With various versions still in play, the precise circumstances remain murky but the fact is clear that India and Pakistan agreed on a ceasefire at around noon on May 10 last year. There is, however, a major unanswered question: Just why did India, by its own account, “accede to the request of Pakistan” for a ceasefire? After all, by its attacks on the Pakistani air defence nodes and various sites across the country, it had established air superiority by May 10.The premature ceasefire actually enabled Pakistan to wriggle out of a sticky spot that the escalation of hostilities had created and ride on US shoulders towards diplomatic rehabilitation. As a result, the terrible terrorist act at Pahalgam lost its resonance and India’s campaign to isolate Pakistan failed. In short, India was unable to convert its claimed military victory into a durable strategic reality.The issue also raises questions about the tensions in Indian policy – terror proxies were treated as separate entities in the military operations, while in terms of political rhetoric it is asserted that there is no difference between the terrorists and the Pakistani establishment.As much is evident from the remarks of Air Marshal A.K. Bharti, who was speaking on May 7 in Jaipur at a press conference on the anniversary of Op Sindoor: “Our fight was with the terrorists and their support infrastructure. And that is what we hit, ensuring no collateral damage. We had achieved our objectives, and our mission was complete.” India had to undertake the operation because “the Pakistani establishment decided to side with terror and make it their own fight, we had no choice to respond in kind. It was about self-defence, much beyond a counter-terror operation.”Illustration: Pariplab Chakraborty.This is in line with the Indian Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) calling his Pakistani counterpart on May 7, 2025, to tell him of India’s compulsions in striking at the terror infrastructure and to convey the message that the Pakistani military should not interfere. But the Pakistani side made it clear that it would be compelled to respond and was, indeed, preparing to do so.A lot of this seems to go against the grain of the Indian belief that there is little or no difference between the Pakistani state and the terrorists. Indeed, the terror establishment is the state itself.But the differentiation was there right from the top. It was the basis for the Indian blunder in not preceding the attack on the terror camps with an operation to suppress Pakistani air defences. As a result of this, the IAF suffered losses of anywhere from three to five fighters on the very first day of the operations.Prime minister Modi put it this way in his address to the nation on May 12: “Instead of supporting India’s strike against terrorism, Pakistan started attacking India itself.” And it was only after suffering heavy losses, “Pakistan’s army contacted our DGMO on the afternoon of 10th May.” By that time India had destroyed terror camps, some deep in Pakistan, and so, according to the PM, “Pakistan appealed and said that it will not indulge in any sort of terror activities or military audacity further.” India thus accepted a ceasefire.Besides declaring that this was just a suspension of operations, the PM laid out three elements of what he said would be the “new normal”: First, India would give a “fitting reply” to any terror attack “on our terms only.” Second, India would not be deterred by the nuclear factor, and third, “we will not differentiate between the government sponsoring terrorism and the masterminds of terrorism.” He noted that there was strong evidence of “state sponsored terrorism.”So, the question is, yes, India wiped out nine terrorist camps across Pakistan. But what did its action achieve with regard to the state sponsorship of terrorism? And thus brings back the issue of whether India agreed to the ceasefire prematurely. The issue becomes even more pertinent given the fact that Pakistan was able to snatch diplomatic victory from the jaws of military defeat thereafter. India’s precision strikes hit Pakistani bases across the country, but the strikes in themselves were limited and the Pakistani military was able to deflect domestic scrutiny because, combined with the dose of disinformation, the extent to which Pakistan air defences had been bested was not immediately apparent.Why it is important to understand the role of the USThis is why it is important to understand the role of the United States here and to ask whether or not India undertook the ceasefire on account of American pressure. The bald fact is that the announcement of the ceasefire was made first in the US, by president Trump through a Truth Social post and not by any spokesman in New Delhi or Rawalpindi.On April 27, 2025, US secretary of state Marco Rubio phoned both the Indian external affairs minister S. Jaishankar and Pakistan prime minister Shehbaz Sharif. After the onset of Op Sindoor, the US-India-Pakistan conversations intensified. Yet at the outbreak