Pakistan’s emergence as a diplomatic interlocutor in the enduring ‘engagement’ between the United States and Iran, has triggered considerable disquiet in New Delhi’s security, political, diplomatic and media circles.For many within India’s strategic and military establishment, this development is as unsettling as it is revealing, underscoring yet again Islamabad’s ability to insert itself into consequential geopolitical matters, well beyond its economic or overall standing and power.India, on the other hand, despite its growing global profile and deepening ties with both Washington and Tel Aviv over the past two decades, remains effectively sidelined – absent from a theatre where its stakes are neither trivial nor distant. At one level, India’s exclusion is structural: it has limited direct leverage over US-Israel-Iran dynamics, particularly given its cautious – some would argue overly supine – balancing between all involved parties and the Gulf states by repeatedly emphasising that war was not an option.But within New Delhi’s official circles, there is also a quieter, more pointed frustration: that Pakistani military and diplomatic officials have once again demonstrated an agility, flexibility, and daleri or chutzpah – in inserting themselves into high-stakes Iran crisis. Traits like these are rarely, if ever, associated with India’s formal, process-driven, and highly bureaucratic strategic culture. Consequently, the recurring outcome is a persistent gap between India’s growing heft on paper and its limited ability to shape outcomes in moments, like the Iran crisis, that truly matter.However, at the outset, India has belittled Pakistan’s role in trying to end the Iran war. Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar’s reported characterisation of Islamabad as a mere “middleman” or “dalal” reflects a view that Pakistan, alongside Egypt, Türkiye and possibly Oman, has allowed itself to be manipulated for tactical ends, rather than engaged as a trusted strategically.Yet such public rhetoric conceals India’s quiet unease – for even a “middleman” occupies a seat at the high table of global diplomacy, shaping atmospherics, facilitating communication, and remaining relevant. By contrast, India is left on the side-lines, its voice neither sought nor missed at a moment of grave global consequence.Pakistan’s utility to Washington in this context is not entirely surprising.Its over 900-km long border with Iran is more than just a geographic line – it is a strategically sensitive and politically consequential frontier that has acquired renewed importance in the current regional flux. Running through the desolate expanse of Balochistan on both sides, it separates Pakistan’s Balochistan province from Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan provinces – two of the most underdeveloped and restive regions in their respective countries.Sparse populations, harsh terrain, and weak state control have historically made this frontier porous, facilitating a range of cross-border activities, from legitimate trade and pilgrim movement to illicit drug trafficking and militant infiltration. Pakistan also retains longstanding channels with Tehran, significantly reinforced by shared religious and societal linkages – being home to the world’s second-largest Shia population after Iran, even though these ties have, over decades, been uneven and often turbulent.Periodic tensions too have flared over cross-border militancy in Balochistan, with both sides accusing the other of harbouring insurgents. There have been occasional armed skirmishes along the frontier, including reciprocal missile and air strikes in early 2024, echoing historical frontier tensions. Disagreements have also emerged in Tehran over Pakistan’s close security ties with almost exclusively-Sunni Saudi Arabia – Tehran’s principal regional rival – and Islamabad’s reluctance to move forward with the Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline under US pressure.Alongside, Pakistan maintains deep ties with key Gulf monarchies and continues to be seen by the US security establishment as a country that, despite its many contradictions, is capable of providing operational and political access to American and allied forces when required. Pakistan’s military, in particular, has historically been adept at leveraging such moments – presenting itself as indispensable in crises, whether during the Cold War, the post‑9/11 campaigns by the US in Afghanistan, or now in the context of regional de‑escalation efforts.But, as always in such delicate situations, Pakistan’s renewed relevance carries a flip side, one that creates a double-edged sword and a king of ‘strategic jalebi’ for Islamabad. On one hand, Pakistan’s renewed relevance can earn it short-term political and diplomatic capital with Washington; on the other, it carries inherent risks. It is both nuclear-armed and long accused of sponsoring militant Islamic proxies, and US experience – from Afghanistan to broader counter-terrorism cooperation – has repeatedly shown that Pakistan’s strategic priorities can diverge sharply from those of its partners.What of China?Complicating matters further is Islamabad’s carefully cultivated alignment with China, its principal strategic and economic partner, anchored by the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor or CPEC, and the broader Belt and Road Initiative. China’s deepening ties with Iran across energy, infrastructure, and security sectors mean that any Pakistani role perceived as facilitating US objectives could generate unease in Beijing.China has historically tolerated Pakistan’s tactical engagements with the US, but there are limits. Hence, if