The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), led by its boisterous Chief Minister, Himanta Biswa Sarma (HBS), is back in power in Assam, the largest state in Northeast India. In fact, the North East Democratic Alliance (NEDA) has returned to the 126-seat assembly with a stronger mandate, with the BJP alone comfortably breaching the majority mark of 64 seats by 18 seats.On the other hand, the Congress-led opposition alliance, Asom Sonmilito Morcha (ASM), and other opposition parties stand on weaker ground than before – with the Congress winning 10 fewer seats and the All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF) winning 14 fewer seats than in 2021. Following are the final numbers from the Election Commission of India (ECI) website:This is the BJP’s third win in the state since the 2016 assembly election, and the second under Sarma’s leadership.So, how did the saffron party manage to win a state that is widely considered to be an unlikely ground for Hindu nationalism for the third straight time?First, we must challenge the basic assumption in the above question – that Assam is an unlikely state for a saffron victory or that a saffron victory is counterintuitive to the state’s social landscape. It is not.A Hindutva laboratoryTwo endemic factors make Assam a natural political catchment for the BJP.One, its sharply divided demography, composed of a large caste Hindu population (61.47%), and a fairly large Muslim minority (34.22%) [figures from the 2011 census].This automatically creates fertile ground for what BJP does very well: communal polarisation. The delimitation exercise, which redrew Assam’s electoral boundaries, used this polarised geography to further constrain the opposition’s operating space.Two, Assam’s long history of sectarian hostility against Bengali Muslims, who are routinely projected in popular culture and political discourse as ‘illegal Bangladeshis’.This communal impulse is rooted in the history of Assamese ethnonationalism or ‘Axomiya jatiyatabad’ – a nativist movement rooted in the politics of ‘jati, maati, bheti’ (ethnicity, land and hearth). While unlike Hindutva, jatiyatabadi politics has traditionally framed both Hindu and Muslim Bengalis as ‘bahiragato’ (outsiders) and/or ‘bidexi’ (foreigners), it gave the BJP an ideological foundation to construct its own sectarian edifice in the state.First, to placate caste Hindu Assamese concerns, the BJP singled out the ‘Miya’ (pejorative term for Bengali Muslims) as the primary ‘non-indigenous other’ in Assam through a mix of aggressive communal rhetoric and direct action measures, like forced evictions. Then, to placate the Bengali Hindus, it deployed specific policies, like the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and selective application of foreigner detection norms, to ensure that no member of the community is disenfranchised.In this way, the BJP collapsed the ‘indigenous’ identity into the larger Hindu identity and redrew the contours of Assamese nationalism to create openings for Hindu nationalism. This process has been so totalising that even the most influential (and original) Assamese nationalist party, the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), can win an election today only by serving as an appendage of the BJP.The CM’s own communally-loaded public speeches targeting the Miya Muslims played a pivotal role in this narrative landscaping. It is alluring to underplay the uptake of such inflammatory rhetoric by the average voter in Assam – as some journalists have done based on ground interviews.But, anyone familiar with Assam’s political history would know that disdain for Miya Muslims holds great sway over the dominant Assamese psyche. It may not instantly roll off the tongue of the average voter, and the average Assamese may not wear it on their sleeve. But, it serves as a scaffolding to other issues (like welfare and development), quietly deciding which button they press on polling day.But, while it is a powerful arrow in the BJP’s quiver in Assam, anti-Miya hatred is not a magic wand.To woo ethnic minorities (or Scheduled Tribes) that are not the most natural votaries of Hindutva, the BJP used tailor-made sops, such as new reserved quotas, and strategically co-opted tribal elites through ticket distribution. Although, even in this case, it sometimes relied on provoking ‘indigenous’ anxieties against ‘outsiders’.In certain areas, like Bodoland, Sarma even allowed powerful ethnic parties – like the Bodoland People’s Front (BPF) – to set their own political narrative. In exchange, he sought electoral support. He knows that smaller ethnic groups generally tend to ally with the dominant party, and he used it to the BJP’s advantage.What must not be taken away from BPF’s gain is the consolidation of Muslim voters behind Mohilary who has curated an image for himself as a “secular” and “inclusive” leader among Muslims and in more than one way went against BJP’s policies accused of targeting Muslims https://t.co/Aedw9t6pfQ— Arshad Ahmed (@arshadreports) May 4, 2026The net outcome? Simultaneous appeasement of three key voting blocs: caste Hindu Assamese; Bengali Hindus; and non-Assamese, non-Muslim minorities (like Scheduled Tribes and Hindi-speaking communities).Yes, there have been chinks in this Machiavellian armour. At times, Assamese groups and other ethnic minorities (like the Karbis) have complained about the BJP’s patronage to non-Assamese groups, like the Bengali and Hindi-speaking Hindus.For example, its decision to give a ticket to Vijay Gupta, a Hindi-speaking politician, in the Guwahati Central constituency drew flak from some Assamese-speaking blocs (Gupta has won the seat).But, through