In an era of widespread scepticism, even among apparently well-informed people, about the power of protests – particularly against resolute foreign policies like those pursued by US President Donald Trump – historical scholarship offers a compelling counter-narrative. The fascinating new book, Gloria J. Browne-Marshall’s A Protest History of the United States (Beacon Press, 2025), shows the powerful effects of historic and contemporary protests and resistance to elite power.Many dismiss demonstrations against US positions on Venezuela or Israel as symbolic at best, ineffective against determined leadership. Yet, sustained mass mobilisation can and does disrupt elite hegemonic projects by challenging the consent that underpins them. Drawing on Antonio Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony – not mere domination through force but rule through manufactured consent in civil society – I view US foreign policy as sustained by elite networks that shape “common sense” ideas about America’s global role. Protests, in this lens, represent counter-hegemonic struggles: wars of position over time that erode legitimacy, expose contradictions, and force policy adjustments, even in ostensibly unyielding administrations.From Vietnam and Reagan’s Central America aggressions to post-1990 ‘forever wars,’ public opposition has repeatedly constrained imperial ambitions. This cumulative backlash influenced both Trump’s and Biden’s 2020 campaigns, where ending endless conflicts became central pledges. In early 2026, as Trump’s second term escalates interventions in Venezuela, Iran, and Gaza, fractures within his MAGA base highlight hegemony’s fragility, creating fertile ground for cross-ideological anti-war coalitions.Vietnam: The archetype of protest-forced reversalThe Vietnam War exemplifies how mass mobilisation can loosen and help dismantle a hegemonic foreign policy consensus. Escalated under Lyndon Johnson purportedly to contain communism, the war initially commanded broad elite and public support, framed as essential to American credibility. As casualties mounted and televised images revealed its brutality, however, mass opposition surged and elite consensus fractured. And some elites at least are encouraged by mass protests because it provides them leverage in official discussions, even if they cannot come out publicly with their doubts about official policy.A Protest History of the United States, Gloria J. Browne-Marshall, Beacon Press, 2025.Teach-ins on campuses from 1965 quickly morphed into mass actions: the 1967 March on the Pentagon attracted over 100,000 participants, while draft resistance and civil disobedience proliferated. Gallup polls captured the shift, with Johnson’s war approval plummeting below 30% by 1968. Scholars like Christian Appy and Melvin Small demonstrate how the movement fractured the Cold War bipartisan consensus, rendering the war politically untenable at home.In Gramscian terms, the anti-war coalition challenged the hegemonic “common sense” that equated US intervention with freedom and security. By linking the war to moral bankruptcy and imperial overreach, protesters waged a war of position in civil society, eroding consent. Consequences were tangible: Johnson halted North Vietnam bombing in 1968 and abandoned re-election bids. Nixon’s massive 1969 Moratorium to End the Vietnam War mobilisations – drawing millions – pressured troop withdrawals and “Vietnamisation.” The movement foreclosed escalatory options like invading the North or using nuclear weapons, accelerating the 1973 Paris Accords. Former defense secretary Robert McNamara later acknowledged that protests exposed the war’s futility, compelling elite recalibration. Absent this counter-hegemony, the conflict could have persisted far longer.Reagan’s Central America: Constraining a hardline presidentRonald Reagan’s 1980s Central America policies bore hallmarks of ideological intransigence akin to later “Trump-style” unilateralism – casting Nicaragua’s Sandinistas and Salvadoran rebels in Manichean anti-communist terms, while arming Contras and backing repressive regimes.Nevertheless, Reagan confronted robust domestic limits from the peace and solidarity movement. Coalitions involving religious activists, veterans, students, and the Sanctuary Movement mobilised hundreds of thousands. Witness for Peace deployed Americans to Nicaragua as human shields against Contra attacks, vividly documenting US-backed atrocities. Over 500 churches defied laws by sheltering Central American refugees.As Christian Smith’s study Resisting Reagan shows, this grassroots effort shifted opinion: by the mid-1980s, most Americans opposed Contra funding. Congressional Boland Amendments progressively curtailed aid, compelling Reagan’s illicit Iran-Contra scheme – exposed in 1986, it severely damaged his presidency.No full-scale US invasion occurred despite bellicose rhetoric. The movement secured humanitarian restrictions on El Salvador aid and bolstered regional peace processes like the 1987 Esquipulas Accords. Van Gosse highlights how it resuscitated post-Vietnam activism, using moral framing to make intervention domestically costly.This represented counter-hegemony disrupting elite-manufactured consent for low-intensity warfare. By infiltrating civil society – churches, campuses, media – the movement contested the narrative of Soviet threats, imposing costs that moderated Reagan’s ambitions.The Gulf War and the seeds of opposition to endless interventionsThe 1991 Gulf War inaugurated post-Cold War entanglements with apparent swift success under George