Thirty years ago, the emerging multipolar energy order seemed clear. China was quietly building a diverse portfolio of oil, gas, and key minerals. Russia was Europe’s main pipeline supplier and a major exporter of food and fertilisers. The U.S. depended on Gulf oil, protected shipping routes, and was the world’s largest consumer, but lacked full control. Today, that balance has shifted. Washington has used shale, sanctions, and export controls to corner Russia, replace Russian markets with American companies, seize Venezuelan oil, cut Iranian exports, and position itself as both a future global swing producer and protector of strategic sea lanes – Panama, Bab el Mandeb, and Hormuz.China, Russia and US consolidated energy securitySince the late 1990s, Beijing regarded energy security as an engineering issue, reducing reliance on tanker crossings at US-chokepoints and securing control over critical minerals and rare earths. After 2009, it built three gas pipelines from Central Asia with a capacity of 55-60 bcm annually, added oil and gas lines from Myanmar in 2013 to bypass the Strait of Malacca, and opened the Power of Siberia pipeline to China in 2019. These overland routes complemented seaborne supplies, creating an inner strategic ring and decreasing dependence on sea lanes.Russia gained resilience through market power, supplying about 45% of the EU’s gas and 30% of its crude oil in 2021 via pipelines such as Nord Stream 1 and 2 and Turk Stream, as well as tanker routes. Gazprom’s long-term contracts and its role as a key grain and fertilizer exporter gave Moscow pricing leverage and political influence. After 2014 sanctions, Russia expanded eastward, launching Power of Siberia to China and planning a Yamal-to-China line via Mongolia to divert gas from Europe. It initially seemed poised to supply both Europe and non-Western markets with fuel and fertilizers.Before the shale boom, the US relied heavily on imported crude, mainly from the Gulf (~30%), with power based on its navy, currency, and financial system. By the mid-2010s, it had become the world’s largest oil and gas producer, exporting crude and LNG. In 2021, it was a secondary supplier to Europe, but by 2025, after Ukraine sanctions, it replaced Russia as a key LNG supplier, providing 35% of Europe’s needs. Russian pipeline exports to the EU dropped into the teens as Europe diversified energy sources to the US, Norway, Middle East, and West Africa, reducing Russia’s western dominance.Chokepoint controlDuring the 2023-24 Red Sea crisis, Bab el‑Mendeb tested asymmetric risk management, with US-led naval coalitions protecting shipping lanes and securing the chokepoint. While global shippers rerouted and faced higher costs, Russia and China largely gained without contributing to security, a sentiment echoed by Trump during the current Hormuz crisis. Yet, the US made peace with the Houthis, a process that continues, albeit unstably, establishing some influence over the chokepoint.The Strait of Hormuz remains a focus of major power activity, with the US conducting naval patrols since the 1970s and Iran using it as leverage. In the 1990s, about 40% of Persian Gulf crude was exported to OECD Europe, 30% to the US, and the rest to Asia. By 2025, due to the shale revolution and changes in Russian exports to the EU, around 80% of Gulf oil and gas was sent to Asia, with some gas reaching the EU, shifting the main market for West Asian oil and gas from the West to the East.In the third chokepoint politics of the past five years, the US achieved a regional victory by reversing Chinese control (CK Hutchison) over the Panama Canal and both its entry ports, prompting BlackRock to purchase CHEC’s shares in the companies, thereby regaining control over a strait that could choke 40% of America’s container traffic. The fourth major chokepoint, China’s key vulnerability, the Malacca Dilemma, remains unchallenged so far, while the fifth, the Suez, has remained silent for the past fifty years.The Sands have shifted for America, against Russia, but China is holdingThe key change over the past five years is that Washington, whether by design or divine intervention, during Biden and Trump’s second terms, has used sanctions, price caps, and chokepoint strategies to push Russia out of its most valuable European markets and into a buyer’s market relationship with China, where Siberian gas and Urals crude are sold at discounts. The US has accepted that it cannot displace Beijing from existing overland pipelines but has moved to limit China’s energy security by exerting control over Venezuelan oil and stifling Russian and Iranian oil and gas.With limited spare capacity at liquefaction plants and pipelines, and recent Gulf disruptions exposing infrastructure constraints, the US cannot swiftly replace a sudden global supply loss, reducing its dominance somewhat. While unable to match China’s long-term diversification of supply chains, the US has spent five years restricting Russian and Chinese access to energy and minerals, regaining influence over two of the three key chokepoints.Trump cards?These Trump cards of influence could likely lead to the creation of an American OPEC if a large producer like Saudi Arabia defects. That would strengthen the petrodollar, counter China’s petro-yuan ambitions, and push back against the growing narrative of de-dollarisation. While there are few signs of such a move, Mr Trump has criticised the OPEC cartel on several occasions and proposed the NOPEC Bill (No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act), a draft legislation that would enable the US government to sue OPEC and other cartels in American courts. Given the need for dramatic events before the mid-term elections, Mr Trump’s steadily declining armoury could do with another piece of theatre.This article first appeared on the author’s Substack.