strategic political management and careful narrative manipulation, Sarma has managed to keep the heat down.Timid oppositionThe other thing that Sarma is really good at is: opposition suppression.This time, he did so using two key tools: personalised targeting of Gaurav Gogoi, the chief of Assam Congress and son of former chief minister, Tarun Gogoi; and defections.Early on, Sarma dialled up the heat on Gogoi by accusing him and his British wife of working for the Pakistani intelligence and harbouring nefarious foreign interests. The party even released AI-generated videos of him conversing gleefully with the Pakistani army chief, Asim Munir.With the India-Pakistan escalation dominating headlines last year and Sarma linking the charges to ‘national security’, the potentially defamatory rhetoric might have sounded even more alarming to the average voter.Gogoi’s response was lacklustre. Beyond boilerplate responses denying the claims, there was no real counter-offensive – until less than a week before the election when Congress leader, Pawan Khera, accused Sarma’s wife of holding three different passports.The spousal tit-for-tat was accomplished, but clumsily and callously. The supposed foreign passports that Khera flashed in a press conference on 5 April were reportedly either forged or misleading. Sarma wasted no time in dragging him to court, and even got a favourable order that painted his wife as an ‘innocent lady’.Making things worse, neither Gogoi, nor the Congress party were able to offer any solid support to Khera’s claims.On defections, Sarma brought two big imports into the BJP this time – former Congress President of Assam, Bhupen Borah; and veteran Congress leader and MP from Nagaon, Pradyut Bordoloi. Both shifts rattled the Congress ecosystem in Assam and likely had a demoralising effect on the cadre base. And both have won their seats – Borah in Bihpuria (his old home) and Bordoloi in Dispur.Sarma is probably one of the most successful defection engineers in the BJP today, not least because he used to be in the Congress until 2014 and knows the party inside-out. Consequently, he also knows what skeletons the party hides in its closet – a leverage that he tends to use strategically in every election cycle.Narrative and outreach imbalanceIt is fair to say that the opposition lacked a coherent narrative and public outreach strategy, assuming one reinforces the other.Regardless of how perverse some of it might be, the BJP was consistent and aggressive in its public messaging. It made sure to flaunt its visible work, such as big-ticket infrastructure projects and – pains me to write this – the forced eviction of Bengali Muslims from their homesteads.Sarma also made an emphatic outreach to women, the youth and the elderly. Days before the election, he embarked on a dramatic statewide ‘Jana Ashirbad Yatra’ (Public Blessing March) to seek support from these groups.Combined with targeted schemes that undoubtedly benefited certain voters, such as the Orunodoi Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) programme for women from low-income households, the coordinated public outreach sealed the deal.The opposition, especially the Congress, focused on the CM’s corruption, corporate loot and unemployment. But, it failed to tie these strands together into a concrete political platform that was legible to a wider, cross-cutting audience.To be more specific, Congress failed to pinpoint how exactly high-level corruption and corporate plunder of Assam’s land harmed the common people of the state. It failed to take these issues to marginalised communities on the ground – those who stand to be directly affected by them.Even on the interlinked issues of unemployment and out-migration that plague small ethnic communities like the Mising, it failed to make any meaningful narrative interventions, allowing the BJP to step in. See Manoranjan’s piece for more on this.The BJP’s communal campaign, which amplified the Hindu-vs-Muslim/indigenous-vs-Muslim divide, made this task even harder. I remember watching a social media influencer go on about how handing over Assam’s land to Adani for redevelopment was better than giving it to the Miya Muslims.Most importantly, the opposition failed to offer a radically different or alternate political imagination to the BJP’s sectarian, divisive politics. Whenever Sarma or his cyber agents targeted the Miya Muslims using inflammatory rhetoric and visuals, the opposition either stayed mute or complained only demurely.It did little to actually stand with the community as a united force, fearing caste Hindu backlash at the polling booth. Such critical omissions undoubtedly corrode the quality of Muslim representation in politics in the longer term.The Congress leadership also continued to reassert its support for the National Register of Citizens (NRC), a project that caused great pain to both Bengali Muslims and Hindus. The party high command also mostly stayed silent on, let alone challenge, the forced detentions and cross-border expulsions of Bengali Muslims by the state government and the Centre.Against the BJP’s theatrical and combative Hindu nationalism, thus, the opposition’s timid and hackneyed Assamese nationalism was barely any match.Did delimitation help BJP win?It is still not very clear how exactly the delimitation process, completed in 2023, affected the opposition. One would have to do a detailed, constituency-wise analysis of the results and compare them to the electoral data from previous polls to be able to make a firm conclusion.But, the redrawing of constituency boundaries, undertaken without much logic or care, certainly did two things in the pre-poll stage: