In what was widely seen as an olive branch, Iran last week extended an invitation to Prime Minister Narendra Modi to attend the official burial ceremonies of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The delegation India plans to send indicates that India does not seek overt reconciliation or realignment at this time. The situation offers an interesting example of how, despite growing internal calls for a strategic reset both with respect to the US and in West Asia, resetting Indian foreign policy is easier said than done.From becoming uncomfortably entangled with the losing side in West Asia to surrendering strategic autonomy on issues like energy security, multiple questionable decisions made in the last year or so have been put down to either poor planning or incompetence. The assumption that these decisions can be reversed rests on a broader theoretical premise that the foreign policy goals of the Modi government are not substantially different from those of its predecessors. Hindutva, it is argued, merely relabels a foreign policy whose world view, understanding of the nation and strategic goals remain unchanged. But does this really hold true today? The current trajectory of India’s foreign policy, when viewed both in terms of its assertions and its silences suggests otherwise. The Hindutva imagination of a nation rooted in a global Hindu identity generates a series of foreign policy priorities that differ from and are increasingly in conflict with more traditional national interests. From territory to identityThe role played by Hindutva in foreign policy often becomes reduced to the single point of Islamophobia. And while this is certainly central to the repulsive glee with which the public discourse embraces atrocities committed by states like Israel, it is insufficient as a framework of analysis. For instance, India’s closeness to the United Arab Emirates has grown in parallel to its indifference to Palestine. Hindutva’s impact on foreign policy stems rather from the manner in which it defines the nation itself. Most modern nation states tend to root themselves, above all else, in the idea of a defined territory. Their primary or central foreign policy concerns therefore tend to revolve around issues that impact the territory in question. These include, for example, guarding territorial borders, sovereign control over resources, securing supply chains or transportation corridors, tariffs, currency exchange rates, the safety of its citizens and so forth. While identity linked grandstanding is common in politics across the world, it is usually secondary to preserving these primary interests. Hindutva in the 21st century – unlike earlier versions of Indian nationalism (including Hindutva in its original form) – de-stresses the importance of territory to the national identity in favour of a more global Hindu identity. This is evidenced in three aspects of India’s current foreign policy: first, the centring of the non-citizen Hindu in India’s diplomatic interventions; second, in dealing with anti-Bangladesh political sentiment; and third, in its relative silence on both territorial aggressions and harm done to Indian citizens abroad that do not feed an underlying identity linked conflict. In the Hindutva years, the primary duty of care demonstrated by the Indian state overseas has been to the global Hindu identity. The extraordinary amount of time and resources Modi has spent on his foreign visits (in which the Hindu diaspora is centred) are indicative of a world view where the geographic location or foreign citizenship of the Hindu diaspora is of less importance to Indianness than their Hindu identity. India’s high commissions have been prompt to condemn attacks on Hindu temples in the UK, Canada and Australia. The Ministry of External Affairs also regularly condemns anti-Hindu violence in Bangladesh and Pakistan. At the same time, the welfare of Indian citizens overseas has taken a backseat. The meekness of the Indian diplomatic response to the attack by the US Navy on Indian merchant sailors follows a pattern that has come to define India’s recent relations with almost every major power in the world with respect to the treatment of its citizens. There was similarly little diplomatic noise made on the issue of Indian workers killed in Russia, or Donald Trump’s humiliating deportation spectacles. A corollary to the prioritisation of the Hindu identity over citizenship in determining Indianness has been the attempts to turn non-Hindu citizens within India into foreigners in the public discourse. This has been done both through the rewriting of popular history and in the current immigration discourse, which attempts to dispense with due process in branding Bengali speaking working-class Muslims in India as undocumented Bangladeshi immigrants. The latter has direct foreign policy implications. Despite a long and often positive history, the Indian government has struggled to reset its relationship with Bangladesh in the aftermath of the departure of Sheikh Hasina in 2024. Multiple overtures towards such a reset have been nullified by the Hindutva demand for high volume shows of petty dominance. The