G.L. Peiris has been member of parliament, minister, and leader of the government side during talks with the Tamil LTTE from 2002 to 2005 to end the civil war. The narrative in his new book, The Sri Lanka Peace Process: An Inside View (Vijitha Yapa Publications, Colombo, 2026), is authoritative and invaluable.The dilemma of the three main island communities was considered as early as 1926 and concluded, ‘federalism as the only solution to our political problem.’ The demand for devolution and power-sharing led to communal tension, terrorism and secession claims by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) despite the constitution prescribing an unitary state. When Sri Lankan president Chandrika Kumaratunga’s exchanges with LTTE chief Prabhakaran led nowhere, she invited Norway in 1999 to facilitate a dialogue. Ranil Wickremasinghe, as prime minister and later president, also supported the process.Negotiations began in 1999 and went through six rounds in Thailand, Norway, Germany and Japan, and terminated after the tsunami of 2004, with conflict resuming until LTTE was defeated in 2009.LTTE regarded the process as its pathway to international acceptance, and was insincere in any exploration of federalism, while the government lacked willingness to depart from the unitary state. The process excluded vital stakeholders from the Tamil, Sinhala and Muslim communities and was vitiated by the president and prime minister in Colombo acting at cross purposes.Economic considerations were given weight, foreign aid regarded as essential, and relief and resettlement prioritised over constitutional and political issues, a sequencing that put the cart before the horse.The Sri Lanka Peace Process: An Inside View by G.L. Peiris. (Vijitha Yapa Publications, Colombo, 2026)Chandrika wished to win Tamils over by devolution and humanitarian means; the government continued to send construction material, and salaries to public officials, in LTTE-controlled areas. Her aim was to alienate the people of the north and east from LTTE, whereas Ranil regarded LTTE as a partner to find solutions, using foreign aid and relief to establish trust and a peace dividend. A ceasefire agreement (CFA) was signed in February 2002 although Chandrika as president in charge of armed forces, refused to lift the LTTE’s proscribed status. Ranil however allowed LTTE to particulate in talks on the theoretical basis of equality.Negotiations beginPeiris notes that ‘the same cluster of issues was taken up with unbroken monotony but increased vehemency’ during the talks. Three subcommittees met ‘in an atmosphere of rapidly declining confidence,’ and the differing emphases of president and prime minister – though in terms of conviction, they did not disagree on the goal of an equitable constitutional devolution of powers – meant that the war impinged on party politics in the government.Chandrika was kept inadequately informed and the army commander refused to withdraw from high security areas unless LTTE abandoned heavy weaponry. ‘Adversarial politics trumped’ national priorities, the CFA did not succeed because lines of control were undefined and maritime conflict excluded. Arms reached LTTE by sea, it press-ganged child soldiers, and its cadres roamed the north and east in the guise of ‘political work’. The Monitoring Mission (MM) was ineffective while Muslims and LTTE’s critics were victims of the greatest violence. The MM was unable to act with even minimal efficacy, with fewer than 25 officers, unarmed, hardly trained, without uniforms, it ignored human rights issues and tilted towards LTTE.Maritime issues were combustible, because this route was the main conduit for LTTE’s arms supplies ‘notwithstanding the patent untenability’ of its assertion to ‘operate at sea on equal terms.’ With the CFA and MM providing no clarity, the government navy experienced ‘profound disenchantment’. With public trust turning hostile, Colombo had to face the possibility of LTTE abandoning the talks, leading to a worse crisis. Media and civil society management during the process was defective, and while Peiris uses temperate language, the Norwegian facilitation inclined to treating LTTE as an equal sovereign party, thereby encouraging its case for separate nationhood.The subcommittee for humanitarian and rehabilitation was a ‘profound disappointment’ and collapsed even before the peace process, although the government was eager to provide relief to LTTE-controlled areas. Presumed international financial support was mainly illusory. Both sides were under financial strain while LTTE’s nominees toured the globe under Norwegian sponsorship. LTTE’s priority was de-escalation. It professed humanitarian concerns while coercing civilians and consolidating authority over much of the north and east. After the Twin Towers attack of 9/11 (2001), and aversion to terror groups, it derived respectability from the ongoing peace process.NorwayNorway as facilitator was accepted by both contending parties, but had no international mandate. The line between mediation and facilitation was blurred and could not be ‘carried to the extent of withholding from the facilitator all creativity.’ Whether on seating plans, flags or protocols, Norway showed pro-LTTE bias; and used diplomatic privilege to ferry communication equipment to LTTE.At the 2002 Oslo talks, Norway summarised that the parties agreed to explore a solution based on internal self-determination for Tamil-speaking peoples based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka, acceptable to all communities. But secession was LTTE’s objective, and the process was running into sand. LTTE negotiator Balasingham’s contact with Prabhakaran was eroding, the Tamil diaspora was critical of anything short of independence, and LTTE remained bent on military victory.The peace process was awkward for Norway after any dealing with terrorists was discouraged following 9/11. It sought to dilute involvement by enlisting western powers and Nordics even as its objectivity began called in question. Despite 9/11, USA remained involved, perhaps due to Ranil’s commitment to private enterprise, but by then only ‘a miniscule minority’ in Sri Lanka believed that ‘international involvement served the national interest.’Human rights and MuslimsInternational support depended on attention to human rights but Prabhakaran was blatantly authoritarian, which meant failure to extract meaningful action from LTTE. Press-ganging child soldiers was a case in point but LTTE’s military ‘had to be preserved at all cost.’ With gender issues, the ‘distance between formal procedures and reality on the ground’ was conspicuous.Muslims being a majority in two eastern districts could claim a Muslim homeland and participate in the peace process, but LTTE excluded them as collaborators and Norway was passive. Contacts between Prabhakaran and Muslim leaders led to little progress though the Oluvil Declaration of 2003 made the case for Muslims of the North and East as a separate nation. By dealing with LTTE without government as intermediary Muslims were able to extract concessions, though violence against them continued till 2006 and their credibility, like LTTE’s later, was crippled by internal dissension.International aspectsRanil placed stress on the international aspect of the peace process because of its traction with western economies and access to financial resources. The assumption that better economic conditions would facilitate political decisions was misplaced, and his policy on privatisation was controversial as economic hardships alienated the public from the peace process.Peiris carefully eschews any critique of India, but Delhi was agnostic if not hostile to any external involvement in Sri Lanka. While the western response was initially enthusiastic and donor meetings in 2003 at Tokyo and Washington were encouraging. LTTE needed to be seen as a provider of material needs to Tamils, but soon began to accuse the international community as concerting with Colombo to exert pressure.Resort to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) led to deeply unpopular austerity measures and eroded public confidence, while benefits reaching LTTE areas through government agencies led to LTTE ‘painting as bleak a picture as possible.’ In government circles the feeling grew that the influence of international actors was excessive. Aid was a necessity but NGOs of ‘dubious character’ and mandate provoked controversies around accountability and alienation from indigenous values.An ‘interim structure’ for rehabilitation, reconstruction, confidence building and attracting aid was considered from the outset but ‘the fundamental problem’ was LTTE’s objective to secure complete control over all institutions in the north and east. In 2003 it presented a plan, probably devised by the Tamil diaspora, that envisaged its total control over eight districts. This was summarily rejected by Peiris supported by Chandrika, who dissolved parliament in 2004.LTTE wanted power without commitment to pluralism or democracy. The CFA had introduced some illusory tranquility, but degenerated into unbridled violence by LTTE whose attacks on Buddhists and dissident Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalas continued unabated. With central issues unaddressed, the peace process became irrelevant. The Tamils then split, with Prabhakaran challenged in the east by an erstwhile subordinate.TsunamiIn December 2004 a tsunami devastated mainly LTTE-held areas. LTTE knew this opened the way to financial resources and talks resumed. Muslims constituted over half the displaced, and had to be represented. International sources offered support, and empowered committees, funding and a ceasefire were discussed, but the Sri Lanka Supreme Court struck down aspects of the arrangements, LTTE withdrew support and the peace process was terminated.Notes on productionThe copy editing in the book is excellent, as are the author’s elegant phrasing and shafts of alleviant humour. Describing a lengthy failed peace process presents a formidable task. Peiris tries to marry granular chronology with analysis without total success, resulting in overlaps and repetitions. Maps were needed, as also a table of acronyms. The timeline of events, frequently consulted, should have appeared at the start and not the conclusion of the text. The use of Mr and other honourifics is inconsistent besides being otiose.Peiris’s epitaph on the peace process is telling. The war ended with the LTTE’s defeat but it would be idle to pretend that the book brought closure to the issues the war had been about.Krishnan Srinivasan is a former foreign secretary.