The Union government, led by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), will count caste in the next national census, a decision announced after years of demands from political groups and social justice advocates. But it remains unclear when the census, already delayed from 2021, will happen.The decision comes amid political pressure, especially since opposition-ruled states conducted their own caste surveys. The call for a nationwide count stems from India’s complex social history and debates over inequality, representation, and affirmative action. Why has this demand gained force, and what is its story?Why count caste?Supporters argue that counting caste is essential for modern India – socially, legally, and administratively. They argue caste remains a powerful social reality, despite constitutional guarantees of equality. Caste still shapes life: marriage (inter-caste unions were rare, ~5% in 2011-12), surnames, where people live, and even political choices for candidates and appointments.Surveys, though often dated or small-scale, consistently show socio-economic gaps linked to caste. For instance, 2011-12 National Sample Survey data showed ST, SC, and OBC households had significantly lower average spending than ‘General’ category households. Poverty estimates from the 2015-16 National Family Health Survey showed poverty concentrated among these groups: STs (50.6%), SCs (33.3%), and OBCs (27.2%), compared to 15.6% for others. Muslims also had higher poverty rates. Also read: Modi’s Somersault on Caste Census is a U-turn Fraught with Long-Term Challenges for the RSS-BJPThe inequalities extend to education and jobs. Official data shows the General category has far more graduates and workers in regular, salaried positions. Conversely, ST, SC, and OBC people are heavily overrepresented among casual labourers and in the large informal sector, often reflecting historical disadvantage.Advocates also stress legal and administrative needs. India’s constitution allows affirmative action (reservations) for SCs, STs, and OBCs in government jobs, education (Articles 15(4) & 16(4)), and local elections (panchayats, municipalities (Articles 243D(6) & 243T(6)). Supporters argue that implementing these policies effectively requires accurate, current population data for each caste group. The Supreme Court, notably in the 1992 Indra Sawhney case, stressed the need for data to manage reservations, identify backward groups, and exclude the OBC ‘creamy layer’. Lack of recent caste data has led courts in several states to halt OBC quotas in local elections. Reliable data is also seen as vital for possible sub-categories within the large OBC group, ensuring benefits reach the neediest, not just dominant groups. The government’s Justice Rohini Commission studied this, reporting in August 2023 after several extensions.Ultimately, supporters argue counting caste makes hidden inequalities visible. They say it is needed to show the structural advantages of upper castes and the specific disadvantages of lower castes, laying groundwork for better social reforms. Some scholars argue official ‘caste blindness’ lets inequality and privilege persist unchallenged in a society still marked by caste.A history of counting and forgetting casteCounting caste isn’t new to India. British administrators counted caste in censuses from 1881 to 1931. Collected mainly for administration, the data revealed stark upper-caste dominance in society and government. This information empowered early lower-caste movements demanding fairer representation, leading to quotas in some regions.But the nationalist movement, led mainly by Congress, grew wary of stressing caste divisions. Leaders feared it would fragment national unity against British rule, especially after the Muslim League mobilised Muslims separately. Efforts were made to downplay caste during census drives. Mahatma Gandhi strongly opposed separate electorates for Dalits (‘Depressed Classes’), fearing it would break Hindu society. This led to the Poona Pact of 1932. Critics like Phule, Periyar and Ambedkar worried independence might just transfer power from Britain to India’s upper-caste elites without ending caste oppression.These fears seemed justified when, after independence in 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru’s government stopped counting caste in the general census (starting 1951). The reason given: counting caste would perpetuate social divisions. An exception was made for SCs and STs, as the constitution required counting them for upliftment policies. Critics argue this decision had major consequences. It effectively reduced caste in public discussion mainly to Dalit untouchability, obscuring inequalities affecting many other lower castes (later called OBCs) and the advantages of upper castes.The rise of OBC politics and the Mandal turning pointThe constitution, however, required the state to identify and promote ‘socially