The Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty between Bangladesh and India will expire on December 12, after a period of 30 years. By the next deadline, both countries will have to decide whether to continue the current agreement that has helped manage water sharing during the dry season, or come up with a new deal that takes into account the changing hydrological conditions, competing domestic demands and political tensions that have strained bilateral relations. The outcome will have ramifications far beyond the allocation of river water. It will test India and Bangladesh’s capacity to maintain practical cooperation as countries sharing a geographical location with vastly differing political ideologies.The treaty was signed in New Delhi on December 12, 1996, for sharing of the waters of the Ganga river at Farakka Barrage during the dry season – between January 1 and May 31. The allocation formula was expected to replace the recurrent conflicts, with political priorities and hydrological conditions serving as the negotiating points of the accord. Now, 30 years on, the question is not just how to keep the treaty alive, but also if its provisions are still adequate for contemporary needs. Both governments have staked out positions that reflect the urgency of this question. In February 2026, India’s Ministry of External Affairs told Parliament that talks on renewal between the two countries had not begun. However, the Indian government had received representations from stakeholders, especially West Bengal, for industrial and drinking water requirements.Bangladesh publicly sought a new deal with better guarantees in September, but India said the Joint Rivers Commission should deal with river-related issues and that discussions were continuing at a technical level. This means that institutional mechanisms are still in place. Yet, it does not show that the two countries have reached an agreement on the content of a successor treaty. Can technical cooperation be transformed into a politically workable agreement in time? That is the pressing question. This is possible only if the two countries are able to rise above the petty political grievances that are beginning to characterise their diplomatic relationship, and concentrate on addressing the real water needs. The current treaty provides a significant starting point in this pursuit. How does the treaty regulate water distribution?The distribution is based on 10-day period average availability of water at Farakka. For values below 70,000 cusecs, Bangladesh received a total of 35,000 cusecs, while the rest, between 50,000 and 75,000 cusecs, goes to India. Meanwhile, when the water flow is higher, India receives 40,000 cusecs and Bangladesh gets the balance. The treaty also provides for alternate periods between March 11 and May 10, when 35,000 cusecs is allocated to each country. Furthermore, article II of the said agreement states that, in case the water flow falls below 50,000 cusecs for a period of 10 days, consultations will be held to decide on the next steps. Also read: Ganges Waters Treaty: A Test for India-Bangladesh ‘Golden Chapter’ TiesThus, the agreement attempts to control scarcity through an agreed formula, rather than making unilateral allocations. However, a formula for distribution cannot guarantee that the river will, of itself, carry enough water to meet the needs of both nations. Low river flow means that water is fought over by agricultural activities and fresh-water needs. This is especially problematic for Bangladesh, the downstream riparian during the lean season. These concerns need to be balanced with the needs of the riparian populations in India, those living in Bihar and West Bengal, for instance.The question of a guarantee clauseIn September 2026, Bangladesh’s water resources minister Shahid Uddin Chowdhury Anee formally sought a new treaty that included a guarantee clause to protect the country’s share during dry season. Additionally, the pact should address the problem of excess monsoon flows, often leading to floods and financial losses. This demand reflects a major shortcoming of the current system: the mere distribution of water does not solve all scarcity or abundance issues. In addition to considering the demand for a guarantee clause, the practical consequences of such a provision should also be carefully studied. A minimum guaranteed volume is not the same as a formula for dividing the water available. Any sudden decrease in flow may endanger the ability to meet a minimum-flow obligation without affecting the needs of the other riparian. Hence, for the updated agreement to be effective, it should specify what is guaranteed, how the obligation would be implemented in case of extraordinary scarcity, and what would happen if actual flows fell below the agreed threshold. India and Bangladesh had a guarantee for the lean season in their earlier 1977 pact. The present attempt by Bangladesh to reinsert such a clause is therefore not a new idea, but a continuation of earlier bilateral agreements on water sharing. Nevertheless, reverting to the original clause would not fix everything that is wrong with the current arrangement. Changes in hydrology, domestic demand and the political climate have changed the nature of negotiations. A guarantee is only as good as the measurements that support it, a commonly agreed-upon method of measuring water supply and a practical way to make last-minute alterations. Politics, climate change and domestic demandsClimate change makes this deliberation even more complicated. Then there is politics. Geographically and economically, India and Bangladesh are very close, but there are irritants in their relationship, such as diplomatic engagement, border management, trade restrictions and the broader impact of the latest political transition in Bangladesh. This background is important to understand the Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty, since the agreement has become a litmus test of the two governments’ dispute management skills. Even though the countries share common interests in water, energy and trade, political conflicts have strained their dynamic. This is why the treaty matters. Bringing it back to life may not resolve the underlying political divides, but it would show that cooperation in the face of extreme political polarisation is still possible. India’s own water politics need to be understood within its borders. Concerns over water availability at Farakka Barrage in West Bengal could have implications for drinking water, agriculture and other sectors. Besides these issues, Bihar is worried about meeting its own water needs. The Union government had sought the views of stakeholders, including West Bengal, while formulating its position on the pact, Indian lawmakers were told in February 2026.Also read: When Rivers Become Ropes: India-Bangladesh Ties and Resisting the Weaponisation of the GangesThe active role of state governments is important precisely because of the potential political instability of an international commitment that is not the product of domestic deliberation. But this should not stop India from negotiating with Bangladesh, even amid its internal disputes. It should instead create an open process to determine which states are most affected and how best to incorporate their demands into a strong negotiating position.Legitimate restrictions could be more readily distinguished from political concerns through credible data on water demand, actual flows and competing uses. This would also help India define the realistic limits of any feasible guarantee, rather than allowing negotiations to degenerate into a tug of war over conflicting claims.A wider framework for cooperationCollaboration is even more important in the broader regional context. India and Bangladesh have 54 rivers flowing across their common border, but water-sharing pacts between the two countries remain in their infancy. If the Ganga accord works, it could pave the way for more systematic cooperation on other shared rivers, including aspects like data exchange, flood forecasting and environmental management. Rising demand for fresh water and the potential economic impacts of hydrological uncertainty mean that both countries would benefit greatly from such cooperation.The immediate concern is to ensure that there is no break in concrete cooperation as the deadline approaches. The two governments should establish a clear timetable for negotiations, identify the points requiring political decisions and do so without delay, while keeping technical dialogue on flow measurements and allocation going.If a successor treaty cannot be reached by December 12, consideration should be given to an appropriate legal basis for a mutually agreed temporary solution. This would keep important monitoring and consultation mechanisms in place while discussions on a successor treaty continue. It would not resolve the underlying disagreement, but it could lessen the impact of the expiry date on the cooperative effort required to manage the river.Political trust is an important condition for productive collaboration, yet it cannot be an alternative to strong institutions. Whether the two nations can establish arrangements that hold up against water scarcity, rising domestic political pressures and hydrological conditions different from those anticipated in the past will matter.Instead of focusing solely on the renewal debate, the two countries have an opportunity to address the institutional shortcomings that may threaten water security in the future, with the expiry date fast approaching. Any long-term allocation scheme must account for actual water availability and the needs of both riparian countries. India must recognise that certainty for the downstream country is a legitimate concern. Bangladesh must do likewise.Political pressure alone will not guarantee long-term water security. For this pact to have a meaningful successor, there must be clear commitments, transparency in the use of evidence and mechanisms for handling disputes. Its success will not be measured by pledges of friendship, but by the strength of the institutions it establishes to withstand environmental and political upheaval.Anusreeta Dutta is a columnist and climate researcher with experience in political research analysis, ESG research and energy policy.