables. Devotees generally offer valuables through three primary channels: (i) by placing them in hundis (hundis), (ii) by depositing them at designated counters and (iii) by offering them near the sanctum sanctorum. Each channel required clear receipts, documentation, weighing, photography, custody and transfer procedures.Regarding valuables received from hundis, it was reported that a register was maintained. However, at the time of the first segregation, there was no uniform compliance with the system of immediate weighing, photography and sealing.A receipt system was available for valuables received at the counters, but discrepancies were observed in cases where devotees were brought in through informal channels or items were received outside the formal process. Records were also available regarding offerings received near the sanctum sanctorum, but some of them were informal in nature and more robust documentation of the custody and transfer process after receipt was required.The investigation team was informed that gold, silver and other valuables are kept in a locker located in front of the sanctum sanctorum, for which a register is maintained. Random physical verification of eleven valuables recorded in the records was conducted and their entries in the locker register were found to be in accordance with the receipts generated by the TCS computer system. An investigation is underway in this regard.Reports regarding valuables offered by devotees are circulating on social media and other platforms. To address these concerns, three major news reports were taken into account.Anurag Rastogi, North India Head of the Indian Bullion and Jewellers Association, has made statements in the media regarding the offering of silver bricks. The Trust records document the offerings made by him. These contributions were made on two dates: 21.07.2020 and 28.07.2020, and the receipts issued on both days confirm the receipt of approximately 38 kg of silver.Additionally, the Sarafa Association also donated a silver brick weighing 22.576 kg on 29.07.2020. They have informed that this silver brick and the two other valuable items mentioned above will be melted and preserved in a bank locker. All of these items are included in the Trust’s list of items designated for melting by the Security Printing and Minting Corporation of India, as noted at point number 64 on page 4, as two entries at point number 92 on page 5, and at point number 81 on page 4 respectively. This clearly indicates that the items were in the Trust’s custody and were subsequently melted.Raju Mandwani, President of the Vishwa Sindhi Seva Samaj, has stated in the media that in 2021, eight silver bricks weighing 25 kg each, totalling 200 kg, were donated, for which he was not issued a receipt. The Trust provided the investigation team with a list of items sent to the Security Printing and Minting Corporation of India for melting. This list is signed by representatives of the Trust and the Corporation. On page 1, point 96, boxes 10 through 17 of the said list the aforementioned silver bricks are mentioned. This clearly indicates that the silver bricks were in the Trust’s custody and were subsequently melted.A silver necklace and silver sandals, or charan padukas, were offered by Mr Anil Vishwakarma, a Mumbai businessman. Trust officials clarified that these offerings are safe in their custody. This has been confirmed by the SIT.Therefore, the allegations against the Trust contained in the three news reports circulating on social media are not substantiated. However, it is worth noting that the management system for offerings of valuables to the temple needs to be strengthened and made robust, so that accountability can be established for those implementing the process.Serious concerns also arise from the role of individuals who were controlling the keys or access arrangements to the hundis without explicit written orders, such as Ram Shankar Yadav alias Tinnu. Custody of the keys to the donation boxes without formal authorisation creates the risk of unauthorised access. As the counting in-charge and the official overseeing the opening of the hundis, Mr Subhash Srivastava is responsible for allowing this informal arrangement to continue.MoU/SOP arrangement that defined the counting processA Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was executed between the Shri Ram Janmabhoomi Teerth Kshetra Trust and the State Bank of India regarding the management and counting of the offerings/ donations. Under this arrangement, the opening of hundis, segregation of cash and coins, classification of valuables, currency counting and deposit in the bank were stipulated in the joint presence of authorised representatives of the Trust and the bank.Additionally, on 20.09.2024 and 06.02.2025, minutes of meeting/standard operating procedures (MoM/SOPs) were prepared between the Trust and the Bank. These documents were signed by the then Branch Manager, State Bank of India, Ayodhya, Shri Govind Mishra and on behalf of the Trust, Dr Anil Mishra. These documents are important because they clearly demonstrate that potential vulnerabilities/threats were identified in advance and specific security measures were put in place to prevent them.These