The terror attack on April 22, 2025, in Kashmir’s Pahalgam, killing 26 people has alarmingly escalated tensions between India and Pakistan. Outraged by the attack, India has adopted a firm and unprecedented posture, announcing the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) – a move with profound strategic, legal, and humanitarian consequences. Pakistan, responding with heightened military preparedness, described India’s actions as “imminent” threats, with its officials cautioning about the possibility of escalation, while asserting that nuclear weapons would be employed only in existential scenarios. The current crisis calls for a closer look at the historical context of transboundary water issues and the strategic architecture that the IWT provided for more than six decades.Water sharing and the partition contextThroughout history, access to water has shaped the destinies of states as much as armies and treaties. Rivers that defy political borders have often stirred rivalries, forcing nations into complicated paths of negotiation, treaties and uneasy truces.The fundamental doctrines enshrined in international water law – the principles of equitable and reasonable utilisation, no significant harm and obligation to cooperate – have guided numerous accords, including landmark agreements such as the Helsinki Rules (1966) and the UN Watercourses Convention (1997). Yet, for all the normative clarity these principles offer, the reality of enforcement remains ruptured and uneven. Power asymmetries, historical grievances and emerging environmental stresses often outpace the reach of legal instruments.Nowhere was this fragility more starkly evident than in the subcontinent’s great rupture of 1947. The Partition of British India carved new international boundaries across the veins of Punjab’s river systems. The Radcliffe Award hastily redrew maps but left unresolved the lifelines that flowed across the new frontier. Critically, key canal headworks like Madhopur on the Ravi and Ferozepur on the Sutlej ended up in Indian hands, while the downstream canal systems irrigating Pakistani Punjab remained dependent on upstream flows. This delicate imbalance quickly turned into confrontation. In April 1948, India’s abrupt suspension of canal waters – apparently to negotiate new terms – plainly demonstrated how rivers could be transformed into instruments of coercion and survival. The water conflict, thus, became not merely a technical dispute but a visceral symbol of the unfinished business of the Partition, setting the stage for one of the world’s most consequential experiments in transboundary river management: the Indus Waters Treaty.Mediation and key provisionsAmid mounting tensions and the spectre of conflict over water, the need for third-party mediation became urgent. It was the World Bank, then under the leadership of Eugene Black, that stepped forward to broker a compromise between the newly formed rivals. After nearly a decade of arduous negotiations, the Indus Waters Treaty was signed on September 19, 1960, in Karachi, by then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan President Ayub Khan, with the World Bank as a guarantor. The treaty offered a pragmatic, if imperfect, division: the three eastern rivers – Ravi, Beas and Sutlej – were allocated to India for exclusive use, while the three western rivers – the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab – were reserved largely for Pakistan. India retained limited rights over the western rivers, notably for domestic needs, agriculture, and run-of-the-river hydroelectric generation without storage beyond permissible limits. The treaty also established a Permanent Indus Commission (PIC), a bilateral body responsible for ensuring treaty compliance, data exchange and dispute resolution. The dispute settlement architecture was multilayered: technical disagreements would be referred to a Neutral Expert; legal disputes could escalate to a Court of Arbitration. Crucially, the treaty does not contain any clause permitting unilateral abrogation or suspension. Any changes must occur through mutual consent, reinforcing the spirit of cooperative management even amid political volatility. Against this backdrop, India’s 2025 announcement of suspension represents a dramatic departure from the treaty’s legal framework. It is not merely a technical manoeuvre but a rupture of a painstakingly-built diplomatic edifice, one that had, until now, withstood wars, skirmishes and diplomatic breakdowns between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.Challenges to the treatyDespite its success in preventing water wars, the IWT has faced numerous challenges over years. Pakistan repeatedly alleged that India’s hydroelectric projects, including Baglihar and Kishanganga, violated treaty terms by reducing downstream flows. India, while modifying designs after technical reviews, viewed Pakistan’s objections as tactical moves to stall infrastructure