Elections are the foundational act of a parliamentary democracy. They are not routine administrative exercises but the solemn constitutional ritual by which sovereignty returns to the people and is consciously re-delegated to their representatives. If democracy is the heart of the Republic, elections are its living pulse.Article 324 of the constitution vests in a single authority – the Election Commission of India (ECI) – the superintendence, direction and control of elections to parliament and to every State Legislature. Over the decades, the ECI built a formidable reputation, conducting elections on a scale unparalleled in human history and often under demanding conditions. Yet in recent years it has increasingly found itself at the centre of political and legal controversy (see final section: Six recent controversies surrounding the ECI).Whether each criticism is ultimately justified or not, the cumulative effect reveals a serious structural concern: when one institution conducts all elections across a vast federation, every controversy – administrative, procedural or even perceptual – assumes national significance and reverberates across the entire democratic system.Comparative federal practiceA comparative analysis of major federal democracies reveals that India’s centralised model is an outlier.In Canada, Elections Canada conducts federal elections, while provincial elections are administered by wholly independent provincial bodies such as Elections Ontario, Elections Quebec, etc., with no federal oversight.In Australia, the Australian Electoral Commission manages federal polls, but state (province-level) elections are conducted exclusively by state electoral commissions, even though a common electoral roll is shared for efficiency.In the United States, elections – including presidential elections – are run entirely by individual states and local authorities, with no national election machinery. The Federal Election Commission regulates campaign finance but conducts no elections.In Switzerland, cantons administer all elections, while the Federal Chancellery coordinates election management and communication, collects, compiles and publishes the final election results.India’s centralised electoral architecture reveals three inherent structural vulnerabilities. First, an institution appointed predominantly by the Union government of the day is required to act as neutral arbiter in contests that determine the same government’s own political future. Second, when the Election Commission is constituted entirely through Union-level processes, the Union executive acquires disproportionate influence – indirectly yet materially – over state elections. Third, the system creates a risk of single-point-of-failure: any erosion in neutrality, credibility or administrative competence of the single central authority affects elections across the entire country simultaneously.These anxieties are not new. They were voiced in the Constituent Assembly in June 1949, when several members cautioned against excessive centralisation of electoral authority. The issue, therefore, is not one of personalities but of design.The Constituent Assembly debatesDuring the debates on Draft Article 289 (now Article 324), the chairman of the drafting committee of the constitution, Dr B.R. Ambedkar, candidly admitted that ensuring the Election Commission’s independence “is going to give this house a great deal of headache”. He conceded that there was nothing “to provide against nomination of an unfit person to the post of the Chief Election Commissioner or the other Election Commissioners” and also that there was “no provision in the Constitution to prevent either a fool or a knave or a person who is likely to be under the thumb of the Executive”.B.R. Ambedkar (top right, seated) at a Constituent Assembly meeting, 1950. Photo: Unknown author, public domain.Shibban Lal Saksena, representing the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh) in the Assembly, argued that “it is quite possible that some party in power who wants to win the next election may appoint a staunch party-man as the Chief Election Commissioner”. He proposed that the appointments to the Election Commission should be subject to confirmation by a two-thirds majority of both houses of parliament in a joint session.Several members opposed the centralisation of the election process. Member Hridaynath Kunzru observed:I do not know of any federal Constitution in which the Centre is charged with the duty of getting the electoral rolls prepared and the elections held fairly and without prejudice to any minority … Is there no danger … that the political prejudices of the Central Government may prevail where otherwise the political prejudices of the provincial Governments might have prevailed?Kunzru, a moderate liberal voice in the Assembly, also famously warned: “If the electoral machinery is defective or is not efficient or is worked by people whose integrity cannot be depended upon, democracy will be poisoned at the source.”Annie Mascarene, from Travancore (now Kerala) remarked:Sir, I am a believer in the right of the people of the province to elect their representatives independent of any control, supervision and direction of any power on earth … From this article it looks as if the Centre is assuming to be the custodian of justice … If this section is to be accepted, we are to believe that thereafter the provincial election will be under the perpetual tutelage of the Centre. That means, Sir, that the integrity of the provincial people is questioned.Assam Congress leader and Constituent Assembly member Kuladhar Chaliha said during the debates, “If we cannot trust our own people, we are not worthy of our independence. Sir, an injustice is sought to be done to the provinces and they are needlessly suspected … ”Despite these apprehensions, the Constituent Assembly adopted Draft Article 289 (now Article 324) in its present form, incorporating what was intended as a “safety clause” in Article 324(2). This provision stipulated that appointments to the ECI would be “subject to the provisions of any law made in that behalf by Parliament”. Yet, for