security measures included the preparation of a list of offering/donation boxes, the prohibition of moving offering/donation boxes without written permission, shift-based counting, the deployment of a fixed number of counting personnel, the provision of reserve personnel, biometric attendance, hundi-wise counting, the prohibition of mixing contents of different hundis, prescribed uniforms, frisking at entry and exit, the prohibition of bringing personal items into the counting room, the updating of records, the use of machines for counting, the prohibition of food and tobacco in the counting room and the submission of daily reports.The SOP dated 06.02.2025 also clearly stated that the Trust would be responsible for maintaining transparency and authenticity of the counting process and regular/surprise checks would be conducted on every person entering and exiting the counting room.The investigation revealed that the above-mentioned security measures were not actually followed. This was not merely a technical or procedural error, but rather deliberate negligence, which led to the theft/embezzlement.Prima facie evidence of theft/embezzlement through CCTV footageThe Special Investigation Team examined the available CCTV footage. The Trust informed that the CCTV system had limited storage capacity and that footage was automatically overwritten after a certain period. Consequently, the period available for investigation was limited.The available footage, covering the period from approximately 27.04.2026 to 05.06.2026, revealed repeated instances within the counting room where some employees engaged in counting operations were seen concealing bundles of notes and loose notes in their clothing, pockets, shoes or other hidden places. On some occasions, there were indications of assistance or cover provided by other employees. Additionally, some CCTV footage recorded by Trust representatives was also provided to the investigation team showing suspicious activities such as concealment and removal of funds.Examination of the footage indicates that this was not an isolated or random incident, but rather a consistent pattern repeated on various dates. Counting personnel had direct access to cash, sat near the bundles of notes and were allowed to carry mobile phones and personal belongings. Effective searches were not conducted at entry and exit points, making it possible for cash to be concealed and removed.It is noteworthy that CCTV footage was available only for the period from 27.04.2026 to 05.06.2026. During this period, 70 acts of theft and embezzlement were detected. The statements of the employees involved, along with the amount of money deposited in bank accounts that was disproportionate to income, clearly indicate that such activities were occurring prior to 27.04.2026. However, due to the unavailability of CCTV footage, the actual number of theft/embezzlement incidents prior to 27.04.2026 could not be accurately assessed.The available CCTV footage prima facie clearly supports the conclusion that theft/embezzlement of funds occurred within the counting room.Persons prima facie confirmed involved in theft/embezzlementBased on CCTV footage, recovery records, bank account materials and available statements, Avinash Shukla and Manish Kumar Yadav are repeatedly seen in the CCTV footage removing/hiding bundles of offerings and loose notes. Anukalp Mishra, Lavkush Mishra and Karunesh Pandey are clearly seen in the CCTV footage assisting Avinash Shukla and Manish Kumar Yadav in stealing the money. Upon examination of the footage provided by the Trust representatives, Ramashankar Mishra was also found removing/hiding bundles.Therefore, the involvement of the following six individuals is confirmed at first glance:Avinash ShuklaAnukalp MishraLavkush MishraManish Kumar YadavKarunesh PandeyRamashankar MishraCCTV footage, seizures and financial transaction data are available regarding these individuals. It is pertinent to mention here that all the individuals involved in the theft/embezzlement were employed by the bank through the contracted service provider, Sainik Security Services (SSS), on the recommendation of the trust officials. For example, Manish Kumar Yadav, who was appointed as a counting personnel, was appointed on the recommendation of his paternal uncle, Mr Ram Shankar Yadav, alias Tinnu. During the investigation, it came to light that Tinnu asked Manish to provide the necessary documents for the contract to bank employee Mr Ratnesh Chaturvedi. Subsequently, Manish Yadav began working in the counting room on 15.04.2026. It is noteworthy that Manish Yadav has been caught stealing/embezzling funds in several CCTV footages since 11.05.2026.The Jointly Formed Guidelines, dated 06.02.2025, stipulated that the Trust would be responsible for maintaining transparency and integrity of the counting process. Therefore, it is completely inappropriate for Trust officials to appoint counting personnel by making recommendations that are contrary to the spirit of the Joint Guidelines’ integrity.Recoveries made by Trust prior to formation of the SITAvailable records indicate that prior to the formation of the SIT, Trust officials had recovered a large sum of money from certain