and educationally backward classes’. This led to the 1953 Kalelkar Commission. Using the old 1931 census data (the only available), it identified thousands of backward castes. But its report was shelved, partly due to the chairman’s own reservations and the government’s reluctance to admit such widespread backwardness.Despite this official hesitation, OBCs gained political importance, especially in southern states with long histories of backward caste movements. In North India, socialist Ram Manohar Lohia and agrarian leader Charan Singh mobilised OBCs, challenging Congress dominance. These trends merged in the Janata Party, an opposition coalition that defeated Indira Gandhi’s Congress in 1977. The Janata government appointed the Mandal Commission in 1978 to re-examine the condition of backward classes.The Mandal Commission’s 1980 report was a turning point. Again relying on 1931 data (lacking newer figures), it controversially estimated OBCs made up 52% of India’s population. The report highlighted severe OBC under-representation in power, especially in central government jobs (under 13% OBC vs nearly 70% upper caste). It argued powerfully that reservation wasn’t just about easing poverty but ensuring a share of power for historically marginalised groups.Based on its findings, but limited by a 50% Supreme Court cap on total reservations (SC/ST quotas were 22.5%), the commission recommended a 27% OBC quota in central government jobs and education.When V.P. Singh’s government implemented this in 1990, fierce upper-caste protests erupted, calling it the ‘death of merit’. But the move also galvanised a pan-Indian OBC political identity. It permanently changed India’s politics, leading to powerful regional OBC parties and more OBCs in Parliament and state legislatures – what political scientist Christophe Jaffrelot called a ‘silent revolution’.The mystery of the 2011 dataIn 2011, the Congress-led UPA government, facing pressure, conducted a separate Socio-Economic and Caste Census (SECC) alongside the main census. But the caste data from this massive exercise was never officially released. The current NDA government later called this data ‘flawed’ and ‘unusable‘ in a 2021 Supreme Court affidavit.Reasons given for withholding the SECC 2011 data involved methodology and execution. The government said the survey wasn’t done under the Census Act’s strict rules, but by ministries inexperienced in such large surveys. Crucially, it lacked a standard, pre-defined caste list and used open-ended questions. The government argued this led enumerators to record a confusing mix of caste names, sub-castes, clans and surnames interchangeably, creating an unusable count of distinct ‘castes’ (reportedly 4.6 million nationally, vs about 4,147 in 1931). Meaningful analysis was deemed impossible.In the same affidavit, the Centre argued against counting caste in the next regular census. It cited major administrative, operational, and logistical challenges. These included complications from differing central and state OBC lists; the worry that briefly trained, part-time enumerators couldn’t verify complex caste identities (unlike clear SC/ST lists); and the fact that census plans are finalised years ahead. The government also maintained that deciding what the census counts is a ‘policy decision’ courts cannot direct, noting no constitutional mandate exists to count OBCs (unlike SCs and STs). Opponents counter that social divisions existed before any census, counting SCs/STs hasn’t increased conflict, and sensitive data like religion is already collected. They add that reliable data would allow objective policy debate, not just fuel demands.The BJP’s complex caste calculusThe ruling BJP’s rise, especially under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, relied heavily on winning support from many Hindu OBC groups (BJP’s OBC vote share reportedly rose from 22% in 2009 to 44% in 2019). It often did this by opposing older OBC parties and stressing broader Hindu unity (‘Hindutva’), sometimes countering ‘Mandal’ (social justice) politics with ‘Kamandal’ (religious politics), seen in the Ram Mandir movement that grew alongside the Mandal debate.Despite relying on OBC votes, the party keeps a strong upper-caste base. Its core ideology has been wary of caste politics, seeing it as potentially dividing the unified Hindu identity it promotes. Though the BJP reportedly agreed before the 2019 election to count caste in the 2021 census, it later backtracked, citing complexities. The situation grew more complex with the 10% reservation for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) introduced in 2019. This quota mainly benefits upper castes (excluding those covered by SC/ST/OBC quotas). Significantly, it breached the long-held 50% reservation ceiling – a breach the Supreme Court upheld in 2022. This fueled arguments from OBC groups to raise their own quotas above 27%, perhaps closer to