Following the press conference in New Delhi on August 5, 2026, by fallen dictator Sheikh Hasina, Dhaka’s outrageous diplomatic pushback once again strained ties between the two neighbours. New Delhi moved quickly to contain the fallout. Randhir Jaiswal, the official spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs of India, distanced the Government of India from Hasina’s remarks, explicitly stating “the government has no involvement” and “no endorsement of Hasina remarks”. Recently Tarique Rahman, prime minister of Bangladesh, cancelled his plan to visit India. This week, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s foreign minister, emphasised on meeting the “test of mutual interest” as a precondition of India and Bangladesh’s bilateral ties. However, any meaningful bilateral relationships between India and Bangladesh requires first understanding the deeper structural roots of anti-India sentiment among the Bangladeshi public.The Hasina question: Post-uprising dilemmaIndia’s decision to shelter fallen dictator Hasina following Bangladesh’s mass uprising will decisively shape the future of bilateral relations. While the collapse of her regime marks a sharp decline in New Delhi’s unchecked influence over Dhaka, reducing the entire dynamic to blanket hostility is an oversimplification. It is inaccurate to brand the broader Bangladeshi public as inherently anti-Indian; rather, public resentment is overwhelmingly directed at Narendra Modi’s administration and New Delhi’s specific Bangladesh policy. If India continues its previous approach without interrogating why this discontent intensified so sharply under the current leadership, relations will remain fundamentally strained.This simmering resentment escalated dramatically during Hasina’s final years in power, culminating in state visits that her opponents widely condemned as detrimental to national interests. Early in her fourth consecutive term, Hasina visited New Delhi twice within a single month – first to attend Modi’s swearing-in ceremony, and shortly after for a formal state visit. The Awami League’s overt alignment with the Indian establishment had long fostered a deep conviction among Bangladeshis that Hasina maintained her autocratic grip on power with New Delhi’s direct backing, rewarding her patrons with major strategic concessions.Her final bilateral visit in 2024 exemplified this perceived asymmetry. During that trip, Dhaka signed a memorandum of understanding granting India transit rights to build a railway network across Bangladeshi territory, effectively bypassing the narrow Siliguri Corridor – the “Chicken’s Neck” – to connect India’s northeastern states with the mainland. Critics argued that Bangladesh gained little tangible reciprocity while assuming significant security and sovereignty risks.Coupled with longstanding grievances over political interference, these unequal deals catalsed a potent grassroots backlash. Spearheaded by youth and civic activists, this dissatisfaction mobilised public resistance, translating political anger into tangible economic action through widespread consumer boycotts of Indian products aimed at targeting India’s lucrative export market in Bangladesh.Anti-India sentiment in historical contextThe historical origins of anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh trace back to early post-independence debates following the 1971 Liberation War. Yet, for decades, bilateral ties maintained a degree of functional stability. That equilibrium fractured decisively after Narendra Modi assumed power in India in 2014 – an ascent that coincided with the beginning of three successive controversial national elections in Bangladesh that entrenched Hasina’s autocratic rule for over fifteen years.Throughout Bangladesh’s political history, the Awami League faced frequent criticism from opposition forces and independent observers for its close, often exclusive, alignment with New Delhi. However, when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) took office in 2014, centrist parties like the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and right-wing factions like Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami anticipated a diplomatic recalibration. Given the Awami League’s historical bonds with the Indian National Congress, Dhaka’s opposition hoped a BJP-led government would transition toward a neutral, state-to-state framework rather than continuing party-specific patronage.Those hopes were swiftly dismantled. Under Modi, New Delhi doubled down on its backing of the Awami League, actively facilitating Hasina’s hold on power through two consecutive electoral charades: the 2018 “midnight election” and 2024 “dummy election.”While Indian leaders had historically engaged in discreet diplomatic maneuvering – such as late President Pranab Mukherjee documenting in his memoir, The Coalition Years, how he quietly worked diplomatic channels to facilitate Hasina’s return in 2008 – support under Modi became conspicuously overt. Senior Awami League ministers openly and unashamedly solicited New Delhi’s intervention to guarantee regime survival. Former foreign minister during Hasina’s regime, A.K. Abdul Momen went so far as to publicly describe the India-Bangladesh relationship as a “husband and wife” dynamic – a humiliating metaphor that convinced the Bangladeshi public that their sovereignty and democratic rights were being bartered away for Indian patronage.Anti-India or anti-Modi sentiment?Beyond geopolitics and bilateral treaties, the rise of majoritarian politics in India has profoundly alienated the Bangladeshi public. Prime minister Narendra Modi’s domestic agenda – marked by policies widely viewed as discriminatory toward Muslims and accompanied by recurring incidents of mob violence – has turned him into a personal lightning rod for anti-India sentiment across the border. In the eyes of many Bangladeshis, the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the subsequent Supreme Court verdict enabling the construction of the Ram Temple cemented Modi’s reputation as overtly hostile to Islam and Muslim rights.This resentment boiled over during Modi’s official visit to Dhaka on March 26, 2021. The trip triggered unprecedented nationwide protests, uniting ideological rivals who rarely share a platform. Overcoming their traditional ideological divide with faith-based groups, leftist student organisations at the University of Dhaka demonstrated alongside major Islamist groups in a sweeping show of resistance. The regime met these demonstrations with lethal force: state crackdowns resulted in at least four civilian deaths in Chittagong and eight in Brahmanbaria. This broad-based mobilisation across both the Left and Right marked a decisive turning point in Bangladesh’s domestic political landscape.Despite the bloodshed, Modi’s visit proceeded as planned, leaving behind an entrenched, multi-partisan hostility toward his administration. This friction has been further stoked by inflammatory rhetoric in Indian domestic state politics, where leaders such as the BJP’s Suvendu Adhikari in West Bengal have weaponised anti-Bangladesh rhetoric and divisive pushback campaigns during election cycles for domestic political leverage. By using Bangladesh and its people as scapegoats in Indian domestic politics, New Delhi has deepened cross-border estrangement and reinforced the conviction in Dhaka that India’s ruling establishment views its neighbor through a hostile, sectarian lens.The future of India-Bangladesh diplomatic relationsAs Bangladesh enters a new political era following the July student-led uprising and subsequent democratic transition, India faces a defining diplomatic choice. The Bangladeshi public and its new leadership stand united on the question of accountability for the fallen regime; as home minister Salahuddin Ahmed emphasised, no neighbour will be allowed to leverage the “Hasina card” to subvert domestic stability. Providing political sanctuary to a ousted dictator while refusing to recalibrate an outdated foreign policy will permanently fracture bilateral ties.The ball is now squarely in India’s court. New Delhi must decide whether to seize this historic opportunity to reset relations on the principles of sovereign equality, reciprocal respect, and democratic legitimacy, or risk permanently alienating a vital regional neighbour. The stakes could not be higher.Rezaul Karim Rony is a thinker, political commentator, and editor of Joban magazine.