individuals involved in the counting process. The surrender/acceptance letters and available records indicate the recovery of approximately Rs 78.94 lakh, in addition to some foreign currency and some jewellery/valuables. In addition, Rs 2.25 lakh was recovered from the bathroom adjacent to the counting room on 04.06.2026.The said, recoveries are said to be related to Anukalp Mishra, Avinash Shukla, Lavkush Mishra, Manish Kumar Yadav, Karunesh Pandey and Ramashankar Mishra.Analysis of bank accounts and deposits mismatching incomeThe Special Investigation Team examined the bank accounts of the individuals involved and those of their family members/associates. The examination revealed that these individuals engaged in the counting work had excessive cash deposits and other financial transactions in their accounts as compared to their known [sources of] income.According to available information, the monthly remuneration of these individuals was approximately Rs 20,000 (approximately Rs 15,000 after deductions).Despite this, large cash deposits, fixed deposits (FDs) and other financial transactions were found in their accounts. This situation, combined with available CCTV footage and recovered material, strongly indicates that an attempt was made to conceal/convert the stolen funds through cash or bank accounts. The embezzled funds were deposited by the above individuals into their own bank accounts and those of their relatives.Against this background, prima facie suspicion arises that the individuals spent large sums of money to acquire movable and immovable property and on various other programs. A detailed investigation into the above appears appropriate.Failure of mandatory security measuresThe investigation revealed that the theft was made possible due to non-compliance with the following security measures:Frisking was not conducted at entry and exit points.The prescribed restriction on wearing pocketless clothing was not enforced.The restriction on carrying personal items was not enforced.Hundi-wise counting was not conducted.The contents of different hundis were mixed.Denomination-wise records, vouchers and certificates were not prepared.Biometric attendance was not effectively implemented.The prohibition on food and beverages in the counting room was not followed.CCTV surveillance was not used as a preventive measure.The combined effect of the above deficiencies made it possible for counting personnel to repeatedly remove funds. Role of Trust officials/other personnel appointed by themDuring the counting process, supervisors/representatives from the Trust were present in the counting room. These supervisors/representatives were responsible for effectively monitoring the conduct of counting personnel, ensuring compliance with the prescribed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), preventing unauthorised handling/removal of funds and effectively implementing search/frisking procedures at the time of entry and exit.Available evidence also indicates that incidents of theft/embezzlement occurred on multiple dates. Prima facie, it appears that the required supervision in the counting room was either not effectively implemented or there was a serious failure to ensure compliance with the prescribed security measures. In such circumstances, the role of the respective supervisors present on behalf of the Trust needs to be examined from the perspective of their actual duties, attendance, conduct, gross negligence, failure to implement security measures and possible facilitation.Dr Anil Mishra was one of the senior officials of the Trust and was responsible for overseeing and monitoring the financial matters and cash collection management process. Mr Mishra was the Trust’s representative in drafting the SOP/Agreement Points agreed with the bank. His role was crucial, as the SOP framework and coordination with the bank was directly related to the funds and counting system.He was also informed through internal channels about the absence of frisking. Despite this, no effective written instructions were issued to enforce the frisking system. Similarly, no effective corrective orders were issued to implement biometric attendance, prescribed dress code, restrictions on personal items, hundi-wise counting, denomination-wise documentation and daily reporting. Mr Mishra is also responsible for laxity in the pre-determined search system.Thus, Dr Anil Mishra’s responsibility lies at a senior supervisory level. Responsibility is based on his failure to ensure effective implementation of security measures and, despite receiving information about non-compliance, failure to take adequate corrective action.Dr Anil Mishra was the architect of the SOP developed by the bank and the Trust regarding the counting process on behalf of the Trust. As a member of the Trust, it was his responsibility to continuously monitor and play an active role in ensuring the effective implementation of the SOPs issued by him. Dr Anil Mishra remained indifferent to these responsibilities, leading to the occurrence of theft and embezzlement.Mr Subhash Srivastava, as the counting in-charge, played a key role in the daily operation and supervision of the counting process. He was appointed to this responsibility