In the first three decades after 1949, the People’s Republic of China went to war five times – against the United States in Korea and the Taiwan Strait, against India in 1962, against the Soviet Union in 1969, and against Vietnam in 1979. Since then, it has not fought a major war.This absence of war is often mistaken for restraint. It is not.China’s Wars: The Politics and Diplomacy Behind its Military Coercion, Vijay Gokhale, S&S India, 2026.What has changed is not China’s willingness to use force, but its preferred methods. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has steadily moved from overt war to what strategists call grey-zone coercion: calibrated, limited uses of military pressure designed to achieve political objectives without triggering full-scale conflict. The Himalayas, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait are all theatres where this approach is now visible.To understand how China might act in the future – particularly towards India – it is necessary to revisit its past conflicts. These wars were not accidents. Nor were they aberrations. They were instruments of statecraft, deployed at moments when political objectives could not be achieved by other means.As Mao Zedong famously put it: “When politics develops to a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep away the obstacles in the way.”This is not a rhetorical flourish. It is a governing principle.The myth of defensive ChinaChinese strategic doctrine insists that the country is inherently defensive, that it fights only in response to aggression, and that its actions are designed to restore the status quo. This narrative has been repeated in official white papers, diplomatic statements, and scholarly writings.Yet the historical record tells a different story.With the limited opening of Chinese archives in the early 2000s, scholars have increasingly concluded that China was not simply reacting to threats; in most cases, it initiated the conflict.The persistence of the “defensive” narrative is not accidental. It performs a crucial political function. By framing its wars as counter-attacks in self-defence, China shifts responsibility for conflict onto its adversaries, even when it strikes first. This allows it to reconcile offensive military action with a self-image of moral restraint.The concept is deeply embedded in Chinese strategic culture. Wars are justified not as acts of expansion, but as necessary corrections of injustice. Once the cause is deemed righteous, the use of force becomes not only permissible but morally necessary.When China uses forceIf China is not inherently pacifist, neither is it reckless. Its use of force follows a discernible pattern.First, China prefers non-kinetic means – diplomacy, economic pressure, signalling – to achieve its objectives. Military force is typically used only after these avenues have been exhausted, or when leaders believe the strategic situation is turning irreversibly against them.Second, when force is used, it is usually limited in scope and duration. The objective is not annihilation of the enemy, but a political effect: to shock, deter, and compel.Henry Kissinger captured this succinctly when he wrote that China’s aim in war is “not so much to defeat the enemy as to alter the calculus of risks.”In practice, this means striking hard and fast at a moment of vulnerability, creating a new reality on the ground, and then quickly shifting to diplomacy.Third, China’s wars are rarely purely military decisions. They are shaped by geopolitical calculations – especially the broader balance of power. Beijing has historically chosen moments when its principal adversaries are distracted or divided.The 1962 war with India, for instance, unfolded at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when both the United States and the Soviet Union were preoccupied elsewhere. Such timing is unlikely to be coincidental.The political logic of coercionChina’s use of force is driven by political objectives that extend beyond the battlefield.One recurring motive is psychological deterrence. A sudden, decisive blow is intended to disorient the adversary and demonstrate China’s resolve, making further escalation appear too costly.Another is the creation – or restoration – of a favourable status quo. When Chinese leaders believe that an adversary is gaining ground, they may act pre-emptively to reverse the trend before it becomes irreversible.Also read: India, China and the Asian CenturyA third objective is to force negotiations. Military action is often followed by diplomatic engagement, with the aim of compelling the adversary to accept terms it would otherwise reject.Finally, there is a domestic dimension. External crises can serve to unify the population, consolidate political authority, and divert attention from internal challenges.These motives are not mutually exclusive. In many cases, they operate simultaneously.From war to grey-zone conflictSince 1979, China has avoided large-scale war. But it has not abandoned coercion.Instead, it has refined a strategy that operates below the threshold of open conflict. Grey-zone tactics include military patrols, infrastructure building, economic sanctions, cyber operations, and information warfare – often used in combination.The objective is to achieve incremental gains without provoking a decisive response.In the South China Sea, China has used maritime militias and coast guard vessels to assert control over contested waters. In the Taiwan Strait, it conducts regular military exercises designed to signal capability and intent. Along the Line of Actual Control with India, it has combined infrastructure development with forward deployments to alter facts on the ground.These actions share three characteristics: they seize the initiative, they are carefully calibrated, and they stop short of triggering full-scale war.Chinese strategists describe this as “war control” – the ability to manage escalation and keep conflict within desired limits. Whether this confidence is justified remains an open question.The risks of miscalculationGrey-zone coercion is often seen as a safer alternative to war. But it carries its own risks.The assumption underlying China’s strategy is that it can accurately gauge the intentions and thresholds of its adversaries. If that assumption is wrong, limited actions can spiral into larger conflicts.There is also the danger of overconfidence. As China’s military capabilities grow, so too does its willingness to test boundaries. What begins as a calibrated probe can be perceived by the other side as a significant escalation.The line between coercion and conflict is thin – and not always visible.Implications for IndiaFor India, the lessons are sobering.The likelihood of a large-scale war with China may be relatively low in the near term. But the probability of sustained grey-zone coercion is high. China’s military superiority in infrastructure and logistics along the border gives it an advantage in shaping the tactical environment.More importantly, China is likely to retain the initiative. By choosing when and where to apply pressure, it can keep India on the defensive, both militarilyVijay Gokhale is a former foreign secretary of India and a former ambassador to China. This is an excerpt from the book China’s Wars: The Politics and Diplomacy Behind its Military Coercion.