New Delhi: On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes on Iran, ushering in a wider regional war. Framing the attack as a pre-emptive attempt at halting Iran’s nuclear programme, Trump claimed that Iran was rebuilding its nuclear capabilities and missiles could soon hit the US – a claim not backed by the US intelligence. Yet the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found no evidence that Iran is building a nuclear weapon. Moreover, the third round of the US-Iran nuclear talks had concluded in Geneva that very week on February 26. The strikes went ahead regardless, without congressional approval. Washington called it prevention; much of the world saw it as a choice.India was not among those critics, with New Delhi maintaining an official stance of neutrality, framed as concern. However, a closer look complicates the claim, revealing uncomfortable realities. Is India an innocent bystander, or has it been quietly benefiting from strategic ambiguity while avoiding moral burden?India’s stance of non-alignmentThe doubts began to arise even before the first strikes. Two days prior, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in Israel, meeting senior leadership and embracing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in a highly-publicised two-day visit. The timing and nature of the visit raised more questions than answers.When the US attacked the IRIS Dena in the Indian Ocean, an Iranian warship on its way back after participating in a naval exercise hosted by India, Prime Minister Modi noticeably remained silent. For a country that prides itself on strategic autonomy, the silence spoke volumes. India is also the only founding BRICS member yet to outrightly condemn the US-Israel-attacks on Iran. This raises a larger question: what role is India choosing to play?The honest answer is that India does not have many options. India’s policy of neutrality is rooted in structural constraints. India’s economy is deeply tied to the countries now at war. It imports more than 85% of its crude oil, with West Asia and Russia as its primary sources. Nearly nine million Indians live in Gulf countries, sending remittances that support entire communities.India is caught between three major powers, each too consequential to alienate. The United States is its largest trading partner, and one misstep risks tariffs or sanctions. Russia supplies nearly 40% of India’s crude oil at discounted prices, and remains a long-standing strategic ally. Iran anchors the Chabahar Port, India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan and supporting the International North-South Transport Corridor, India’s answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Silence on every end is a choice, and every choice comes at a cost.Financial cost of neutralityIndia has not fired a single bullet, but is already absorbing economic shocks. Oil prices have surged from $70 per barrel to well over $100 – briefly even touching $120 – since the war began. Every 10% rise in crude prices pushes India’s inflation upward by 20-30 basis points, significantly raising costs across the economy, something voters never bargained for.The aviation industry also faces disruption, risking a loss of around Rs 80,500 crore every single week that the war goes on, and over 400 flights affected daily. At Indian ports, 400,000 metric tons of basmati rice sits stranded as a substantial share of Indian’s annual exports are destined for the Middle East – a market now destabilised.The Strait of Hormuz, through which around 20% of the world’s daily oil supply flows, remains closed. India holds roughly 45 days’ worth of strategic oil reserves, and the clock is ticking. The government has already adjusted gas allocation priorities, with cooking fuel taking precedence, as India imports nearly half of its LPG from the Middle East.When the International Energy Agency (IEA) urged nations to release emergency reserves, India’s response was revealing: ‘the crisis is not our creation, and those responsible must deal with it.’ It is a fair point, but a limited one, because the crisis has already reached India’s doorstep.Security issues in the neighbourhoodThe deeper challenges for India are geographic and are still unfolding. To its west, Iranian missiles have targeted parts of the Gulf – the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait – where millions of Indian workers live. To the northwest, Pakistan faces internal unrest, with reports of instability and pro-Iranian protests in Gilgit and Skardu.At the same time, evolving ties between Riyadh and Islamabad are being watched by New Delhi with growing concern. Some analysts suggest that further escalation could draw in neighbouring territories, placing pressure directly on India’s western flank.India has long prepared for a two-front challenge from China and Pakistan. What it did not anticipate was a major conflict in West Asia intimately impacting its strategic environment.India has traditionally portrayed itself as a net security provider in the region. Today, it faces constraints in securing its own interests – from protecting trade flows and energy access, to the safety of its diaspora. The crisis is no longer distant; it is immediate, and India is fine-tuning its response. The situation is so dire that PM Modi, who has till now remained largely silent, called the Iranian President Pezeshkian on March 13, to ask for Indian ships to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Beijing’s windfallWhile India absorbs these shocks, China is better positioned to handle them. Entering the war with months of strategic oil reserves and long-term energy arrangements, China effectively reduced its exposure to volatility. Simultaneously, Beijing has engaged diplomatically with multiple sides, positioning itself as a potential mediator, while India remains silent.China’s Belt and Road initiative, the infrastructure empire India has long sought to counter, stands to gain exponentially as regional dependencies shift. India anticipated competition from China and Pakistan, but not a war, 2,000 kilometers away, tilting the balance in Beijing’s favour. India has spent years building alternatives to Chinese influence, which the war is dismantling quietly, efficiently, and at no cost to Beijing whatsoever.China’s advantage may extend beyond the war. Post-war reconstruction across major hubs in West Asia – Dubai, Abu Dhabi, et cetera – will require considerable investment, creating opportunities for external powers like China to swoop in.Losing West Asian influence to China is not an option for India. The region is a part of its extended neighbourhoods, with the Indian diaspora remitting approximately $135 billion annually. The UAE remains India’s third largest trading partner, with bilateral trade exceeding $100 billion in FY 2024-25. The third meeting of the India-Saudi Arabia Security Working Group was held in January 2026, reiterating their condemnation of terrorism and enhancing maritime security. These ties form a critical pillar of India’s economic and strategic growth.At the same time, the US faces growing domestic as well as international criticism, creating space for other powers like China. Several countries in the Europe and the UK have framed the war as a failure of diplomacy, often drawing comparisons to earlier US interventions, such as the 2003 Iraq invasion.India, meanwhile, is negotiating to stabilise energy access, including discussions around the opening of Strait of Hormuz for passage of LNG and LPG tankers. If the disruptions persist, the domestic economic impact too could multiply.Balancing internal pressures along with its external image, India finds itself in a precarious spot.This time, silence or non-alignment may not be the most effective course of action.Non-alignment was never intended as a mode of silence, but as a mode of independence. Contemporary India has blurred that distinction. One of the few remaining countries with working relationships across all sides of the conflict, with factors like credibility and geography on its side, India needs to assume a more pro-active role.During the Cold War, leaders like Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru exercised that space with confidence. Today, China is occupying it, engaging actively with both Washington and Tehran. The world is not asking India to choose a side – it is waiting for India to assert itself more visibly.Swetasree Ghosh Roy is a professor of Political Science at the Jindal School of Government and Public Policy, and the Director of Jindal Policy Research Lab; Madhav Pransukha is a student of PPE at the Jindal School of Government and Public Policy, and runs the blog Kahani Suno on Substack.