The time has come for India and China to explore new institutional mechanisms for resolving their boundary dispute.
M. Jagadesh Kumar will do greater service to JNU if he creates a new department for the study of war and peace rather than promoting jingoism.
While India has been assertive in protecting interests it considers vital to its security posture in the region, New Delhi remain cagey when it comes to drawing lines on a map.
Modi’s remarks aimed to put across an India that was ready to synchronise itself with the Trump administration’s goals, but the US president made it clear he wanted India to commit to “free and fair trade”.
India’s membership of the SCO is a manifestation of the reality that India’s interests are as much in the Indian Ocean as the Eurasian landmass.
Tomorrow, the use of human shields could become standard operating procedure. Instead of the difficult process of flushing out militants by armed assault, the army could line up civilians and use them to breach a position.
Given the quantity of investments, China can’t afford to have the OBOR initiative fail. Sceptics like India can use that to persuade China to make modifications.
China wants to move its manufacturing up the value chain to become a producer and exporter of high-value goods, for which Europe can be the best market.
If only some way could be found to target the BATs specifically, then some kind of a deterrent pressure could be built. As of now, the poor jawans who get killed are merely collateral damage.
Two of the six spots renamed could be of significance, but the other four are simply points on a map. Is there a method behind this that we cannot discern at the moment?
The state’s monopoly of violence is accepted only if it follows the rule of law; if it doesn’t, it justifies the breaking of its monopoly by individuals, mobs and insurgents.
There are many obstacles for the US-China summit, such that the American side is simply not ready for a substantive negotiation. But there are also many areas of discussion, including North Korea, the One-China policy and trade.
The National Security Council Secretariat, headed by top spy Ajit Doval, may have received a staggering 311% increase in funds this year to tackle issues at the intersection of cybersecurity and nuclear weapon delivery systems.
A former top Chinese negotiator’s statements on a trade-off between Tawang and Aksai Chin could mean a variety of things.
General Bipin Rawat may be right to warn those who try to obstruct anti-militancy operations, but labelling separatism and militancy with terrorism is not the solution.
At the root of India’s problems, the authors of ‘Dragon on Our Doorstep’ write, is the erroneous belief that a large and well equipped military alone can win wars.
China could take on the US’s attack to try and emerge as a “full fledged super power”.
Casting itself as a humane authority has meant accepting some constraints on its behaviour but, backed with the power of the American military and economic system, the strategy has been a winning one for the US until now.
The paper discusses issues like the Korean nuclear crisis and the South China Sea dispute, as well as ties with the US and India. But it is important to read between the lines to understand the Chinese perspective.
While leadership structure in the army ensures that the jawan gets his due, the same cannot be said for the armed police.
Hardeep Singh Puri’s book highlights the interconnected world where mistrust, violence and injustice are increasing while international covenants fray, and stresses the need for a collective legal framework to deal with them.
One of the government’s biggest failures has been its handling of Kashmir, singularly blaming Pakistan for everything that went wrong without understanding the nature of civil violence in the state.
A hard look at our politics and society suggests it may be a good idea to go by seniority alone till we become more complete ‘Indians’ and our approach to governance is more professional.
The composition of various ‘landing teams’ is perhaps the best indicator of the important sub-cabinet appointments that will be made.
While the demise of the TPP may not be bad for India, the country’s investments in Iran could be in trouble if Donald Trump decides to upend the Iran nuclear agreement.
Any shift in India’s doctrine cannot be based on Pakistan’s actions and neither will the consequences remain confined to the Islamabad-New Delhi dyad. There is a more formidable nuclear state to consider – China.
Apprehensive World Leaders Need Not Worry Yet, the US’s Peculiar Political System Will Keep Trump in Check
At the end of the day,Trump’s policymaking will depend on the team that executes it, and, as of now, no one has a clue about what this team may look like.
Israel’s history, geographical area and position all contribute to its offense-based military strategy; however, the same factors don’t apply to India.
Lt General Ranbir Singh was careful to add that the surgical strike was a one-time affair as an escalation of tension would rebound negatively for India.
Given the conventional parity which exists between India and Pakistan, the outcome of war operations in the western theatre in 1965 and 1971 paints a picture that is still relevant today.
At the end of the day, Modi has to ensure that the options he exercises – particularly the military ones – do not leave the country worse off than before in terms of casualties and costs.
The US hopes India will aid its attempts to confront Chinese assertiveness in the region, but Sino-Russian bonhomie and Beijing’s plans for the South China Sea could prove tough to navigate.
Vietnam wants closer ties with India but is aware of the fact that this will not deter China’s rise.
The biggest problem the government confronts is in determining the typology of the Kashmir uprising – Does it arise from the lack of job opportunities and poor development? Or is it a Pakistani-inspired event as Arun Jaitley suggested the other day?
Where Chanakyan statecraft recommends a mix of approaches to dealing with a problem, the Modi government’s only response has been “dand”, or punishment.
The constitution gives the people inalienable rights, the most precious of which is the right of dissent. Just when dissent or resistance becomes “anti- national” is not for the politicians, policemen and sundry Hindutva outfits to decide.
The way sensible riot control is done is to deploy sizeable numbers before rioters every day and to use attrition as their principal weapon.
China may have denounced the verdict, but it cannot continue to bully its neighbours. The international community must now work to make it part of the solution.
As in Blair’s Britain, the official culture in India is for the military, bureaucracy and intelligence community to tailor their views to those they believe the political leadership wants.
Dikotter maps the prolonged paroxysm of that figure who tormented China and sought to perpetuate his political legacy by destroying what he had himself created.