development in Jammu and Kashmir. In recent years, procedural breakdowns became evident. Pakistan’s premature escalation of differences to disputes, parallel adjudication tracks pursued by the World Bank, and India’s frustration with procedural delays all pointed to growing strains. In 2023 and 2024, India formally notified Pakistan of its intent to seek treaty modification, citing climatic shifts, demographic pressures and persistent cross-border hostilities. Strategic, legal and livelihood implicationsStrategically, India’s suspension of the IWT tends to cause a significant escalation. Although India lacks immediate infrastructure to drastically cut off flows to Pakistan – a process that could take a decade, the mere signalling of intent introduces psychological and diplomatic pressure.Legally, the unilateral suspension raises complex questions under international law. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) provides that a party may suspend a treaty only under specific circumstances: fundamental breach, impossibility of performance or a radical change of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus) – none of which clearly apply here. Unilateral termination of water-sharing treaties is extremely rare. In cases like the 1978 Nile Waters dispute or the Jordan River allocations between Israel and its neighbours, even amid armed conflicts, states preferred renegotiations over abrupt annulments.Moreover, the UN Watercourses Convention (1997) emphasises the obligation to cooperate and not to cause significant harm to downstream users. India’s move could thus be perceived internationally as a violation of customary international law principles governing shared water resources, potentially attracting diplomatic isolation or arbitration claims.Precedents elsewhere show that abrupt suspension tends to escalate conflicts. For instance, Ethiopia’s unilateral filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) without agreement with Sudan and Egypt strained regional relations severely, leading to international mediation efforts by the African Union. In this light, India’s move may invite third-party scrutiny, encourage Pakistan to approach international forums, and complicate India’s diplomatic engagements, particularly with countries prioritizing global water governance norms.Economically, Pakistan faces acute risks. Agriculture constitutes 24 % of its GDP and employs 37.4% of its workforce. The Indus system irrigates 90% of Pakistan’s food crops, including wheat, rice and cotton. Minor disruptions in sowing or harvest seasons could produce food insecurity, rural unrest and economic shocks.Beyond the state-centric focus, the threat of disrupted flows touches human security concerns. Shripad Dharmadhikary of Manthan Adhyayan Kendra warns that weaponising water would not only damage livelihoods but would also violate emerging norms of recognizing water as a human right. Water governance experts like Himanshu Thakkar caution that building the infrastructure to exercise full control over western rivers would take years and, if perceived as hostile, could invite international scrutiny. Former Indus Water Commissioner P.K. Saxena advocates for a strategic, calibrated approach: maximising rights under the Treaty, completing pending hydro projects and pursuing Treaty renegotiations without appearing aggressive. There are also arguments that water disputes between India and Pakistan cannot be separated from the deeper psychological wounds of partition, mutual securitisation, and elite-driven fear narratives. According to them, unless the structural mistrust is addressed, technical solutions alone, including any reworking of the IWT, will remain fragile. Treaty at crossroadsThe suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty has come as a major shift in the India-Pakistan strategic scenario. It challenges the durability of one of the world’s most successful examples of water diplomacy, introduces new uncertainties into a climate-stressed region, and raises broader questions about the resilience of international legal norms in times of political turbulence.While India may have strategic and national security reasons for asserting greater control, the humanitarian risks, diplomatic costs and legal challenges of such a path are considerable. On the other hand, Pakistan’s dependence on the Indus system renders it highly vulnerable to even symbolic disruptions.Eventually, whether the IWT collapses, adapts or emerges reimagined will depend not only on infrastructure and treaties but on the political imagination, the ability of two adversarial states to recognise that shared rivers can be the site not just of conflict, but of coexistence.K.M. Seethi is Director at Inter University Centre for Social Science Research and Extension (IUCSSRE), Mahatma Gandhi University (MGU), Kerala. He also served as ICSSR senior fellow, senior professor of International Relations and Dean of Social Sciences at MGU.