more than seventy-three years, Parliament did not enact such a law.In Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023), the Supreme Court intervened to safeguard institutional neutrality, directing that appointments be made by a selection committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the Chief Justice of India, pending legislative action. However, parliament responded with the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023, which substituted the Chief Justice with a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister. As a result, the Union Executive retains a 2-1 majority in the selection committee, effectively restoring executive predominance.Evidence across sectors: when centralisation creates fragilityWhen the conduct of both Union and state elections is vested in a single central authority, the danger is not merely of bias or administrative error but of systemic failure. In a federal democracy as vast and diverse as India, resilience must be designed into the structure itself.The intellectual foundation for distributed resilience emerged in Cold War nuclear strategy. In 1964, Paul Baran of the RAND Corporation was tasked with solving a grave vulnerability: the United States command-and-control communications were highly centralised. A successful “decapitation strike” on Washington D.C. could blind and paralyse the entire defence apparatus. Baran rejected the prevailing “star network” model in which all communications radiated from a single hub.Instead, he proposed a “distributed mesh” model – often likened to a fishnet – where every node was connected to several others and no single node was indispensable. If one city was destroyed, data would simply route around the damage through other nodes. This insight became the architectural blueprint for ARPANET and eventually the Internet. The Internet survives not because it has a powerful centre, but because it has none. It is a federation of autonomous networks governed by shared protocols. Its strength lies in dispersion.India’s own experience across sectors demonstrates the danger of monolithic design.Centralised electricity grids deliver efficiency but at the cost of fragility. In July 2012, a transmission failure near Agra cascaded across the northern, eastern and northeastern grids, plunging nearly 600 million people into darkness. By contrast, microgrids and distributed generation, capable of “islanding” themselves from the main grid, can contain shocks and ensure local continuity even when the national backbone fails.A similar vulnerability emerged in the centralisation of high-stakes entrance examinations under the National Testing Agency (NTA). The fragility became evident in 2024: NEET-UG was compromised by confirmed paper leaks across multiple States; UGC–NET was cancelled following a breach; and CUET results faced repeated delays. A decentralised examination architecture would have confined damage rather than amplifying it.The Goods and Services Tax Network (GSTN) offers yet another illustration. As the centralised digital backbone of indirect taxation, when the portal goes down – as during major outages in 2020, 2023, and 2025 – tax filing and compliance across the entire country grinds to a halt. A federated digital design – common standards with decentralised state-level interfaces – would localise failure and preserve continuity.Divesting ECI of responsibility of conducting state electionsThe Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth Constitutional Amendments (1992) created a State Election Commission (SEC) under Articles 243K and 243ZA for each state to conduct elections to panchayats and municipalities. This produced a striking anomaly: Local body elections, involving thousands of constituencies and immense logistical complexities, are conducted by SECs, while the far simpler state Assembly elections are conducted by the ECI.If states are competent to conduct the most decentralised and politically sensitive elections, it is constitutionally incoherent to deny them control over elections to their own legislatures. Decentralisation also mitigates the danger of a single point of institutional failure. Errors, bias or institutional capture in one state remain contained, while elections elsewhere retain integrity.A federally more appropriate, administratively sounder, and institutionally safer method of restructuring the election machinery is to amend the Constitution so that:(i) The ECI confines itself to elections to the Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha, the offices of the President and Vice-President and Union Territories.(ii) The SEC conducts elections to the State Legislature and Local Bodies, and shall be responsible for the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation and maintenance of the electoral rolls for all elections.To give effect to this proposal:Entry 72 (Union List) should be amended by deleting the words “to the Legislatures of States”;Entry 37 (State List) should be amended by deleting the words “subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament”;Article 324(1) should be amended to divest the ECI of the responsibility for “the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the electoral rolls” and “the conduct of elections to the Legislature of every State”;A new Article 324A should be inserted to read: “The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the electoral rolls for, and the conduct of elections to, the Legislature of the State shall be vested in a State Election Commission,” and consequential amendments should be made to Articles 243K, 243ZA and 327. These electoral rolls will be used by the ECI for Union elections without any supervisory or overriding authority over their preparation.Redefining the ECIAs already noted, the ECI’s jurisdiction should be confined to Union elections – Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha, the offices of the President and Vice-President and Union Territories. Given this specific remit, a three-member body comprising a CEC and two Election Commissioners (ECs) is sufficient. The references to Regional Commissioners in Article 324 should be removed. The ECI’s independence must be fortified against executive pressure through the following three structural reform:(i) Security of tenure: Currently, under Article 324(5), only the CEC enjoys constitutional protection against removal, which can be effected only through a process analogous to the impeachment of a judge of the Supreme Court. The ECs can be removed by the President on the mere recommendation of the CEC, leaving them vulnerable. This asymmetry undermines the collegial character and institutional independence of the commission. Article 324(5) should therefore be amended to extend the constitutional protection for the CEC to the ECs, ensuring they can be removed only through a process equivalent to that applicable to Judges of the Supreme Court.