on the recommendation of Dr Anil Mishra. Available evidence indicates that there were serious shortcomings in the deployment of counting personnel, attendance, discipline, search procedures and effective compliance with other security measures. The most serious issue is that despite being the counting room in-charge, he did not conduct any frisking of the counting personnel.Based on the available evidence, his role appears to extend beyond mere administrative negligence, but also to gross negligence, a serious failure to comply with necessary security measures and the creation and facilitation of circumstances conducive to theft and embezzlement.During the investigation, it was revealed that Ram Shankar Yadav, alias Tinnu, was handling the keys and access arrangements for the donation boxes without explicit written authorisation. Any individual in custody of the keys to the offering/donation boxes without formal authorisation creates the risk of unauthorised access. As the head of the counting and the official overseeing the opening of the hundis, Mr Subhash Srivastava is responsible for allowing this informal arrangement to continue.It is noteworthy that counting personnel, Manish Kumar Yadav, who was involved in the theft and embezzlement, was appointed on the recommendation of his paternal uncle, Mr Ram Shankar Yadav, alias Tinnu. Manish Yadav started working in the counting room on 15.04.2026 and was found involved in theft/embezzlement since 11.05.2026.The Trust has entered into a contract with the private organisation SIS for security duties at the Shri Ram Janmabhoomi Temple complex. An SIS personnel is stationed just outside the counting room entrance. Monitoring the counting process to ensure transparency and authenticity was one of the Trust’s key responsibilities. It is pertinent to mention point number 2B of the MoU dated 09.02.2024 signed between the Trust and the State Bank of India, which states:“The SRJBT shall ensure that there are proper security measures in its premises wherein the cash notes are sorted and collected by the bank. Further, the strong box/vault will be kept under strict security, which will be the responsibility of the SRJBT only.”Under these circumstances and provisions, it was the responsibility of the Trust personnel/officials to conduct thorough searches of counting personnel upon entry and exit of the counting room by security personnel provided by SIS, an organisation affiliated with the Trust.It is also noteworthy that the guidelines regarding frisking were relaxed in the guidelines jointly established by the Trust and the Bank dated 06.02.2025. While it was previously agreed that all persons entering the counting room would be frisked by guards, this provision was relaxed and a provision for regular/random searches was added. It came to light that counting personnel were not arriving at the counting room in the prescribed attire.Trust personnel/officials failed to take cognisance of this and the failure of counting personnel to appear in the prescribed attire contributed to the theft/embezzlement. All Trust personnel/officials accountable for implementing, supervising and monitoring the counting management process are responsible for this serious lapse.The internal audit reports for the financial years 2022-23 to 2025-26 pointed out some serious irregularities, primarily serious and repeated deficiencies in the offerings/donation management system, improper documentation of the opening date and number of the hundi, lack of CCTV coverage when transferring offerings/donations from the hundis for counting and a case of non-issuance of receipts for in-kind offerings. The audit report also clearly recommended 180 days of CCTV recording. However, the Trust officials did not take these reports seriously and ignored the audit reports, leading to the current problem.Role of bank representatives and bank employeesAccording to the MoU and SOP, the role of the State Bank of India was not limited to receiving funds, but also included responsibility for the counting process, availability of machines, monitoring of personnel and compliance with security measures. The investigation revealed that the responsibilities laid down in the SOP were not fulfilled even at the bank level.Key points revealed in the preliminary investigationThe investigation prima facie reveals that incidents of theft/embezzlement occurred during the counting process of offerings/donations at the Shri Ram Janmabhoomi Temple, Ayodhya. Available CCTV footage revealed approximately 70 instances of counting personnel concealing bundles of notes and loose notes. The recovered funds, valuables and amounts in bank accounts inconsistent with income further support this conclusion. The statements of personnel involved in the theft and the amounts deposited in bank accounts inconsistent with income clearly indicate that acts of theft/embezzlement were occurring even before 27.04.2025. However, due to the lack of CCTV footage, the actual extent of theft/embezzlement during the period prior to 27.04.2026 could not be accurately assessed.This crime was possible because prescribed security measures were not effectively followed. Arrangements such as entry and exit frisking, prescribed