The transformation of religious rituals from introspective, localised acts of piety into sweeping spectacles of public assertion is one of the defining features of contemporary North Indian political life, increasingly embracing majoritarianism. Nowhere is this shift more vivid than in the evolution of the Kanwar Yatra, a Shaivite pilgrimage undertaken on the Mondays of July-August, during the Hindu lunar month of Shravan, across western Uttar Pradesh. While the traditional Bol Bam pilgrimage from Sultanganj to Baidyanath Dham (Deoghar) across Bihar-Jharkhand has existed for generations as an organic, deeply-rooted mass folk tradition, its western UP counterpart underwent a dramatic mutation since the late 1980s-1990s, and more manifestly, in the 21st century. Once a modest, quiet penance undertaken by village elders, ascetics and specific merchant communities carrying Gangajal (water from the sacred river Ganges) to regional shrines like Pura Mahadeva in Baghpat or Augharnath in Meerut, the Haridwar-western UP corridor has expanded into one of the largest annual human gatherings in the world. However, as this pilgrimage grew in scale, it also acquired a distinct socio-political character – one where economic precarity (or instability and uncertainty, in terms of economic, social or job related insecurities), state patronage and majoritarian spectacle increasingly intersect, altering the pluralist fabric of Indian public life. Subaltern subject and the spectacle of faithTo understand the sudden expansion of Kanwar Yatra in western UP, one must examine both its material conditions and its cultural machinery. As anthropologist Ruma Bose’s 2019 book, Walking with Pilgrims: The Kanwar Pilgrimage of Bihar, Jharkhand and the Terai of Nepal, observes, the ritual vocabulary of the pilgrimage – the uniform attire, strict dietary codes and the iconic “Bol Bam” chant – was historically rooted in the eastern folk practices of Bihar and Jharkhand. In Bihar, this tradition was long practiced as an inclusive, non-confrontational cultural rhythm that rarely morphed into a public civic menace. In western UP, however, this ritual grammar was borrowed, re-contextualised and magnified through the audio-cassette revolution of the late 1980s. Driven by T-Series and low-cost music production, traditional devotional chants were synthesised with high-energy pop-folk rhythms, turning the pilgrimage into an energetic, youth-centric cultural phenomenon. Yet, technology alone cannot explain the fervour. Sociologist Vikash Singh’s Uprising of the Fools: Pilgrimage as Moral Protest in Contemporary India notes that the Yatra’s explosion coincided directly with post-1990s neoliberal economic shifts and informal labour precarity. For millions of young, working-class men navigating jobless growth, systemic marginalisation and casualised labour, identifying with Shiva – as Bhola, the innocent mendicant – offered a powerful idiom. Physical endurance, collective movement and public visibility allowed these men to transform structural powerlessness into a dramatic display of spiritual strength and subaltern agency. As James G. Lochtefeld’s book God’s Gateway: Identity and Meaning in a Hindu Pilgrimage Place highlights, Haridwar’s adaptation to these shifting demographics was further accelerated by expanding media networks and evolving state administration along the Delhi–Haridwar highway corridor (NH-58). Public arenas, communal asymmetry and the stateThis phenomenon cannot be understood solely as a socio-economic outlet; it is deeply embedded in the historical trajectory of religious identity in North India. Historian Sandria Freitag, in Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India, demonstrates how public religious performances and collective processions are rarely politically neutral. Instead, they serve as crucial sites where identity conscious religious communities assert presence, claim physical space and define power relations relative to the state and other communities.This dynamic echoes the historical processes detailed by Nandini Gooptu in The Politics of the Urban Poor in Early Twentieth-Century India. Gooptu traces how, during the 1920s and 1930s, across UP cities, the working poor (mainly backward and Dalit communities) were mobilised through two parallel socio-religious currents: a militant, physical-culture-driven Hinduism and a simultaneous Islamic resurgence across urban spaces. Gooptu demonstrates that the reclamation of public spaces by marginalised classes through aggressive religious symbolism has long been tied to broader political mobilisations and inter-community friction.The modern Kanwar Yatra in western UP sits squarely within these historical continuities, but with a stark structural asymmetry. Historically, North Indian public life featured fluid, syncretic overlaps, exemplified by Hindu participation in Muharram processions, where local non-Muslim communities routinely joined in the mourning rituals and spatial marches. However, Muslims rarely intend or feel motivated to reciprocate in the Kanwar Yatra. Rather than fostering shared civic participation, the modern Yatra operates through spatial dominance, effectively requiring non-Hindu populations, particularly Muslims, to withdraw from public visibility during the pilgrimage season.Political consequences and state patronageThis spatial friction has had concrete political consequences. The underlying tensions generated by mass, assertive public processions contributed directly to the volatile atmosphere in western UP that culminated in the catastrophic 2013 Muzaffarnagar communal riots, which originated from altercations, disputes, and political mobilisations surrounding the Kanwar Yatra season.What distinguishes the modern iteration of the Yatra from its historical precursors in Bihar is the role of the state. Far from acting as a neutral arbiter of public space, the state has actively invested in, institutionalised and patronised the Kanwar Yatra. From diverting national highways and shutting down educational institutions to showering flower petals from state helicopters and offering official municipal facilitation, government authorities have transformed a religious procession into a state-endorsed majoritarian spectacle. This heavy state investment actively affects and erodes the pluralist character of Indian society. The evolution of the Kaanwar Yatra from a modest folk pilgrimage into an overwhelming public phenomenon illustrates the complex intersection of subaltern angst, media capital and political mobilisation in modern India. While Bihar’s Bol Bam tradition of pre-1990s demonstrates that mass devotionalism can exist harmoniously within the public sphere, western UP’s contemporary experience reveals the dangers of fusing religious assertion with majoritarian state backing. When the state actively subsidises and elevates the religious displays of one community while restricting the civic life of others, more particularly of Muslims, the pluralist foundation of Indian secularism is profoundly altered. Reclaiming public space as a shared, egalitarian arena requires recognising how socio-economic vulnerabilities are weaponised – and ensuring that religious devotion does not come at the huge expense of civic harmony and pluralist democracy.Professor Mohammad Sajjad (@sajjadhist) teaches Modern & Contemporary Indian History at the Aligarh Muslim University. The views expressed above are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of his institution’s.