A lot of the commentary on the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Beijing – both pro and con – has bordered on the breathless. Pictures of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping in animated discussions have been seen around the world, and by their intended target, US President Donald Trump.Indeed, Trump should take the bow for making this happen.All we have to do is to recall that in 2023, when India was to host the SCO summit, it made an unexplained last-minute change in May and decided to hold it virtually. That was the year in which, while visiting Washington DC, Modi recounted his advice to Putin that “this is not an era of war.”In December 2022, he did not attend the annual India-Russia summit hosted by Moscow because of unspecified “scheduling issues.” India was represented in the SCO summits in Astana and Islamabad in 2024 by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar.Why Modi went in 2025 is not difficult to understand. India’s foreign policy was turned upside down by Donald Trump within six months of his assuming the presidency of the United States. He had believed that Trump was his “friend”, but despite an early visit in February 2025 to offer fealty to him in Washington DC, India soon found itself out in the cold.Initially, there were expectations of a quick trade deal between the two countries, with India offering to lower if not eliminate tariffs on most products (except agricultural and dairy). That did not happen and India landed up on the list with 25% reciprocal tariffs, soon raised to 50% on account of its Russian oil purchases.Just why things went haywire is not clear, but many suspect it was the mishandling of Trump’s claims to have helped bring about a ceasefire between India and Pakistan in their short war of May 2025. Seizing the initiative, Pakistan proposed Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize and had its Field Marshal Munir invited to the White House for lunch.The Modi-Xi bilateral summit held on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Taijin lent special significance to it. This was Modi’s first visit to China in seven years and the meeting’s confirmation of re-engagement between New Delhi and Beijing lent it some heft.Scott Bessent, the US Secretary of Treasury, has termed the SCO summit as “performative.” He’s not wrong. But performative activity is very much part of international diplomacy. Another facet of this was the public Modi-Putin interaction, including their unscheduled meeting in the latter’s limousine – which shows how far Modi has traveled since 2022 when he was advising Putin on the issue of war.A great deal of commentary on the summit, including Trump’s tweet today, is based on the visuals of Xi, Modi, Putin and not on the substance of the remarks or the decisions taken there, many of which are not public and known only to the principals.The Chinese performance was perfect. The ten SCO member states and the SCO Plus summit with the attendance of 14 dialogue partners and observers, was dovetailed into the 3rd September military parade to commemorate the victory over Japan in World War II. And it came along with a summit with Modi that is seeking to rebuild ties between China and India.Xi’s messaging, too, was timely. He spoke of a more “just and equitable” world order at a time when the US was demolishing the one it had constructed in the wake of World War II. He called for a clear stand against “hegemonism and power politics” and framed new proposals for countering the US without really naming it. He unveiled a new Global Governance Initiative to promote a multi-polar world and positioned China as an alternative and powerful force for development.Trump has been watching and first charged Russia, North Korea and China of conspiring against the US. Later he declared “It was very, very impressive…I understood the reason why they were doing it.”At one level, the SCO is a talk shop whose effectiveness is hampered by the fact that it needs the consensus of its dozen or so members to take action on issues. This leads to watered down outcomes or an inability to address issues. For example, the SCO said and did nothing when Israel and the US bombed Iran (India did not want to even criticise the attacks at the time), though it finally came around to issuing a condemnation at Tianjin.Another problem is that some its members like India and China have deep seated border disputes and there is a great deal of hostility between India and Pakistan and this can block consensus.SCO lacks mechanisms to effect its policy decisionsMore important perhaps is the fact that the SCO lacks mechanisms to effect its policy decisions and enforce its agreements. So its economic and connectivity schemes remain poorly executed.Many of these issues have ensured that even though it has states with strong economies like China and India, the organisation has not been able to advance economic integration amongst each other.There is a limited value in the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) that facilitates some intelligence sharing, joint military exercises and coordination in combating terrorism and separatism.The SCO is really an institutional expression of the desire of the world for a multipolar world order. In this way it is being pushed by its key member China to offset the influence of the United States. The Chinese also offered $280 million in grants and $ 1.4 billion in loans to an SCO banking consortium and proposed the creation of an SCO development bank. This is part of the systematic Chinese effort to give the SCO some heft in the face of the US retreat from its global obligations.Not surprisingly, the outcome of the Tianjin summit emphasised the strong stand against terrorism and it condemned terrorist incidents in India (Pahalgam) and Pakistan (Jaffar Express). It emphasised support for a multilateral trading system which goes against the current American approach of levying tariffs on friends and foe.India’s approach towards the SCO is in line with its approach towards multi-alignment, which is an updated version of the old non-alignment. Non-alignment was largely defensive, multi-alignment stresses a more transactional and proactive approach and, in this case, New Delhi wanted to send a signal to the US that it was not without options in the international system in the face of the US barracking.There is little doubt that global governance is in desperate need of reform, but neither the US nor China have the remedy for it. Neither of the two really back multi-alignment. The US seeks to shore up its global hegemony, while China is really looking for a G-2 formula. It barely conceals its desire to be seen as a global power, and to be taken as such by the United States. The performance in Tianjin is very much part of its tactics towards that end.The writer is a distinguished fellow with the Observer Research Foundation in Delhi.This piece was first published on The India Cable – a premium newsletter from The Wire – and has been updated and republished here. To subscribe to The India Cable, click here.