Though denounced by many historians as a war-criminal during his eight years as President Richard Nixon and President Gerald Ford’s foreign policy executioner, Henry Kissinger began reinventing himself as a “wise man” as soon as the Republicans had to vacate the White House in January 1977. In November 1977, Kissinger allowed himself to express his understanding of the considerations that must inform the United States-Isreal relationships. The occasion was the felicitation of the former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir on November 13, 1977, just a week before Anwar Sadat’s historic trip to Jerusalem. It was a gathering of most consequential Jewish leaders in the United States.When Kissinger spoke, there was no Islamic Republic of Iran. The Shah of Iran, assigned the role by the United States as the “Policeman of the Persian Gulf” was still presiding over a repressive regime in Tehran. The Soviet Union had not collapsed and the Cold War still was a chilling central theme of global tensions. “9/11” was light years away; the “clash of civilisations” had not yet begun. So, the formulations Kissinger had to make in November 1977 were profoundly realistic. Those principles and prescriptions remain contemporaneously useful templates, for any set of decision-makers who gather in the Oval Office, including those assigned for negotiations in Islamabad. First, “the security of Israel is a moral imperative for all free peoples.” And, that “a just peace cannot be in imposed peace. A just peace must be a peace which the participants accept and feel a stake in preserving.” Furthermore, Kissinger noted for the benefit of the Jewish leaders that “no people [the Israelis] can be more aware of how fragile, and how precious, are the restraints that make men and nations civilized.”Second, US policy-makers must always watch-out against inadvertently giving wrong signals to Israel and its leaders. “The art of diplomacy is to move events carefully and shape them towards achievable ends,” and, for that coordination between Israel and the United States was an imperative.Third, while the US needed to be extra solicitous of Israel’s security concern, even its paranoia, “the Israelis must understand the importance of Middle East peace to the global concerns of the United States and the Western world, which are the essential underpinnings of Israel’s own security.”Fourth, there are “parties with an unequal commitment to peace.” Therefore, “we must not give a veto to the most intransigent elements with the area.” In a complex situation like in West Asia, “moderation” should not be penalised. And, lastly, “any peace settlement must of necessity involve guarantees. But they must be worked out with great care and with a sense of their limits. History should teach us that guarantees by themselves are not a substitute for security. No nation should be asked to abdicate its judgment of the requirements of its survival.”The Islamabad Conclave will end up in a stalemate, if not worse, unless J.D. Vance and his fellow negotiators keep in mind that they represent a great power and that they need to apply Kissinger’s prescriptions and principles both to Iran and Israel. They cannot possibly give the most intransigent party, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – a veto power nor should the United States be so contemptuous of the Iranian civilisation. Neither the US nor Israel has any appreciation of the old civilisations; Kissinger had once observed that in their global interactions, the Chinese leaders tended to reflect “a common tradition of painstaking analysis and the distillation of the experiences of an ancient country with an instinct for distinguishing between the permanent and the tactical.” Every word and every implication that judgment applies to Iran, irrespective of the nature of the regime in Tehran. Like China, Iran is also an emotional society, at peace with itself. All those who have gathered in Islamabad know that President Trump does not believe in a moral presidency; he takes pride in his own transactional skills, at tactical and strategic level. The confabulations in Islamabad are also a test of the Trump administration’s capacity and ability to make a distinction between Netanyahu’s war-thirstiness and the United States’ interests and responsibilities as a global power. America has always had the necessary leverage, muscle, and clout to arrange and rearrange men and matters in line with its own geopolitical needs and strategic calculations. Washington has done well for itself. There is no “Arab” enemy of Israel; there are only divided, insecure and vulnerable principalities and kingdom, all dependent upon the United States for their survival. The policy-makers in Washington by and large, have been canny enough to understand, what a great friend of the Jewish state, the eminent liberal voice, Tony Judt, observed in 2009: “The Israelis have long claimed that Arabs only respond to a show of force. The same is true of Israel.” In fact, Israel today has become the most aggressive and schizophrenic nation. If Kissinger were around, he would tell Donald Trump the United States’ obligation is to help Israel, its leaders, and its politics walk back to a sane and moral society. In the immediate future, the Donald Trump team needs to understand that it is not Iran that is playing up Washington, it is Benjamin Netanyahu’s Israel that is cocking a snook at it. Harish Khare is a former editor-in-chief of The Tribune.