one, reduce the number of Muslim-dominated constituencies from around 33 to 20; two, disturb the opposition’s electoral strategy by forcing it to drop certain candidates to suit the new boundaries (some of whom then defected to other parties).Also, see this analysis for a simulation-based analysis on how delimitation made the opposition’s task of winning herculean, if not impossible.Further, a quick analysis of the results shows that delimitation might have played a key role in dramatically reducing the presence of the main Bengali Muslim-oriented party, AIUDF, and expanding the presence of BJP’s ally in Bodoland, the BPF.At least half of the total number of constituencies that sent an AIUDF MLA to the assembly in 2021 were either abolished or redrawn. The party has won just two seats this time. And of the 10 seats that the BPF has won this time, 6 are newly-created.Watch this Barbed Wires podcast with Srinivas Kodali, digital researcher, to understand the devious mechanics of the delimitation process in Assam.The Zubeen Garg momentThe tragic and untimely demise of Assam’s legendary singer, Zubeen Garg, in Singapore in September triggered a massive political firestorm in the state.Among those widely blamed for his death (confirmed to be caused by accidental drowning by Singaporean authorities) is Shyamkanu Mahanta – an event manager and entrepreneur.Mahanta belongs to a powerful family that is understood to be close to the Sarma government. His elder brother, Bhaskar Jyoti Mahanta, was Assam’s police chief until 2023 and Chief Information Commissioner of the state until November 2025; and his other brother, Nani Gopal Mahanta, is current Vice Chancellor of Gauhati University.Shyamkanu Mahanta’s leading role in organising the music festival that Garg had flown to Singapore for provoked a tsunami of conspiratorial rhetoric around his alleged role in orchestrating his death. Because of his intimacy to Sarma and allied figures, part of the public anger was pitted against the chief minister.This drove some to conclude that Garg’s death would weaken Sarma’s grip over Assam.But, this proved to be a gross misreading. Sarma, being the master strategist that he is, managed to change the direction of the wind in his favour. He arranged a grand funeral procession and a spectacular, emotionally-charged cremation ceremony for the deceased singer.His government also promptly filed serious charges against Mahanta and Garg’s agent, and made sure they were arrested. He then flaunted it as a selfless and audacious act in keeping with public sentiments. The investigation may soon reach a dead end in the absence of any concrete evidence, but Sarma’s job was done.He also cleverly issued an appeal to not ‘do politics’ over his death. This constrained the opposition’s space to open a new front against him.In short, Sarma emerged as the mediator of Assam’s collective grief over Zubeen’s passing, and a self-professed vanguard of his legacy. Instead of challenging it, he indirectly participated in the ‘#JusticeForZubeen’ movement as a concerned party, effectively blunting the anti-government edge. So, contrary to what many might believe, he came out of it politically stronger than before.‘Sarma ji’ enduresI don’t wish to be too anecdotal in a political analysis, but let me take the liberty just this once. It was only the other day that I was casually accosted by an elderly uncle inside the lift of an apartment building in Noida, a common affair as some of my readers would know. He had just returned from his evening walk and the fresh air made him particularly chatty.On learning that I belonged to Assam, he promptly and excitedly quipped: “Oh! You are from Sarma ji’s state! He is a strong leader.”To me, it was an all too familiar refrain. Over the last three years or so, I had heard it from at least two others in Delhi NCR – a cabbie and a small-time advocate. A dentist that my father had consulted in the city was similarly enchanted by ‘Sarma ji’.Again, this is anecdotal analysis based on a tiny sample size. But, it is fair to say that HBS has managed to shatter the political glass ceiling between Assam and the ‘mainland’. None of his predecessors could do that.By aggressively positioning himself in the media spotlight, ranting in broken Hindi (and sometimes tweeting in Hindi), and continuously transgressing the accepted standards of sectarian hate speech, he has made himself eminently recognisable to the average North Indian BJP voter.But, there is something more. His Brahmin surname is far more familiar to the Hindutva heartland than a ‘Gogoi’, ‘Sonowal’, ‘Mahanta’ or ‘Saikia’. This caste familiarity, of course, doesn’t do much independently. But, combined with his strident Hindutva rhetoric and media presence, it works wonders.There is little doubt that Sarma has carved out a niche for himself in the wider BJP ecosystem. He is a force in himself now. In fact, his stature in Assam is at par to, if not higher than, that of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It may not be an exaggeration to say that while votes in most states captured by the BJP are generally cast in Modi’s name, in Assam, they are now being cast in Sarma’s name.For Sarma, this political prestige is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it could shield him from the roughest of winds. On the other hand, it could provoke the kind of anxieties in Delhi that have cut rising saffron leaders to size in the past. Time will tell what Sarma ji does with it.Angshuman Choudhury is an associate fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.This article first appeared on the author’s Substack Barbed Wires and has been republished with permission.