Extracts from the judgement that impact Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, which criminalises ‘unnatural’ sexual acts
New Delhi: A nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court today ruled that the right to privacy is a fundamental right, that it is intrinsic to life and liberty and comes under Article 21 of the constitution.
While the judgment will have far reaching implications on a range of government policies and actions, it will also impact the status of existing laws to the extent to which they violate a citizen’s right to privacy – a fundamental right as per the court’s landmark ruling. Chief among these laws is Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, which criminalises ‘unnatural’ sexual acts such as anal sex.
Though the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the section, its December 2013 ruling is being challenged once again. And Thursday’s judgment on the right to privacy will strengthen the arguments of those who say the criminalisation of private acts of intimacy by consenting adults is a violation of their fundamental rights.
At least three of the five separate but concurring judgments that made up the Supreme Court’s privacy ruling – the four-judge judgment authored by Justice D.Y. Chandrachud on behalf of the Chief Justice, Justice R.K. Agarwal, himself and Justice Nazeer, and the judgment of Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul – explicitly tackled the implications of privacy as a fundamental right on Section 377 or the sexual orientation of a citizen.
The Wire presents below the relevant extracts.
Excerpt from the judgment of Chief Justice J.S. Khehar and Justices R.K. Agrawal, D.Y. Chandrachud and S. Abdul Nazeer
Suresh Kumar Koushal vs NAZ foundation
Another discordant note which directly bears upon the evolution of the constitutional jurisprudence on the right to privacy finds reflection in a two judge Bench decision of this Court in Suresh Kumar Koushal v NAZ foundation (“Koushal”). The proceedings before this Court arose from a judgment of the Delhi High Court holding that Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, insofar as it criminalises consensual sexual acts of adults in private is violative of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. The Delhi High Court, however, clarified that Section 377 will continue to govern non-consensual penile, non-vaginal sex and penile non-vaginal sex involving minors. Among the grounds of challenge was that the statutory provision constituted an infringement of the rights to dignity and privacy. The Delhi High Court held that:
“…The sphere of privacy allows persons to develop human relations without interference from the outside community or from the State. The exercise of autonomy enables an individual to attain fulfilment, grow in self-esteem, build relationships of his or her choice and fulfil all legitimate goals that he or she may set. In the Indian Constitution, the right to live with dignity and the right of privacy both are recognised as dimensions of Article 21…”
Section 377 was held to be a denial of the dignity of an individual and to criminalise his or her core identity solely on account of sexuality would violate Article 21. The High Court adverted at length to global trends in the protection of privacy – dignity rights of homosexuals, including decisions emanating from the US Supreme Court, the South African Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights. The view of the High Court was that a statutory provision targeting homosexuals as a class violates Article 14, and amounted to a hostile discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation (outlawed by Article 15). The High Court, however, read down Section 377 in the manner which has been adverted to above.
When the matter travelled to this Court, Justice Singhvi, speaking for the Bench dealt with several grounds including the one based on privacy – dignity. The Court recognised that the right to privacy which is recognised by Article 12 of the Universal Declaration and Article 17 of ICCPR has been read into Article 21 “through expansive reading of the right to life and liberty”. This Court, however, found fault with the basis of the judgment of the High Court for the following, among other reasons:
“…the Division Bench of the High Court overlooked that a miniscule fraction of the country’s population constitutes lesbians, gays, bisexuals or transgenders and in last more than 150 years less than 200 persons have been prosecuted (as per the reported orders) for committing offence under Section 377 IPC and this cannot be made sound basis for declaring that section ultra vires the provisions of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution,” (emphasis supplied)
The privacy and dignity based challenge was repelled with the following observations:
“In its anxiety to protect the so-called rights of LGBT persons and to declare that Section 377 IPC violates the right to privacy, autonomy and dignity, the High Court has extensively relied upon the judgments of other jurisdictions. Though these judgments shed considerable light on various aspects of this right and are informative in relation to the plight of sexual minorities, we feel that they cannot be applied blindfolded for deciding the constitutionality of the law enacted by the Indian Legislature.”220 (emphasis supplied)
Neither of the above reasons can be regarded as a valid constitutional basis for disregarding a claim based on privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution. That “a miniscule fraction of the country’s population constitutes lesbians, gays, bisexuals or transgenders” (as observed in the judgment of this Court) is not a sustainable basis to deny the right to privacy. The purpose of elevating certain rights to the stature of guaranteed fundamental rights is to insulate their exercise from the disdain of majorities, whether legislative or popular. The guarantee of constitutional rights does not depend upon their exercise being favourably regarded by majoritarian opinion. The test of popular acceptance does not furnish a valid basis to disregard rights which are conferred with the sanctity of constitutional protection. Discrete and insular minorities face grave dangers of discrimination for the simple reason that their views, beliefs or way of life does not accord with the ‘mainstream’. Yet in a democratic Constitution founded on the rule of law, their rights are as sacred as those conferred on other citizens to protect their freedoms and liberties. Sexual orientation is an essential attribute of privacy. Discrimination against an individual on the basis of sexual orientation is deeply offensive to the dignity and self-worth of the individual. Equality demands that the sexual orientation of each individual in society must be protected on an even platform. The right to privacy and the protection of sexual orientation lie at the core of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.