H.W. Bush. Yet emerging protests critiqued its oil-driven rationale, foreshadowing scepticism toward perpetual commitments. Though smaller than Vietnam-era actions, they drew on that legacy to question “new world order” rhetoric.Douglas Little’s work notes how opposition contributed to postwar doubts, amid recession, aiding Bush’s 1992 electoral defeat. These mobilisations planted seeds for viewing Middle East interventions as resource-draining quagmires.The Iraq War: Peak of Mass Mobilisation Against Imperial OverreachThe 2003 Iraq invasion under George W. Bush – premised on manufactured intelligence – sparked history’s largest global anti-war protests. February 15, 2003, sawIllustration: Pariplab Chakraborty.millions march worldwide, including hundreds of thousands in US cities. Coalitions like ANSWER and MoveOn linked the war to neocon ideology and corporate gain.As occupation unravelled, with immense human and financial costs, dissent deepened. Cindy Sheehan’s 2005 vigil epitomised personal loss fuelling national outrage. By 2006, polls deemed the war a mistake for 60% of Americans. Andrew Bacevich argues protests eroded support, enabling Democratic midterm gains and constraining further escalations.The movement critiqued the broader War on Terror, including Afghanistan’s shift to nation-building. It mainstreamed anti-imperial views, influencing Obama’s “dumb wars” critique – though his expansions perpetuated cycles.In Gramscian perspective, these protests contested post-9/11 hegemonic fear narratives, forging counter-common sense around endless war’s futility.Forever wars since 1990: Cumulative fatigue and political realignmentEncompassing Somalia, Libya, Syria, and beyond, these interventions bred war-weariness. Veterans’ groups exposed traumas; by 2019, Pew found majorities regretting Iraq.This realignment propelled Trump’s attacks on Bush-era follies and promises against “stupid wars,” alongside Biden’s Afghanistan withdrawal vow – pivotal in 2020. Stephen Walt emphasises how opposition limited options, preventing invasions of Iran or Syria amid hawkish pressures.This underscored public fatigue as counter-hegemonic erosion of elite consensus sustaining empire.Echoes in 2026: MAGA discontent over Venezuela, Gaza, and IranTrump’s second term has resurrected forever war spectres, contradicting “America First.” Strikes capturing Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro in early 2026, June 2025 Iranian nuclear facility bombings, and steadfast Gaza support amid catastrophic casualties have alienated parts of the MAGA base.MAGA figures like Marjorie Taylor Greene denounce “never-ending aggression”; Tucker Carlson and Steve Bannon oppose escalations. Charlie Kirk declared Trump’s policies were more like ‘Israel First’ than America First. Social media echoes betrayal of anti-intervention pledges, with polls signalling eroding support if conflicts prolong.These rifts reveal hegemony’s instability when actions contradict manufactured consent.Building Alliances: MAGA, the Left, and cross-ideological anti-war coalitionsDiscontent fosters improbable alliances. MAGA restrainers share terrain with progressives opposing entanglements. Republican Rand Paul warns Venezuela risks splintering the base; Democrat Ro Khanna labels moves betrayals. Bipartisan restraint advocates, like the Quincy Institute, note populist resentment against elite wars. Conferences bridge divides on Gaza and Iran.History – from Vietnam’s eclectic coalitions to Iraq’s diverse dissent – shows such fronts amplifying counter-hegemony. Crises expose imperial contradictions, enabling wars of position across ideologies.A gramscian twist: Protests as counter-hegemony in American empireIn my own published work, applying a neo-Gramscian approach, I reframe these episodes. US hegemony, I suggest, relies on elite networks – foundations, think tanks – engineering consent for global dominance, often masking imperialism as liberal order. Protests disrupt this by contesting “common sense,” potentially forging alternative historic blocs, or just roadblocks to policy.Vietnam and Central America movements challenged Cold War narratives; post-1990 opposition eroded post-9/11 fear-based consent. Today’s fractures – within MAGA over renewed interventions – signal interregnum, where old hegemony wanes without new coherence.Yet, as Gramsci noted, subaltern uprisings risk co-optation absent organised counter-hegemony. Opportunities abound: cross-ideological coalitions could build wars of position, linking domestic inequities to foreign overreach, potentially reshaping empire’s trajectory.Mass mobilisation has historically compelled even stubborn policies to bend. In 2026, reviving counter-hegemonic traditions across divides remains empire’s most potent check, fuelled by Gramsci’s never-give-up maxim: “pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will.”Inderjeet Parmar is a professor of international politics and associate dean of research in the School of Policy and Global Affairs at City St George’s, University of London, a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences, and writes the American Imperium column at The Wire. He is an International Fellow at the ROADS Initiative think tank, Islamabad, on the board of the Miami Institute for the Social Sciences, USA, and on the advisory board of INCT-INEU, Brazil, its leading association for study of the United States. Author of several books including Foundations of the American Century, he is currently writing a book on the history, politics, and crises of the US foreign policy establishment.