Pakistan’s mediation is seen as enabling outcomes that undermine Chinese interests in Iran, or the wider Gulf region, it could introduce friction into an otherwise robust partnership that is as ‘towering as the Himalayas and as deep as the oceans’. Islamabad, therefore, will need to calibrate its role carefully – projecting usefulness to Washington without appearing overly aligned and .above all, according priority to Beijing’s multiple strategic, energy and geopolitical interests.The Arab states present a similarly complex challenge for Islamabad. Pakistan has long-standing ties with key Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, rooted not only in military cooperation but also in labour migration and financial support. These ties are largely transactional: while remittances from Gulf and Saudi expatriates provide Islamabad with crucial economic backing, they also limit its freedom to act independently whenever Gulf or Saudi priorities shift – a constraint made especially acute today as Riyadh faces persistent drone and missile attacks from Iran.Coffins containing the remains of victims of a Monday airstrike on a drug rehabilitation hospital are laid out before burial in Kabul, Afghanistan, Wednesday, March 18, 2026. Photo: AP/PTI.Furthermore, Pakistan’s diplomatic push over Iran is also overshadowed by the latest escalation in its long-running hostilities with Afghanistan, which flared earlier this year after prolonged tensions. Both neighbours have reported casualties in what many analysts describe as an ongoing shadow, or “private” war. And, what was already a volatile and unresolved frontier is gradually edging toward a sustained military conflict, complicating Pakistan’s attempts to project itself as a stabilising intermediary elsewhere in the region.Yet, despite its multiple security and overbearing economic vulnerabilities, political instability, and an often fraught bilateral relationship with Tehran, Pakistan continues to play a masterful poker hand in its dealings with Iran. Notwithstanding its poor cards, it has leveraged its unique geographic and historical position to stay relevant.Meanwhile, from Washington’s perspective, it appears that using Pakistan as an interlocutor is less about trust and more about utility. A March 27 Associated Press report quoting several Pakistani security analysts highlighted that the US cannot engage Iran directly, without political cost – especially amid ongoing tensions involving Israel and guarantees of security for all the Gulf sheikhdoms. In essence, the US views Pakistan not primarily as a trusted or reliable partner, but as a practical instrument to advance its objectives with Iran, while minimising political and operational risks.‘Military diplomacy’Meanwhile, a recurring blind spot for India in assessing US-Pakistan ties is the extent to which Islamabad – particularly its military, led by self-styled Field Marshal Aim Munir – has mastered the art of influence over American perceptions and policy. Over decades, the Pakistani Army has cultivated US officials through a charm offensive: a mix of access, flattery, and carefully managed exposure.A cross-section of US analysts like C. Christine Fair, professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University and author of Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War, maintain that even junior American security officials, think-tank researchers, and congressional staffers have routinely been granted unusually open access to senior Pakistani military leaders, including army chief’s and Inter-Services Intelligence heads. According to Fair, this access has fostered networks of familiarity, trust, and goodwill that favourably shape US perceptions of Pakistan.Such calculated soft-power initiatives were carefully reinforced by spectacle or what might be termed “military diplomacy.” Delegations of American officials, analysts and influencers were specially flown to sensitive Pakistani frontier regions, briefed and entertained in grand settings, and immersed in a carefully crafted narrative which casted Pakistan as both an indispensable partner and a misunderstood victim. The eventual effect was often lasting, so much so that even when Pakistan pursued policies at odds with US interests – including links to militant groups – Washington continued to provide Islamabad tens of billions in aid and advanced military equipmentThe result has been paradoxical; a relationship marked by mistrust at the strategic level, yet sustained by deep interpersonal influence. And it is precisely that influence, nurtured over time, that now seems to have been responsible for Pakistan’s current role as the ‘middleman’ in the Iran conflict.India, by comparison, should theoretically have translated its growing defence partnerships with the US and Israel, its expanding global strategic footprint, and long-standing ambition to be seen as a leading power into a more consequential diplomatic role in the current Iran crisis. And. despite the highly publicised personal rapport between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Donald Trump –often projected as a cornerstone of India’s strategic leverage in Washington – Delhi’s standing has remained notably peripheral, palpably inconsequential.That perceived personal closeness has yielded little more than symbolic capital at a moment of real geopolitical consequence, exposing the limits of charisma-driven diplomacy. India’s reliance on formal partnerships, bilateral goodwill, and projected influence has failed to translate into tangible leverage. The outcome is brutally clear: India’s ambitions to lead, collide with its inability to wield real power when it matters most.