Under Modi’s rule, Indo-Israeli rapprochement accelerated in 2017 with the prime minister’s visit to Tel Aviv, a first for an Indian prime minister. India has long been a leader in the Palestinian cause. Historically, it opposed the creation of the State of Israel, with Nehru advocating for the creation of a secular state where the Jewish minority would enjoy protections. However, New Delhi recognised the State of Israel in 1950, before providing financial support, from 1951 onwards, to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and, from the 1970s onwards, to the Palestine Liberation Organization. India was then the first non-Arab country to recognise the State of Palestine when it was proclaimed in 1988. Things changed when India and Israel established diplomatic relations, allowing embassies to open in 1992, with New Delhi quickly sourcing weapons from Tel Aviv, particularly during the Kargil War (1999) against Pakistan. But New Delhi strove to keep its distance from Israel. Narendra Modi, who had already visited Israel as chief minister of Gujarat, changed the status quo on this issue. Although Atal Bihari Vajpayee had received Ariel Sharon in New Delhi in 2003, the prime ministers of the two countries had not met since then. Modi, the second prime minister from the BJP, resumed this practice at the first opportunity, the United Nations General Assembly in September 2014. His Israeli counterpart, Netanyahu, then welcomed the promise of this collaboration between two “ancient civilizations“. A few weeks later, the Union home minister Rajnath Singh visited Tel Aviv to explore avenues of cooperation with the Israeli prime minister to combat the terrorism facing India. The following year, for the first time in its history, India chose to abstain rather than vote on a resolution condemning Israel at the United Nations Human Rights Commission. This resolution, passed by 45 countries, condemned strikes on Gaza as war crimes, and the Palestinian Authority ambassador to New Delhi said he was “shocked” and “affected” by this decision, which broke with India’s “traditional position” . But New Delhi worked to reassure him and restore balance. In fact, after his 2017 visit to Israel, Modi invited Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to New Delhi, and during that visit, he reiterated his support for a two-state solution and called for “a sovereign, independent, united and viable Palestine, coexisting peacefully with Israel.” In December 2017, just before Netanyahu’s visit to New Delhi in 2018, India also supported a vote by the United Nations General Assembly against the unilateral declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel by then-US President Donald Trump. In 2018, continuing to demonstrate his own brand of diplomatic activism (aimed at attracting attention, perhaps), Modi became the first Indian head of government to visit Ramallah. Finally, in 2020, India decided to quadruple its aid to UNRWA and voted in favor of a resolution condemning Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Between 2014 and 2023, by drawing closer to Israel without betraying the Palestinian cause, India has maximised its national interest by gaining access to the civil and military technologies mastered by the Israelis. Admittedly, contracts had already been signed to this effect since the 1990s, as evidenced by the delivery of the Awacs radar manufactured under US licence for $1 billion, but Modi’s proactive approach enabled him to gain Israel’s trust and obtain more. His 2017 visit provided an opportunity to create the India-Israel Industrial R&D Technological Fund (I4F), under which, the following year, leading companies promised to provide India with advanced technologies in the field of medical imaging, for example. Tech Mahindra, a large Indian firm, signed a collaboration agreement with Israel Aerospace Industries in 2018 in the field of cybersecurity. Indo-Israeli collaboration in the agricultural sector—which Narendra Modi had promoted as chief minister of Gujarat—also gained momentum, particularly in the area of irrigation techniques, to such an extent that in 2018, 3,000 Indian farmers participated in the 20th edition of Agritech Israel. But it is naturally in the military field that progress has been most rapid: Indian companies (Ashok Leyland and the Adani Group) have committed to manufacturing equipment for Elbit, while Israel Aerospace Industries and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems have sold India some of the most sophisticated missiles. The Adani Group also contributed to the deepening of India’s relations with Israel, which took a new turn in 2017 with Narendra Modi’s visit to Tel Aviv. In 2018, the Adani Group and Israel’s arms manufacturer, Elbit System, created a joint largest venture to produce a drone, the Hermes 900 UAV, which would be used in Gaza in the 2020s. In July 2022, the Israeli government, which had launched the privatization process for the port of Haifa, announced that the consortium dominated—with a 70% stake—by the Adani Group had won the contract. In September 2024, the Adani Group established a joint venture with the group Israeli Tower Semiconductor to manufacture components used in the production of semiconductors, one of the industrial activities that Narendra Modi considers to be one of his economic priorities. The attacks of October 7, 2023, and their aftermath changed the situation, India siding with Israel without saying so.India and Gaza: How can one remain neutral in wartime?India tried hard not to take sides in Israel’s war on Gaza, but by abstaining as civilian casualties – and international outrage – continued to mount, it effectively sided with Israel. It should be noted that India’s failure to condemn Israel at the UN Human Rights Council in the early 2020s was denounced by Palestine’s ambassador to India, who was “shocked” and saw it as a break with New Delhi’s “traditional position”.On October 27, 2023, India abstained from voting in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on a resolution calling for a “humanitarian truce” (120 countries voted in favour). External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar then stated that India, itself a victim of terrorist acts, sympathized with Israel and could not support a resolution that did not directly condemn the Hamas attack. Admittedly, in December 2023 and then in December 2024, India voted in favour of two UNGA resolutions demanding an “immediate, unconditional, and permanent” ceasefire in Gaza and reiterating the demand for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages. But on June 12, 2025, when more than 57,000 men, women, and children had died, according to official data, under Israeli bombs and bullets, India