their actual population share, making accurate data seem even more urgent. The long census delay also sparked speculation about the government’s motives: avoiding controversy over the planned National Population Register (NPR) update, or managing politics during India’s G20 presidency and before the 2024 elections.State surveys increase the pressureFrustrated by the Union government’s inaction on the 2011 data or a new caste count, several state governments launched their own surveys, greatly increasing political pressure.In Bihar, the Nitish Kumar government released findings in 2023 showing OBCs (27%) and EBCs (36%) together constituted 63.13% of Bihar’s 13.07 crore population. The General category was 15.5%, SCs 19.65%, and STs 1.68%. The survey also highlighted economic distress (34.13% families earning ≤ ₹6,000/month) and low education levels (only 7% graduates). Methodologically, it used a predefined list of 214 castes plus an “Other” category, avoiding SECC 2011’s pitfalls. Also read: Eyeing Bihar Polls, Cabinet Approves Caste Census in Next Population Count But Gives No TimelineThe Congress government in Telangana, after its 2023 election win, conducted a caste survey ending in late 2024. It found BCs constitute 56.33% (including 10.08% BC Muslims), SCs 17.43%, STs 10.45%, and Other Castes 15.79% (including 2.48% OC Muslims) of the enumerated ~3.54 crore population. This survey too faced controversies: questions about stagnant population figures compared to other estimates (SKS 2014, projections); allegations of undercounting, particularly in Hyderabad; and surveyor issues (subcontracting work). A major point of contention is the government’s reluctance to release granular data, citing “privacy” concerns, despite the Supreme Court’s view (in Bihar’s case) favouring transparency for scrutiny. The findings were used to inform policy, including fulfilling the promise to raise backward caste reservation in local bodies, education and employment to 42%, along with introducing sub-categorisation in the Scheduled Castes. The inclusion of Muslims as BCs faces opposition from the state BJP, contrasting with the national BJP’s outreach to Pasmanda Muslims.In Karnataka, the Socio-Economic and Education Survey, commissioned by Siddaramaiah in 2015, was finally submitted in February 2024 and tabled in April 2024. It faced significant controversy, with dominant Lingayat and Vokkaliga communities questioning its methodology and findings, fearing diminished influence. Leaked details suggest it estimates OBCs at a staggering 69.6%, recommending an increase in their quota from 32% to 51%. It reportedly found Lingayat (13.6%) and Vokkaliga (12.2%) populations lower than commonly perceived estimates (17% and 15% respectively). It proposed a new Most Backward Classes (MBC) category (IB) with 12% quota, including Siddaramaiah’s Kuruba community, carved out from the existing IIA category (whose quota would reduce), sparking allegations of preferential treatment. The political sensitivity led to delays in Cabinet discussion and decision-making.These state surveys, despite methods issues and controversies, undeniably pushed the demand for caste data into national politics, making it harder for the central government to ignore.What lies ahead?The Union government’s decision to finally count caste in the next national census marks a potential turning point. Yet, crucial questions remain.Firstly, the timeline is uncertain. When will the delayed census happen? The delay affects real people, especially targeting aid for vital programs like the National Food Security Act, still using old 2011 figures, potentially excluding millions.Second, methodology is key. How will the government avoid the known failures of the 2011 SECC? Experts suggest steps like amending the Census Act to require caste counting; using trained census staff; developing pre-defined, public state caste lists; careful questionnaire design; and using digital tech for collection, checks and quality control.Third, data transparency is a big question. Will the caste data be made public in an accessible format? Past experience with the 2011 SECC and hesitation in states like Telangana raise concerns. Experts and activists stress that public scrutiny ensures data integrity. Access to anonymous, grouped data is seen as vital for research, informed policy, and empowering communities to understand their position and advocate for their rights. The Supreme Court also favours such data being public.Finally, the political and policy effects could be far-reaching. Accurate data could reignite debates over reservation percentages, perhaps challenging the 50% ceiling for good. It would provide the data needed for scientific OBC sub-categories, possibly redistributing opportunities among caste groups. The findings could reshape political strategies, possibly splitting vote banks while revealing inequalities within castes as well as between them.