The highly publicised initiative by Humayun Kabir, the suspended Trinamool Congress (TMC) MLA, to construct a mosque in Murshidabad modelled after the demolished Babri Masjid, is arguably one of the most significant symbolic challenges to West Bengal’s unique political settlement since the 1992 demolition itself. This act, timed to coincide with the anniversary of the destruction, is not mere construction; it is a profound and politically calculated strike designed to detonate the carefully maintained communal equilibrium that has long underpinned the TMC’s power. It is a calculated attempt to tap into a deep-seated “Babri sentiment” among Bengal’s Muslims. This equilibrium was maintained by utilising people’s inabilities to perceive the political production of cultural expressions. This is quite ubiquitous in India, ranging from the resurrection of Ram Temple in Ayodhya to the construction of Jagannath Temple in West Bengal. Kabir’s project is a tangible monument to a national wound. His action leverages a deep-seated grievance to introduce an unprecedented level of confrontational identity politics into a state long considered immune to such macro-level communal mobilisation. It is important to understand that the initiative’s true insight lies in its dismantling of the TMC’s long-drawn and strategic maintenance of secular equilibrium. Initiatives such as these have the potential to accelerate the institutional entrenchment of communal cleavage.West Bengal’s Muslim population, constituting over 27% of the electorate, has traditionally supported the ruling secular party – initially the Left Front, then the TMC – as a pragmatic electoral choice to fend off the Hindu Right. This arrangement, however, during the Left Front rested upon a political system that managed, but never genuinely resolved, the historical trauma and socio-economic marginalisation of the minority. It was clearly evidenced with the Sachar Committee Report. Instead of addressing the core issues, the new government continued to treat Muslim population as their protective shield in elections. Meanwhile, the radicalisation of Islam continued, creating and maintaining a deep social cleavage that not only makes Hindu-Muslim boundary prominent and urgent but also defines ideal Muslim and Hindu prototypes. Both Hindu and Islamic fundamentalism are coevolving.Also read: A ‘Babri Masjid’ in Bengal and the Shifting Politics of the Man Behind itThe mechanism for the growth of mutual exclusivity is prescribed institutionally, practised everyday and are often surveillanced by the institutions such as the Masjid committee or the Ram Navami celebration committees. TMC attempted to institutionalise the communal events such as Babri demolition by using cultural spectacles like observing ‘Sanhati Diwas’ on December 6th, offering prayer with Islamic attire, alongside heavily criticised symbolic policies such as honorariums for Imams. The rise of concerns with Durga puja is popularly seen as TMC’s desperate attempt to strike a balance between the two competing forces. Such use of cultural expressions are important mechanism for generating popular legitimacy and diverting attention from systemic failures such as the delivery of public services. Muslim community consequently required to subsume its core identity grievances, including the trauma of the Babri demolition. With the rise of BJP as the opposition force alongside the rapid spread of their identity assertions through invented events like Ram Navami, and temple politics the entire community had to manage their everyday survival under the banner of political pragmatism.Kabir’s mosque is a direct repudiation of this bargain. By explicitly invoking the name Babri Masjid he addresses the vulnerable but potent symbol of a failure and injustice. He forces the grievance to the forefront of the public sphere. He shifts the conversation from a transactional politics of welfare and security to a confrontational politics of dignity and symbolic memory. TMC’s response was to suspend him for “communal provocation” This suspension actually validates Kabir’s underlying claim: the ruling party prioritises maintaining its secular façade over permitting a genuine, highly symbolic expression of minority identity. This act is symptomatic of the fact that symbolic initiatives alongside of a rising threat of BJP is failing at least among a section of the Muslims, because the trauma is no longer manageable or containable.The choice of Murshidabad, a district with a substantial Muslim population, is deliberate, tapping into an already existing trajectory of Islamic fundamentalist consolidation in the region. In my fieldwork in Rejinagar back in 2017 to 2019 I have seen posters demanding a rebuilding of Babri Masjid. My ethnography shows that Islamic politics in Bengal has been undergoing a puritanical purification, marked by a concentric attack on the relatively open and syncretic folk Islamic traditions by the Shariya Islam. Although conflicts such as this are not new, there is a serious rise of competitive communalism. This process, most prominently manifested through the forced conversion and destruction of Sufi centres (Mazars) into orthodox prayer-hall-style mosques, as seen in Rejinagar has created an organised and emotionally unified base of Shariya adherents. These are groups that actively practice a politics of inclusion and exclusion, defining an ‘ideal Muslim’ and punishing those who deviate. Kabir’s initiative appeals directly to this emerging, radical monolith. His use of overtly aggressive language, such as recalling his earlier comment that Muslims could, “if they wished, throw Hindus into the waters of the Bhagirathi“, aligns with the aggressive communalism that has fuelled riots in West Bengal’s communal hot spots. The Babri replica thus legitimises the puritanical trend by nationalising its grievances, accelerating the cultural displacement of syncretism with confrontation in a situation where production of political violence is tangible and institutionalised. The most clear political impact is the immediate threat of electoral fragmentation for the secular-democratic section of the political spectrum which includes the left and congress. Kabir, following his suspension, has openly explored launching a new party and aligning with Asaduddin Owaisi’s All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM).Also read: Why Communal Tensions Are Rising in Karnataka’s Old Mysore RegionFor TMC, which secured a significant victory in 2021 by positioning itself as the ‘secular’ bulwark and pivoting to service delivery politics, the fragmentation of its minority vote bank is an existential crisis. TMC’s electoral success hinges on the unified support of the 27% Muslim population. Even a minor split, as seen in other Indian states, can shift the fragile vote share and inadvertently benefit the BJP.The BJP’s reaction completes the cycle of competitive communalism. BJP leaders immediately accused TMC Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee of orchestrating Kabir’s actions to secure the Muslim vote. This is an instance of political discourse leveraging the post-truth moment. They use the spectacle of the mosque to reinforce the dominant, factually questionable narrative that “Hindus are in danger” under TMC rule.Humayun Kabir’s ‘Babri Masjid’ initiative is thus far more than a simple act of defiance. It is a strike against the long-term use of Cultural apparatus that sustained Bengal’s political normalcy. It actively exploits the underlying reality of emerging monolithic Islamic identity in districts like Murshidabad.The consequence is a possible permanent shift. By transforming a historical trauma into a tangible, confrontational political statement, Kabir accelerates the state’s transition from a politics primarily concerned with service delivery to one increasingly defined by the institutionalisation of grievance. This new trajectory confirms the weakening of secular, democratic forces and indicates that the contest for power in West Bengal will continue to be fought on the volatile, polarised terrain of identity and symbolic memory.Suman Nath is a Political Anthropologist and teaches at Government General Degree College, Keshiary, Paschim Medinipur, West Bengal.