again abstained from voting on a UNGA resolution calling for a ceasefire and the lifting of the blockade of Gaza to allow humanitarian aid to be delivered. Furthermore, India also abstained in 2024 at the UN Human Rights Council when a resolution on stopping arms sales to Israel was put to a vote. It should be noted that the Indian Supreme Court also ruled in the same vein: when approached by human rights defenders, it refused to oppose India’s arms exports to Israel in October 2024. The lethal nature of these deliveries had, however, just been revealed by third parties. In May 2024, Spain banned an Indian ship carrying 27 tons of explosives to Haifa from docking in one of its ports, while another ship, prevented from docking in the same way the following month, diverted to Slovenia with explosives and rockets on board.At the same time, India and Israel have stepped up their economic cooperation. In September 2025, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich visited India without this highly controversial figure being questioned about his recent positions: leader of the far-right Zionist party Mafdal, supporter of the annexation of all of Palestine and, in 2023, of “total war” in Gaza, in 2024 Smotrich had declared that it was “justified and moral” to “starve” the civilian population of Gaza in order to recover the hostages held prisoner by Hamas. He finally signed an agreement with his Indian counterpart, Nirmala Sitharaman, aimed at increasing trade and investment between the two countries, particularly in the areas of cybersecurity and defence. For his part, the Israeli ambassador met with the head of the Uttar Pradesh government in order to find, in particular, the workforce his country needed in this state since Palestinians could no longer work there as before. Five thousand people from UP were recruited. By the mid-2020s, it was clear that India had chosen Israel, while maintaining that its position remained unchanged – a stance that sparked fierce protests from the Congress, students and certain intellectuals.Besides economic cooperation and arms deals, the Modi government’s pro-Israel stance can be explained by both its ideology and its anti-terrorism doctrine. Indeed, Hindu nationalists have always had an affinity with Zionism, which became apparent in the context of the attacks of October 7, 2022, and the war that followed: like the founders of the State of Israel, they define their community not as composed of believers of a religion, but as a people whose members are united by blood ties and who are the sons of the soil, the “race jati ” (to use the words of Savarkar, of a sacred land. Furthermore, they see themselves as victims of a tormented history due to Muslim invasions on the one hand, exodus on the other, and today, living under the threat of Islamists who surround them and form, at least potentially in their eyes, “a fifth column“. Even before the rapprochement that emerged from the Gaza war, Israeli diplomats – starting with the Consul in Mumbai – were promoting these ideological affinities. After October 7, 2023, leaders of the Hindutva movement – including ministers and members of parliament – expressed their unreserved solidarity with Israel, denouncing not only terrorists but Muslims in general, as evidenced by popular hashtags such as #IndiaStandsWithIsrael and #PalestineTerrorist. This pro-Israel bias was so widespread that the judiciary once again echoed it by banning demonstrations in support of the Palestinians – on the grounds that Indians had enough problems to deal with at home without worrying about those of others. Many BJP leaders – Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Adityanath, for example – ordered the police to hunt down account holders who posted pro-Palestinian messages on social media . India’s pro-Israel stance can also be explained by the Modi government’s anti-terrorism doctrine, which is explicitly inspired by the Israeli “model”. In 2016, when India retaliated against the attacks in Uri, Narendra Modi made this clear in no uncertain terms. In an address to the nation, he said: “Our army’s valour is being discussed across the country these days. We used to hear earlier that Israel has done this. The nation has seen that the Indian army is no less than anybody”. In 2023 Hindu nationalist leaders have transposed Israel’s situation to India, analysing its post-October 7 response as a counter-terrorism operation comparable to those that India has or will have to carry out in Kashmir against Pakistan. From then on, Israel’s war became their war for Hindu nationalist sympathisers. Arnab Goswami made no secret of it: “This is not just Israel’s war. Israel is fighting this war for all of us. They are fighting a group that raped women and took their babies hostage, and killed babies. You may think this is happening far from India. But there are many Hamas-type groups waiting across the border in Pakistan, and some trying to grow in India. If Hamas is not completely destroyed, such groups will try to do something similar in India.”Not only is Israel a source of inspiration for India in its counterterrorism operations, but it is also a source of equipment, giving it access to the most sophisticated technologies. New Delhi has become one of Tel Aviv’s best customers in terms of arms sales, with Indian orders accounting for 46% of Israeli deliveries. Modi’s current visit to Israel should result in additional arms deals.India is therefore taking sides in West Asia, even if New Delhi will probably not go so far as to join Donald Trump’s coalition to rebuild Gaza. To what extent will this allow it to maintain good relations with its other partners in the region? New Delhi already seems to have sacrificed its investments in Chabahar – and its ties with Iran – under pressure from the United States. Will its recent ties with Saudi Arabia withstand its pro-Israel stance, given that Riyadh is already upgrading relations with Islamabad, or will the United Arab Emirates become its main point of support in the Persian Gulf? Plurilateral or multi-alignment diplomacy is not easy to cultivate in times of war – isn’t New Delhi having the worst of difficulties remaining also friends with Trump and Putin at a time of war in Ukraine? India’s foreign policy may well be at the crossroads in the Middle East and beyond because of growing polarisation – a difficult situation that Nehru, by comparison, handled rather well during the Cold War. This bar is very high indeed. Christophe Jaffrelot is Senior Research Fellow at CERI-Sciences Po/CNRS, Paris, Professor of Indian Politics and Sociology at King’s College London, Non resident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Chair of the British Association for South Asian Studies.