(ii) Appointment process: The appointment mechanism should be constitutionally entrenched rather than left to ordinary legislation, which is vulnerable to easy alteration by transient parliamentary majorities. Appointments should be made by the President on the recommendation of a three-member Selection Committee consisting of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the Leader of the next largest party in the Lok Sabha.The third member may, in a given situation, be a supporter, an opponent, or a neutral actor vis-à-vis the ruling party; but in every configuration, such a composition broadens the representational base and strengthens democratic legitimacy. It also corrects the structural bias in the current arrangement, wherein the Union Executive always commands a 2:1 majority and has its way.Concerns about deadlock are overstated because all stakeholders share a vital interest in the timely conduct of elections. A more balanced Selection Committee is not designed to paralyse appointments but to ensure that manifestly partisan candidates are filtered out and that institutional credibility is preserved. In a constitutional democracy, contestation is a virtue, not a vice; it is the necessary price of securing appointments that command respect across the political spectrum.(iii) Autonomy: To secure genuine institutional independence, the ECI must enjoy financial and administrative autonomy comparable to that of the Supreme Court, High Courts, the Comptroller and Auditor General, and the Union Public Service Commission. Its expenditure should therefore be charged to the Consolidated Fund of India, insulating it from executive discretion in budgetary allocations. The commission should also be provided with an independent secretariat under its exclusive control.Further, to eliminate even the appearance of inducement or post-retirement expectations, the CEC and ECs should be constitutionally barred from accepting any office of profit under the Union or any state after demitting office.Redefining the SECA new Article 324A should vest in the State Election Commission (SEC) the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls and the conduct of elections to the State Legislature and to Local Bodies. Each SEC should consist of a Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and two Election Commissioners (ECs), with their mode of appointment and removal expressly provided in Article 324A itself.Appointments should be made by the Governor on the recommendation of a Selection Committee comprising the Chief Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the Leader of the next largest party in the Assembly. Such a composition broadens stakeholder participation, enhances democratic legitimacy and reduces the likelihood of overtly partisan appointments.In the rare case of an Assembly with representation from only two parties, the third member could be drawn from the next largest recognised party in the State or selected by lot from among independent MLAs.Removal of the State CEC and ECs should require a two-thirds majority of the State Legislature on grounds of proven misbehaviour or incapacity, ensuring that only grave and demonstrable misconduct justifies ouster. Institutional independence must be reinforced by charging the SEC’s expenditure to the State Consolidated Fund, establishing an independent secretariat under its exclusive control, and constitutionally barring post-retirement appointments under the Union or the state.Article 325 already mandates that the same electoral rolls shall be used for both state and Union elections. To preserve coherence, Lok Sabha constituencies should continue to consist of an integral number of Assembly constituencies. A “National Electoral Council”, chaired by the CEC of the ECI and comprising the CECs of all states, should be established to coordinate the preparation of electoral rolls and other election-related functions.Article 325 already mandates a common electoral roll for Union and state elections. To preserve structural coherence, each Lok Sabha constituency should continue to comprise an integral number of Assembly constituencies. A “National Electoral Council”, chaired by the CEC of the ECI and comprising the CECs of all states, should be established to coordinate the preparation of electoral rolls and other election-related functions.The Kurian Joseph Committee recommendationThe Justice Kurian Joseph Committee on Union-State Relations, constituted by the government of Tamil Nadu – of which this author is a member – has examined these questions at length and reached a considered conclusion. It has recommended:“Aligning with federal best practices, India should separate Union and state election administration to disperse risk and strengthen institutional resilience. The Election Commission of India should be confined to elections to the Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha, the offices of the President and Vice-President and the Union Territories. Independent State Election Commissions should be entrusted with the conduct of elections to State Legislatures and Local Bodies, as well as with the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation and maintenance of the electoral rolls, which may be used by the Election Commission of India for Union elections without any supervisory or overriding authority