Why a Grand Alliance is the Only Way to Defeat the BJP

The likely success of grand alliance in the recent UP polls suggests that the parties the BJP defeated in 2017 will put in a serious effort to get one going at the national level.

Supporters of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) celebrate after learning of the initial poll results outside the party headquarters in Kolkata, India, March 11, 2017. REUTERS/Rupak De Chowdhuri

Supporters of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) celebrate after learning of the initial UP poll results outside the party headquarters in Kolkata, India, March 11, 2017. Credit: Rupak De Chowdhuri/Reuters/Files

There’s nothing like the word ‘mahagathbandhan’ (grand alliance) to make even the most boosterish BJP supporter sweat a little. And it’s not just because of what happened in Bihar in 2015, when an alliance of the Rashtriya Janata Dal, Janata Dal (United) and Indian National Congress (INC) inflicted a defeat on the BJP. Ever since 1977, dominant parties – the INC until the 1980s, the BJP now – have been vulnerable to a united opposition challenge. Which is why Nitish Kumar and Lalu Prasad Yadav have both urged the INC to engineer a national-level grand alliance to break the BJP’s current ascendance.

Uttar Pradesh is of course the lynchpin of the BJP’s national dominance, having contributed 71 of its 282 Lok Sabha seats in 2014. That is why its recent state election victory was such good news for the party, since it places the BJP on a strong footing for the 2019 election, only two years away now.

The best way to stop the BJP juggernaut, at this point, seems to be a mahagathbandhan in UP. After the Emergency, an opposition alliance forced the INC’s Lok Sabha seats in UP down from 73 (of 85) in 1971 to exactly zero in 1977. Its state assembly tally fell from 215 in 1974 to 47 in 1977. Little more than a decade later, another grand alliance knocked the INC down from 83 Lok Sabha seats in 1984 to 15 in 1989. In the state assembly, the INC dropped from 269 seats in 1985 to 94 in 1989. Grand alliances in UP have proved effective in countering dominant political parties.

Like the previous instances, a UP grand alliance might not be more than a stopgap. The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and Samajwadi Party (SP) have a history of animosity that won’t be easy to overcome, though the INC could play mediator between former rivals as it did in Bihar.

So what impact might a mahagathbandhan have had on the just completed state elections? Here’s what the new UP state assembly looks like.

A simple addition exercise shows that the BJP and its allies exceeded the combined vote share of the SP, BSP and INC in 115 state assembly seats. If we include the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD), this number drops to 101.

What about the Lok Sabha? The BJP and its allies won more votes than a theoretical mahagathbandhan in only 25 seats (24 if you include the RLD), compared with its 2014 tally of 73. The BJP would still have won the national election, but its Lok Sabha tally would have been down to (a still impressive) 236.

There are obvious caveats: it’s not clear that parties’s vote banks will seamlessly transfer to grand alliance partners. Some portion of BSP and SP voters who dislike the other party could instead vote for a third party, which could even be the BJP. Or party workers could be unenthusiastic for a candidate in their constituency from a different party. For instance, INC candidates on average won fewer votes in the 2017 UP election than did SP candidates, which political scientist Gilles Verniers sees as evidence that “SP supporters did not transfer their votes to Congress supporters to the same extent that Congress supporters did”.

On the other hand, a grand alliance that looks like a potential winner could gain votes purely on momentum. The Centre for the Study of Developing Societies’ 2014 National Election Study found strong evidence for such a bandwagon effect – 43% of voters said that they chose the party they thought was leading the race.

Either way, the compelling logic of a grand alliance in UP suggests that the parties the BJP defeated in 2017 will put in a serious effort to get one going. Whether it happens or not is the 80-seat question.

This article originally appeared on Chunauti. Read the original article.

  • Siddhartha

    The issue with a ‘Mahagathbandhan” is that while it may be a good short term strategy to win back power, they result in a more confused polity as alliance partners differ on ideology, priorities and are vulnerable to regional pulls and pressures. At the end of the day, they collapse under the weight of their internal paradoxes and rigid dichotomies. The opportunistic instincts that come to the fore in forging a “Mahagathbandhan” also detract from honest introspection and an analyses of strengths and weaknesses of the individual parties that form part of the alliance. The Grand Alliance in Bihar achieved great success, but for the Congress it was essentially kicking the can down the road. It camouflaged the organizational weaknesses at the grassroots level, the marginalization in Bihar politics, and leadership weaknesses. Moreover, most “Mahagathbandhan” experiments have ended in unstable formations at the Centre, such as 1977-79, 89-91, and 96-98, and the nation and the electorate are the losers. It would be interesting to see whether the landscape changes over the next few years and new political blocs emerge that reflect more concrete ideologies rather than the same fuzzy and nebulous “secular” tent. The ideal choices would be 3 national parties that represent the ideological spectrum (with low standard deviation) of center-left, center, and center-right, and the fringe is kept out.