uniforms, control of personal belongings, hundi-wise counting, denomination-wise documentation and effective supervision were not implemented in practice. Despite the presence of supervisors/representatives from the Trust and the Bank, the prescribed MoU/SOP security measures were not effectively implemented and crimes could not be prevented.According to the prescribed SOP dated 06.02.2025, the Trust was responsible for maintaining the purity and transparency of the counting process. The previously agreed upon arrangement between the Bank and the Trust for the implementation of this process, dated 20.09.2024, regarding the entry and exit of individuals into the counting room, was relaxed by the provision of regular/random searches in the SOP issued on 06.02.2025. The circumstances under which this modification was made by the Trust officials are a matter of thorough investigation and consideration. Even under the relaxed provisions, it has come to light that regular or random searches were not conducted.Dr Anil Mishra, as Trust representative, issued a joint agreement dated 20.09.2024 and jointly issued guidelines dated 06.02.2025 with the bank regarding the management of the offering/donation box. After issuing the guidelines, it was his responsibility to continuously review the implementation of the guidelines. However, there was a clear lack of continuous review, in-charge supervision and monitoring.Mr Subhash Srivastava, appointed by the Trust, was acting as the counting room in-charge. All incidents of theft/embezzlement of funds occurred in the counting room itself. Failure to conduct regular searches is a major reason for the occurrence of theft/embezzlement. Therefore, as the counting room in-charge, he is primarily responsible for such incidents.Ram Shankar Yadav alias Tinnu, acting as the Trust representative, kept the keys to the donation boxes located at various locations within the temple complex in his custody. No formal authorisation was issued for it. It is inappropriate to discharge such an important responsibility without formal responsibility and accountability. He recommended Manish Kumar Yadav, a relative, for counting duty, which provided him with the opportunity to embezzle money.CCTV cameras were installed in the counting room. If the Trust’s staff had carefully monitored the CCTV footage during counting, this incident would not have occurred. Cash counting is a sensitive task; preserving only 45 days of CCTV footage was not appropriate given the importance of the task. Audit reports also recommended preserving 180 days of CCTV footage, which was not followed.Responsible bank officials did not provide the counting personnel with the prescribed uniforms. Bank representatives were also present during counting. The bank was responsible for supervising the personnel involved in the counting process. A monthly rotation of bank officials was also provided. But in reality the prescribed guidelines could not be followed.It appears prima facie that during the counting process in the Shri Ram Janmabhoomi Temple counting room, individuals including Avinash Shukla, Anukalp Mishra, Lavkush Mishra, Manish Kumar Yadav, Karunesh Pandey, and Ramashankar Mishra were involved in crimes such as theft/embezzlement, criminal misappropriation, criminal breach of trust and possession of stolen property.Similarly, the in-charge of the counting room, Mr Subhash Srivastava, along with other supervisory personnel failed to ensure compliance with mandatory security measures such as thorough frisking, controlled dress code, and effective supervision, which allowed thefts to occur unabated and created conducive environment for criminal activities.Similarly, Ram Shankar Yadav, alias Tinnu Yadav, was controlling the keys to donation boxes or access arrangements without any written formal authorisation and Manish Kumar Yadav, who was involved in the theft, was appointed to the counting room on his recommendation. Given these facts, their roles also appear to be questionable from the perspective of instigation, common intent, conspiracy, or facilitating the crime.Therefore, it would be appropriate to register charges against Avinash Shukla, Anukalp Mishra, Lavkush Mishra, Manish Kumar Yadav, Karunesh Pandey and Ramshankar Mishra for theft, criminal misappropriation, criminal breach of trust, possession/receiving stolen property, common intent, conspiracy and other relevant sections.Furthermore, it appears just and appropriate to register an FIR against Subhash Srivastava, the supervisory officer present in the counting room and Ram Shankar Yadav alias Tinnu under the charges of conspiracy, abetment, common intent, facilitating the crime by gross neglect of duty and other relevant sections and investigate them.This is a preliminary investigation report and the investigation is still ongoing. A report regarding supervisory failures, administrative responsibility, institutional deficiencies and corrective suggestions will be submitted in the final report.(Neel Ratan)Special Secretary,Finance Department,U P Government, LucknowMember-SIT (Kiran S.)Inspector General of Police,Lucknow Zone,Lucknow,Member-SIT (Vijay Vishwas Pant)Commissioner,Lucknow Division, Lucknow,Chairman-SIT