The view in Koushal that the High Court had erroneously relied upon international precedents “in its anxiety to protect the so-called rights of LGBT. persons” is similarly, in our view, unsustainable. The rights of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender population cannot be construed to be “so-called rights”. The expression “so-called” seems to suggest the exercise of a liberty in the garb of a right which is illusory. This is an inappropriate construction of the privacy based claims of the LGBT population. Their rights are not “so-called” but are real rights founded on sound constitutional doctrine. They inhere in the right to life. They dwell in privacy and dignity. They constitute the essence of liberty and freedom. Sexual orientation is an essential component of identity. Equal protection demands protection of the identity of every individual without discrimination.
The decision in Koushal presents a de minimis rationale when it asserts that there have been only two hundred prosecutions for violating Section 377. The de minimis hypothesis is misplaced because the invasion of a fundamental right is not rendered tolerable when a few, as opposed to a large number of persons, are subjected to hostile treatment. The reason why such acts of hostile discrimination are constitutionally impermissible is because of the chilling effect which they have on the exercise of the fundamental right in the first place. For instance, pre-publication restraints such as censorship are vulnerable because they discourage people from exercising their right to free speech because of the fear of a restraint coming into operation. The chilling effect on the exercise of the right poses a grave danger to the unhindered fulfilment of one’s sexual orientation, as an element of privacy and dignity. The chilling effect is due to the danger of a human being subjected to social opprobrium or disapproval, as reflected in the punishment of crime. Hence the Koushal rationale that prosecution of a few is not an index of violation is flawed and cannot be accepted. Consequently, we disagree with the manner in which Koushal has dealt with the privacy – dignity based claims of LGBT persons on this aspect.
Since the challenge to Section 377 is pending consideration before a larger Bench of this Court, we would leave the constitutional validity to be decided in an appropriate proceeding.
Extracts from judgment of Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul
Here are two aspects of the opinion of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud,J., one of which is common to the opinion of Rohinton F. Nariman, needing specific mention. While considering the evolution of Constitutional jurisprudence on the right of privacy he has referred to the judgment in Suresh Kumar Koushal Vs. Naz Foundation.32 In the challenge laid to Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code before the Delhi High Court, one of the grounds of challenge was that the said provision amounted to an infringement of the right to dignity and privacy. The Delhi High Court, inter alia, observed that the right to live with dignity and the right of privacy both are recognized as dimensions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The view of the High Court, however did not find favour with the Supreme Court and it was observed that only a miniscule fraction of the country’s population constitutes lesbians, gays, bisexuals or transgenders and thus, there cannot be any basis for declaring the Section ultra virus of provisions of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. The matter did not rest at this, as the issue of privacy and dignity discussed by the High Court was also observed upon. The sexual orientation even within the four walls of the house thus became an aspect of debate. I am in agreement with the view of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J., who in paragraphs 123 & 124 of his judgment, states that the right of privacy cannot be denied, even if there is a miniscule fraction of the population which is affected. The majoritarian concept does not apply to Constitutional rights and the Courts are often called up on to take what may be categorized as a non-majoritarian view, in the check and balance of power envisaged under the Constitution of India. Ones sexual orientation is undoubtedly an attribute of privacy. The observations made in Mosley vs. News Group Papers Ltd. 33, in a broader concept may be usefully referred to:
“130… It is not simply a matter of personal privacy versus the public interest. The modern perception is that there is a public interest in respecting personal privacy. It is thus a question of taking account of conflicting public interest considerations and evaluating them according to increasingly well recognized criteria.
When the courts identify an infringement of a person’s Article 8 rights, and in particular in the context of his freedom to conduct his sex life and personal relationships as he wishes, it is right to afford a remedy and to vindicate that right. The only permitted exception is where there is a countervailing public interest which in the particular circumstances is strong enough to outweigh it; that is to say, because one at least of the established “limiting principles” comes into play. Was it necessary and proportionate for the intrusion to take place, for example, in order to expose illegal activity or to prevent the public from being significantly misled by public claims hitherto made by the individual concerned (as with Naomi Campbell’s public denials of drug-taking)? Or was it necessary because the information, in the words of the Strasbourg court in Von Hannover at (60) and (76), would make a contribution to “a debate of general interest”? That is, of course, a very high test, it is yet to be determined how far that doctrine will be taken in the courts of this jurisdiction in relation to photography in public places. If taken literally, it would mean a very significant change in what is permitted. It would have a profound effect on the tabloid and celebrity culture to which we have become accustomed in recent years.”
It is not necessary to delve into this issue further, other than in the context of privacy as that would be an issue to be debated before the appropriate Bench, the matter having been referred to a larger Bench.
Extracts of judgment by Justice S. A. Bobde
Section T, Para 3(F): Privacy includes at its core the preservation of personal intimacies, the sanctity of family life, marriage, procreation, the home and sexual orientation. Privacy also connotes a right to be left alone. Privacy safeguards individual autonomy and recognises the ability of the individual to control vital aspects of his or her life. Personal choices governing a way of life are intrinsic to privacy. Privacy protects heterogeneity and recognises the plurality and diversity of our culture. While the legitimate expectation of privacy may vary from the intimate zone to the private zone and from the private to the public arenas, it is important to underscore that privacy is not lost or surrendered merely because the individual is in a public place. Privacy attaches to the person since it is an essential facet of the dignity of the human being.