widening of the so called “push-ins” or pushbacks, which the Bangladeshi government has termed a violation of its territorial sovereignty risks becoming a fresh diplomatic powder keg. Finally, and worryingly, territorial disputes that do not threaten the Hindu identity are simply erased in the public discourse. Chinese incursions into Indian territory in the last decade have generally been downplayed by the media. The loss of lives in border skirmishes, recent Chinese assertions with respect to Arunachal Pradesh and a long standing civil war in the border state of Manipur, have all been met with a lethargy that stands in stark contrast to the hysteria that surrounds relations with Pakistan or Bangladesh. When divorced from Hindu identity related concerns, it almost appears as if territorial aggressions do not matter. Exploiting the gapOther states have not been blind to this evolution. Many recognise that Modi’s brand of Hindutva has foreign policy priorities that differ from India’s traditional foreign policy interests and are not averse to exploiting the gap. The shift from territory to identity places specific demands on Indian foreign policy that can be used as points of intervention or influence by other states. First, Hindutva requires aspirational spectacles overseas for the loose global Hindu coalition to collectively celebrate. Over the last decade, these spectacles have included the organisation of large diaspora rallies, Hindu cultural events to welcome Modi, and in particular the bestowal of civilian honours on the prime minister. In his tenure, Modi has received at least 29 such awards. In comparison, all previous prime ministers of India combined have received 14. Countries have been able to use this need to tide over difficult geopolitical situations, or to force India into unfavorable geopolitical positions. In West Asia, for example, Modi’s acceptance of a newly minted medal from the Israeli Knesset on the eve of the American and Israeli strikes on Iran effectively allowed Israel to nullify decades of Indian work on the Iran-India relationship.The pointed cordiality displayed for Modi by US President Donald Trump in recent weeks, which stands in stark contrast with the current state of Indo-US ties, is also a good example. While Trump has referred to Modi as a “tough cookie”, a “killer” (a compliment), an “angel” and one of the “two greatest leaders in the world” today, there has been no apology or remorse expressed for the killing of three Indian merchant sailors by the US Navy earlier this month. On the contrary, in a call with External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, Marco Rubio made it clear that the US would not hesitate to repeat their actions if required. Second, the Hindutva worldview also generates additional capital related foreign policy priorities. For example, access to foreign markets for Hindu capitalists and their capital has been a priority for the state in the Modi years, even when the benefits of that access do not geographically percolate back to India. Overseas direct investment by Indians rose from USD 14.4 billion in financial year 2024 to USD 26.7 billion in financial year 2026. In cities like Dubai, Indians are now among the largest foreign property buyers. In this milieu a complicated slew of private capital related concerns, including for example the leniency with which Indian businessmen are treated abroad, or protecting access to this capital held abroad, also risk becoming pressure points in foreign policy. Is a reset possible?In times of relative global stability, Hindutva’s identity-related demands could vaguely be classified as a soft power push. Scholars argued, for example, that the rhetoric of Hindu assertion demonstrated on Modi’s foreign visits was far more inclusive (“vasudeva kutumbakam”) than the version reserved for domestic politics, and that the energy invested in the diaspora could turn them into a powerful lobby group that would advocate for Indian interests in their new homelands. The assumption that these identity assertions are simply a tool to further India’s strategic interests. implies that when these tools fail to, or refuse to, work, they can be discarded for a different approach. Last year has shown that this is easier said than done. The diaspora remains central to foreign visits irrespective of whether or not they advocate for Indian interests, the Modi government continues to conflate medals with diplomatic achievement, and India continues to reject opportunities for a reset of relations from states that are deemed irrelevant to this global Hindu community. In times of geopolitical stress, nations tend to reveal their defining values. The foreign policy red lines, or the issues a nation will not compromise on, are rooted in how the nation defines itself. The lines India has drawn, as well as the lines India has failed to draw, both reveal a state that continues to prioritise the global identity-related goals of Hindutva over its traditional strategic interests. Sarayu Pani is a lawyer by training and posts on X @sarayupani.Missing Link is her column on the social aspects of the events that move India.