of the war, on May 8, the US vice president said that the US would not intervene in the conflict saying that the fighting was “fundamentally none of our business.” He said the US would seek to de-escalate and pursue their aims through diplomatic channels.And yet, on the night of May 9 according to Modi himself, Vance insistently called him. There were four missed calls since the PM was in a meeting with military officials. When he did manage to get through, he told Modi that Pakistan was planning a massive attack. Modi replied that our response would be stronger. Indeed, the Pakistani attack under its Operation Bunyan un Marsoos was pre-empted by a massive Indian strike that hit its airbases across the country. What else transpired in the conversation is not known.India and Pakistan reached an agreement at 3.35 pm on May 10, and the ceasefire went into effect at 5 pm. But the first announcement came from president Trump in Washington at 5:25 PM IST on his social media platform Truth Social: “After a night of talks mediated by the United States, I am pleased to announce that India and Pakistan have agreed to a FULL AND IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE.”Secretary Rubio thereafter announced that “Vice president Vance and I have engaged with senior Indian and Pakistani officials, including prime ministers Narendra Modi and Shehbaz Sharif, external affairs minister S. Jaishankar, chief of army staff Asim Munir and national security advisors Ajit Doval and Asim Malik”. As a result, he noted the two countries had agreed to an immediate ceasefire “and to start talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site.On the other hand, EAM Jaishankar announced on May 10 that India and Pakistan had bilaterally reached an understanding about stopping “military action” and “firing”. In a briefing thereafter, foreign secretary Vikram Misri said that the ceasefire came after an outreach from Pakistan. “The Director-General of Military Operations of Pakistan called the Director-General of Military Operations of India at about 1535 hours (3.35 pm IST). It was agreed between them that both sides will stop all firing… with effect from 1700 hours (5 p.m.) IST.”However, the record, and Trump’s insistent claims of playing the key role suggests that the US played a significant role in India’s decision. The reason clearly appears to be the nuclear factor. On May 10 morning, Pakistan announced that it was calling a meeting of its Nuclear Command Authority. This was subsequently denied but it was clearly a signalling exercise that triggered the Vance turnaround and Rubio picking up the phone to talk directly with Gen. Asim Munir. The urgency of Vance’s calls to Modi suggests that there was, perhaps, more to the nuclear issue and the US was reacting to it.The US has played a significant role in India’s war termination in its tangled history with Pakistan. In 1965, the US role was to put an arms embargo on India and Pakistan. In 1971, the US indirectly threatened India to declare a ceasefire after the creation of Bangladesh. In the Kargil war, US president Bill Clinton persuaded Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif to withdraw Pakistani troops, after they had already received a battering from an Indian counter-offensive.The 2001-02 standoff after the Parliament House attack ended after the US put intense pressure and got assurances from president Pervez Musharraf that cross-border infiltration would end. It can be speculated, that both in the case of 1965 and 1971, if India had resisted pressure for a ceasefire, it could have arrived at a more substantive result with Pakistan.War termination is a complex event as the US is getting to know these days. In the case of India and Pakistan, their nuclear status injects a dose of prudence into their actions – even though Op Sindoor has openly stretched the limits of the Pakistani red lines.The issue here is not the need for a ceasefire to prevent the conflict between two nuclear armed countries from escalating. But the judgment as to the extent of punishment that Pakistan needed in order to be deterred, at least for a while. Here, the Indian decision may have fallen short of the mark. Greater destruction of its military assets could have made Pakistan’s predicament more palpable.What we have now is not a strategic reset but an uneasy and antagonistic equilibrium with both sides preparing for yet another round. Pakistan has been quick off the mark in creating a new rocket force in view of the damage it suffered from long-range Indian missile strikes and its inability to retaliate. Besides, other factors remain in play ranging from their continued military buildup to the slow-motion impact of India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty.The writer is a distinguished fellow with the Observer Research Foundation in Delhi.This piece was first published on The India Cable – a premium newsletter from The Wire – and has been updated and republished here. To subscribe to The India Cable, click here.