over their preparation. To effectuate this reform, the Seventh Schedule and Articles 324, 327, 243K, and 243ZA should be amended, and a new Article 324A inserted.”This recommendation does not arise from distrust of individuals but from a principled understanding of institutional design. No institution, however illustrious its past, is immune from strain, controversy or error. A mature constitutional order must be structured not only for seasons of tranquillity but for periods of sharp political contestation. It must anticipate human frailty rather than presume perpetual infallibility.When authority is concentrated in a single institutional hub, risk is concentrated in equal measure; and once risk is concentrated, fragility ceases to be episodic – it becomes systemic. By contrast, a distributed model of electoral authority strengthens institutional resilience and deepens public confidence. Shared norms can coexist with decentralised execution; coherence does not require concentration. The reform proposed is therefore not merely desirable – it is a constitutional imperative, anchored in democratic prudence and affirmed by comparative federal practice.Six recent controversies surrounding the ECIIn recent years, the ECI has faced significant scrutiny regarding its role as an impartial arbiter of democracy. While the commission maintains its processes are robust, the following episodes have sparked public and legal debate over its institutional independence.The 2024 Lok Sabha elections voter turnout data controversyThe ECI released final Phase 1 turnout figures after an 11-day delay, showing a 5-6% increase over initial estimates. Subsequent phases saw similar delays and upward revisions. The Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) petitioned the Supreme Court, demanding the immediate disclosure of absolute voter numbers and Form 17C (booth-wise records). While the ECI cited compilation time and lack of statutory mandate, critics countered that EVMs provide instantaneous totals., and releasing only percentages instead of absolute counts raised questions about institutional credibility.Selective enforcement of Model Code of ConductThe ECI faced sharp criticism for its “softness” towards the ruling party. Despite multiple complaints alleging communal hate speech by top leadership, the commission’s response was significantly delayed. Further, by issuing notices to party presidents instead of the alleged individual offenders – a departure from established practice – the ECI was seen as shielding high-ranking figures from direct accountability.The 2025 Bihar Assembly election cash transfer controversyUnder the Mukhyamantri Mahila Rojgar Yojana, Rs 10,000 was transferred directly to millions of beneficiaries while the Model Code of Conduct was in force. Opposition parties described the disbursement as “political bribery”. The ECI’s decision to allow the transfers stood in contrast to earlier precedents in states such as Tamil Nadu and Telangana, where even ongoing welfare schemes were suspended once the Model Code took effect.Discrepancies between votes polled and countedAnalysis by the ADR of the 2024 Lok Sabha elections revealed vote count discrepancies in 538 constituencies during the 2024 elections: 362 seats showed 5.5 lakh uncounted votes, while 176 had surplus votes. The ECI attributed this to mock poll errors, but critics dismissed this since mock slips must be removed before actual polling. Because EVMs provide a “Total” button for real-time polling data, the count recorded by the Presiding Officer should tally perfectly with the final count on results day. These unreconciled gaps between votes polled and counted fuel significant doubts regarding the ECI’s data integrity and the overall electoral process.Resistance to scientifically robust VVPAT auditsA ‘defective EVM’ is defined as one where there is a mismatch between the EVM count and the manual count of VVPAT slips, whether due to machine malfunction or manipulation. The ECI presently mandates the matching of EVM count and VVPAT count only for five EVMs per Assembly constituency, irrespective of whether the constituency deploys 20 EVMs or 330. This is a statistical howler with very high margins of error. The ECI has neither defined the “population” of EVMs to which this sampling applies nor prescribed any “decision rule” about the “next steps” in the event of a ‘defective EVM’ turning up in the sample.In statistical quality control, under the “lot acceptance sampling” method, if any ‘defective EVM’ is discovered, a full manual count of all VVPAT slips of all the remaining EVMs in the defined “population” should be ordered. But the ECI simply glosses over such mismatches.The Special Intensive Revision (SIR) controversyIn late 2025 and early 2026, the ECI conducted Phase 2 of a nationwide Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls across nine States and three Union Territories, covering approximately 51 crore electors. The exercise – the first large-scale revision in over two decades – sought to remove duplicate, deceased and otherwise ineligible entries and improve roll accuracy.During Phase 1 in Bihar, opposition parties criticised the compressed timeline and the requirement that voters submit onerous documentary proof. For Phase 2, the ECI modified the procedure, limiting document submission primarily to cases where linkage with prior rolls could not be established, and extended deadlines in certain states to facilitate verification. A major flashpoint concerned allegations of “bulk filing” of Form 7 applications for deletion of names.Opposition leaders described this as politically motivated disenfranchisement. While official data indicated approximately 6.5 crore names across several jurisdictions targeted for deletion in draft rolls, the final net deletions stood at 1.70 crore voters, with Bihar accounting for an additional 46 lakh, totalling approximately 2.16 crore net deletions nationwide.K. Ashok Vardhan Shetty is a retired IAS officer, a former vice-chancellor of the Indian Maritime University, Chennai, and a member of Tamil Nadu’s High-Level Committee on Union-State Relations.