India occupies a unique geographical position: upstream in one river system and downstream in another, each carrying different strategic implications. In the Indus basin, India holds upstream leverage over Pakistan, while in the Brahmaputra, it faces the constraints of being a downstream state relative to China. This duality has long shaped India’s water diplomacy. However, India’s recent decision to suspend the Indus Water Treaty following the Pahalgam attack, calling it “null and void,” raises a broader question. Could India become a victim of its own precedent if China were to act similarly? India’s contradictory position lies at the heart of the issue and could ultimately cost it more than it gains.A foundational principle governing transboundary rivers: the country where a river originates holds significant power. It can build dams, store water or regulate flows, while downstream countries remain dependent and vulnerable. This asymmetry is precisely why nations sign water treaties, to ensure that water is not weaponised.The Indus disputeIndia’s geography places it on both sides of this equation. The Indus Water Treaty allocates six rivers between India and Pakistan, giving India upstream control over flows on which Pakistan depends. On April 22, 2025, militants attacked tourists in Pahalgam, Kashmir, killing 26 people in one of the deadliest assaults on civilians in the region in 25 years. The attack triggered serious escalations between the two countries, before a ceasefire in May 2025. In its aftermath, India suspended the Indus Water Treaty, a 65-year-old agreement that had survived multiple wars between the two states. Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that “blood and water cannot flow together,” while Home Minister Amit Shah said the treaty would not be restored. The move also reflects long-standing frustrations over cross-border terrorism and the treaty’s inability to address broader security concerns.Also read: Indus Treaty: Can India Stop All the Water?India and China: The Brahmaputra problemWith China, on the other hand, the situation is reversed. The Brahmaputra, a lifeline for India’s northeastern states, originates in Tibet, which is under Chinese control, making India the downstream state. The river accounts for nearly 30% of India’s freshwater resources and about 41% of its hydropower potential, according to the India WRIS Brahmaputra Basin Report. In Assam alone, more than 25 million people depend on it for drinking water, agriculture and daily needs.Furthermore, China is constructing a dam near the point where the river enters India. With a planned capacity of 60,000 MW, the Medog dam is one of the world’s largest hydropower projects. Construction began in July 2025 at an estimated cost of approximately $167 billion, according to Al Jazeera. Although such projects are often described as run-of-the-river, meaning they do not store water, concerns persist about the project’s influence over the timing and volume of flows into Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. India, at the same time, is accelerating hydropower development in the basin, including projects like the Upper Siang dam, and retains tools to manage some of these risks.India has no treaty with China governing the Brahmaputra, with no binding rules or legal safeguards. The 2002 Memorandum of Understanding on hydrological data sharing, the only formal mechanism of cooperation between the two countries regarding the river, expired in June 2023 and is yet to be renewed. This leaves India without upstream data on a river that millions in the northeast rely upon.A dangerous precedentIndia’s position is further weakened by its conduct in the Indus river dispute. By rejecting the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling that the Indus Water Treaty remains binding, India has undermined a cornerstone of global legal stability. Such matters fall under pacta sunt servanda, a foundational principle of international law requiring that treaties be honoured in good faith. This departure risks setting a dangerous precedent, signalling that states may unilaterally discard treaty obligations whenever political tensions arise. India’s refusal to honour the agreement has not been overlooked by China. Chinese policy advisor Victor Zhikai Gao remarked, “do not do unto others what you do not want others to do unto you.” While not an explicit threat, the statement suggests that arguments applied in one river system could be easily invoked in another.Transboundary water challenges extend further still. After flowing through Assam, the Brahmaputra enters Bangladesh, where it is known as the Jamuna. As the most downstream country in this system, Bangladesh is particularly vulnerable to decisions made by China and India. Moreover, India’s relationship with Bangladesh remains deeply unsettled. The long-pending Teesta agreement has constrained dry-season flows into Bangladesh for years, affecting agriculture and livelihoods. These delays have coincided with Bangladesh, deepening its engagement with China on river management, including data-sharing arrangements on the Brahmaputra system and Chinese financing for the Teesta River Comprehensive Management Project. This complicates India’s position considerably. Any effort to build a downstream alignment requires Bangladesh as a key partner, yet that relationship has weakened over time.Diplomatic consequences of India’s actions may be more subtle, but are equally significant. When India raises concerns about potential Chinese actions, its credibility will be shaped by perceptions of its own conduct as an upstream state. If norms governing treaty stability weaken, upstream states could feel greater freedom to act unilaterally, a dynamic working against India in the Brahmaputra basin. This is not to suggest that India’s response to the Pahalgam attack was unwarranted. The attack demanded a firm response. However, the instrument chosen carries longer-term implications that require careful management.The way aheadThree priorities need to be taken into consideration. First, India must intensify engagement with China on the Brahmaputra. While a comprehensive treaty may be difficult to implement, expanding data-sharing and transparency mechanisms can reduce uncertainty. The existing 2002 Memorandum of Understanding for flood-season data, which expired in June 2023, remains the only formal mechanism of cooperation in this regard. Second, India must strengthen domestic preparedness, including hydropower and water management infrastructure, while ensuring credible engagement with local communities. Third, India must rebuild trust with downstream partners, particularly Bangladesh, as part of a broader regional approach.Water is increasingly becoming a defining strategic resource. The principle that agreements must be honoured is central to the stability of shared river systems. When that principle is subverted, the consequences rarely remain contained. They flow across borders and accumulate over time.Nidheesh Jain is associated with the Emerald Heights International Education Society and writes on socio-economic issues.