Last week, Pakistan delivered the Trump administration’s 15-point peace plan to Iran. This is not the first time an American president has got Islamabad to play a mediating role: in the early 1970s, Richard Nixon had persuaded General Yahya Khan to serve as an intermediary between Washington and Beijing with a view to the official recognition of the People’s Republic of China, which took place shortly after a visit to the Chinese capital by Henry Kissinger – who was supposedly ill in Islamabad while Khan was introducing him to Mao Zedong.Why is Pakistan going along with this? Because it has more to gain than to lose.First, helping Trump – as it intended to do last year regarding the deployment of Pakistani troops to Gaza, which was ultimately rejected by Israel – is a way to cultivate the White House’s trust, which has already manifested itself in the resumption of military cooperation in exchange for rare earth minerals from Balochistan and an agreement on cryptocurrencies. Strengthening ties with the United States thus allows Pakistan to somewhat emancipate itself from its immense dependence on China and to reconnect with a country that was, throughout the Cold War – and again after 9/11, for nearly 15 years – a very generous partner, particularly in waging the war in Afghanistan, first against the Soviets and then against the Taliban: Islamabad may even hope for a return to the “good old days” when Pakistani officers were trained in the United States.Second, it is a way to prevent Trump from criticising the war Pakistan has been waging in Afghanistan since last month – which amounts to repeating the scenario of 1970–71: Nixon needed the Pakistanis too much in his dealings with the Chinese to speak out against the repression of the Bengalis who were demanding independence – and who eventually achieved it.Third, by taking on the role of mediator, Pakistan enhances its international prestige, particularly in relation to India, a country whose reputation has long been built on this type of action under Nehru (following the Korean War and the Indochina War) and which, today, remains silent.Fourth, Pakistan is as badly affected by the Iran war as India – if not more: for a country suffering from a chronic trade deficit and heavy debts, the shock caused by the rise of the price of oil and gas is bound to result in an economic crisis with disastrous social consequences.Fifth, acting as an intermediary allows Pakistan to avoid taking sides in a war that directly or indirectly pits countries against one another with which Islamabad seeks to maintain good relations, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia. In 2015, this was the reason Pakistan had already refused to join the coalition Riyadh had formed to wage war against the Houthis in Yemen.Getting involved would have risked alienating the country’s roughly 20% Shia population and, above all, Iran.Since then, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have grown closer, to the point of signing a mutual defence agreement last year. Yet Riyadh now appears determined to settle the score with Iran – thus following in Netanyahu’s footsteps – while Pakistan would prefer not to have to provide military aid to Saudi Arabia should the latter go to war with Iran, a country it wishes to keep on good terms with. Refusing to respond to Riyadh’s potential calls for help from now on is easier to justify since Islamabad can point to the role of mediator entrusted to it by Uncle Sam!Also read: In Inserting Itself into the West Asia Crisis, Pakistan’s Diplomacy Has Shown ChutzpahWhy does Pakistan not wish to alienate Iran? Because the two countries not only share a border of over 900 km – which is in itself a source of vulnerability – but also because on both sides of the border live Baloch tribes driven by a strong irredentist sentiment: in the recent past, Pakistan has been the victim of Iranian Baloch fighters, linked to their Pakistani brothers-in-arms from the same tribes, who have been carrying out a growing number of terrorist attacks in recent months. Islamabad has accused Tehran of turning a blind eye and has sought to punish its neighbour with targeted strikes.Moreover, Iran has other cards up its sleeve to destabilise its neighbour, starting with its privileged relationship with India, which Tehran has already allowed to establish itself in the deep-water port of Chabahar. Pakistanis live in constant fear of being caught in a pincer movement between India and an Iran allied with New Delhi – which they already accuse of trying to encircle them by drawing closer to the Taliban (a major reason for its recent attacks on Afghanistan).This does not mean that Pakistan is not pleased to see its Iranian neighbor weakened: the Israeli-American strikes allow it, in particular, to secure for the long term its position as the only Muslim nuclear power, this “Islamic bomb” – as Z.A. Bhutto called it – having, incidentally, been financed in part by Arab countries. But while seeing Iran weakened is not unwelcome to Islamabad, making an enemy of it would not be in its interest.In short, Pakistan tries to play the role of mediator, not only to build closer ties with the United States (much to the chagrin of India, which believed itself to be their top partner in South Asia), but also to avoid having to take sides with belligerents with whom it wishes to remain on good terms.Whether the mediation succeeds or not is, all things considered, secondary for the Pakistanis – that it lasts as long as the war does matters more to them.Christophe Jaffrelot is Senior Research Fellow at CERI-Sciences Po/CNRS, Paris, Professor of Indian Politics and Sociology at King’s College London, Non resident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Chair of the British Association for South Asian Studies.