On Saturday (May 24), US secretary of state Marco Rubio arrived in Kolkata on the first leg of his four-day visit to the country. The centrepiece of the visit is a meeting of the Quad foreign ministers in New Delhi on Tuesday (May 26). There is little doubt as one American commentator put it, that the visit is a “repair mode” operation aimed at reviving bilateral ties “that appear to be rudderless after decades of progress.”The visit comes immediately after the landmark US-China summit which is moving towards a significant reset of relations between the two countries from a position of antagonistic relations to peaceful cooperation and stability. This has implications for India, whose ties with the US have been framed in terms of their common cause to check an assertive China.The bilateral leg of the visit, which included official level talks and a dinner, appeared to be somewhat defensive as Rubio insisted that though the US and India had a “strategic alliance”, American actions on trade and visas were not targeted at India but part of a larger domestic shift, that included a modernisation of its immigration system. In their talks, the two sides discussed a scaling up of energy, defence and critical minerals cooperation even while waiting for an interim trade agreement which is under discussion.Illustration: Pariplab Chakraborty.There was also a performative edge to the occasion in a major social event to mark the 250th year of American independence held at the Bharat Mandapam facility. The highlight of the event was an appearance by Donald Trump via video where he lavished praise on Modi “I love the Prime Minister, Modi is great, he’s my friend and I just want to say good evening to everybody.” He went on to add that “We’ve never been closer to India and India can count on me 100% and on our country” adding, “If they ever need help, they know where to call – they’ll call right here.”It is unlikely that the Rubio visit by itself can achieve the goal of reassuring India when it is known that the principal architect of US global policy is president Donald Trump and notwithstanding his over-the-top words on Sunday (May 24) evening, there is no real evidence that the Americans will be specially helpful to India.For the past two decades, India-US relations have been framed in idealistic terms as a natural alliance of two great democracies bound by a commitment for mutual benefit. However, the past year of the Trump administration has stripped the veneer and exposed the realpolitik foundations that need to be reinforced to keep it going.This is evident from the February 2026 framework trade deal’s clause, reiterated by Rubio on Saturday, that commits India to buying $500 billion worth of energy, technology and agriculture products over the next five years. But the Rubio tour comes in the wake of Trump’s summit with Xi Jinping in Beijing which is set to change the context of the India-US relationship which has largely been based on a need to check the rise of China.The Beijing vortexOn May 14, in his talks with his US counterpart, Chinese president Xi Jinping mooted the notion of building a “constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability” as the new leitmotif of relations between the two countries. In practical terms, this means a relationship that emphasises cooperation, manageable competition and stable relations amidst peaceful ties.There was no official response from the US, and it was only three days later on May 17, after Trump had returned from China – in a Fact Sheet issued by the White House – that the US committed itself to this new term. It noted that “President Trump and President Xi agreed that the United States and China should build a constructive relationship of strategic stability” adding that it would be “on the basis of fairness and reciprocity.”The developments in China, which include the visit of Russian president Vladimir Putin, are likely to compel a readjustment of India’s policies. Though the joint statement following the Putin visit spoke of a multipolar world, clearly, the Chinese were seeking to draw in Moscow into its uneasy strategic peace with the United States.For the past 25 years, successive US administrations have sought to woo India as a counter-weight to a rising China. But Trump has moved in a direction of stabilising ties with Beijing. The US has sought to directly confront China through trade wars and technology blockades and failed. The Chinese ability to use their agriculture and strategic mineral exports to compel the US to pay a price has led to an understanding in Washington that the time has come to find a new equilibrium with them.What we are witnessing now is the ground shifting from under India’s feet following last week’s Beijing summit. What we could be witnessing is a G-2 type relationship in the name of promoting strategic stability. And, Russia could well go along with it.India has since attempted a careful balancing act – maintaining caution and scepticism toward Beijing in the security realm, while attempting to normalise relations in less sensitive economic domains. But this progress will not change the fundamentally competitive nature of the China-India relationship, and it will constantly be tested by tensions and the disruptive actions of third parties, including the United States itself.Trade and energyThe India-US relationship is routinely described as one of the most important partnerships of the 21st century. And there is truth in that. But if we are being honest, 2025 and 2026 have also exposed deep fault lines in this relationship – fault lines that diplomatic optimism tends to paper over.Start with the headline achievement: the February 2026 framework trade agreement. The announcement offered both sides a welcome opportunity to reset their relationship – but it did not eliminate all the sources of friction that had led to a sharp and unexpected deterioration in bilateral ties over the course of 2025.India also had to confront the reality of its energy crisis. The US has compelled India to stop buying discounted Iranian and Russian crude and also undertaken a war which has resulted in a blockage of the Strait of Hormuz through which 90% of Indian LNG, 50 % of LPG and crude oil comes, in addition to fertiliser and other products. The irony is that despite its US ties, India found itself facing US sanctions for buying Russian oil (there is currently a month-long waiver), while China and Europe, much bigger purchasers, remained unaffected. The US is mooting energy sales to India from its shores, as well as from Venezuela.The Pakistan problemPerhaps the most uncomfortable development for India has been the dramatic warming of US-Pakistan relations. In February 2025, prime minister Modi was warmly welcomed to the White House as the second foreign leader hosted by the newly inaugurated President Trump. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s prime minister hadn’t even gotten a phone call. Later that year, in August 2025, the seemingly impossible happened – India, Washington’s so-called “indispensable” partner, was hit with a brutal 50% tariff, while Pakistan began being celebrated as America’s favourite regional ally.How did this reversal come about? It all started when New Delhi publicly rejected Trump’s claim to have mediated an end to the May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict. Since then, high-level dialogue has largely collapsed – no Quad summit, no Trump visit to India, no trade relief.Trump publicly praised the Pakistani leadership on several occasions and called Pakistan’s army chief Asim Munir his “favourite field marshal.” Though India has leaned towards the US and Israel in the February war, Pakistan emerged as the mediator of choice. For India, this is a deeply uncomfortable signal – that Washington’s loyalties in South Asia remain transactional and can shift with startling speed.Whither the Quad?The ostensible mission of secretary Rubio to New Delhi is to attend a summit of the Quadrilateral Dialogue (Quad) foreign ministers. Perhaps this is aimed at a signal to the countries that joined the US in off-setting Chinese growth in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad gathered considerable momentum when it was revived by the first Trump administration to supplement its policy of strategic competition with China. Within years, it had become a leader-level dialogue with a succession of summits under the Biden administration. But with the American shift on China, it has lost momentum. In a recent article former foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale has pointed out that “With China no longer explicitly identified as the principal target in newer American strategic thinking, the logic sustaining the Quad weakens considerably.”As it is, there is some tension arising from the fact that three of the four members are military allies and probably more comfortable in the SQUAD, a term for the US-Australia-Japan-Philippines line up. India needs to ask itself hard questions about its continued participation in this body.Conclusion: A relationship still worth watchingLet us be clear – despite all of this, the India-US partnership remains consequential. The technology cooperation, defence integration, and trade relationship are real and growing but just who is benefiting is not all that clear. The partnership is not the frictionless, values-driven alignment that its cheerleaders describe. It is a relationship shaped by competing interests, managed by shrewd leaders, and tested by a volatile geopolitical environment where China’s shadow looms large and America’s attention span cannot always be relied upon.India would do well to build this partnership with eyes open – as a strategic necessity, not a romantic alliance.The writer is a distinguished fellow with the Observer Research Foundation in Delhi.This piece was first published on The India Cable – a premium newsletter from The Wire – and has been updated and republished here. To subscribe to The India Cable, click here.